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ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СУДА ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ОТ 25.04.1983 ПАКЕЛЛИ (PAKELLI) ПРОТИВ ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГЕРМАНИИ [РУС. (ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ), АНГЛ.]

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  • ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СУДА ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ОТ 25.04.1983 ПАКЕЛЛИ (PAKELLI) ПРОТИВ ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГЕРМАНИИ [РУС. (ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ), АНГЛ.]

    (по состоянию на 20 октября 2006 года)

                                                   [неофициальный перевод]
       
                      ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
                                       
                               СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
                     ПАКЕЛЛИ (PAKELLI) ПРОТИВ ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ
                              РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГЕРМАНИИ
                                       
                       (Страсбург, 25 апреля 1983 года)
       
                                 (Извлечение)
       
              КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
       
                               A. Основные факты
       
           Заявитель, гражданин Турции, родившийся в 1937 г., был  осужден
       участковым  судом  Хейлбронна 30 апреля  1976  г.  и  приговорен  к
       тюремному  заключению  за  участие  в  торговле  наркотиками.   Его
       адвокат  г-н  Вингертер обратился с жалобой  в  порядке  ревизии  в
       Федеральную судебную палату - высшую судебную инстанцию.  В  жалобе
       он  указал на ряд процессуальных нарушений, в том числе статьи  146
       Уголовно-процессуального   кодекса,  который   запрещает   адвокату
       защищать  обвиняемого,  если  ранее  он  защищал  одного   из   его
       соучастников.   Таким  образом,  г-н  Вингертер   указал   как   на
       процессуальное  нарушение  свое  собственное  участие  в  процессе.
       Однако  в  принятии жалобы к рассмотрению было отказано,  поскольку
       она   была   подана   адвокатом,  не  имевшим  право   представлять
       заявителя.
           После того как ревизионная жалоба была подана другим адвокатом,
       г-ном  Раушенбушем, она была принята к рассмотрению. Однако  палата
       по  уголовным  делам Федерального суда отказалась допустить  его  к
       слушанию  дела,  поскольку  он  участвовал  в  процессе  Пакелли  в
       качестве   защитника   другого   обвиняемого.   Палата   отказалась
       назначить  г-ну  Пакелли официального защитника, поскольку  законом
       для  рассмотрения дела в высшей судебной инстанции такое назначение
       не  предусмотрено, а в слушании может участвовать сам г-н  Пакелли.
       Последний  к  этому времени был освобожден из тюрьмы и  вернулся  в
       Турцию.  Он  утверждал, что не имеет финансовых  возможностей  быть
       представленным  другим  адвокатом. В результате  дело  слушалось  в
       отсутствие  г-на Пакелли и адвоката и в удовлетворении жалобы  было
       отказано.
           Г-н  Пакелли подал жалобу в Федеральный Конституционный  Суд  в
       январе  1978  г.  В постановлении, вынесенном 10 мая,  коллегия  из
       трех  судей приняла решение не принимать жалобу к рассмотрению  как
       не имеющую достаточных перспектив успешного разрешения.
       
               B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
       
           В  жалобе,  поданной в Комиссию в октябре 1978 г., г-н  Пакелли
       утверждал,  что  отказ  суда назначить ему  официального  защитника
       нарушил  его  право  на  справедливое  разбирательство  на   основе
       состязательности  (статья  6  п.  1  Конвенции)  и  его  право   на
       бесплатную юридическую помощь (статья 6 п. 3 "c").
           7  мая 1981 г. Комиссия объявила жалобу частично приемлемой.  В
       своем  докладе от 12 декабря 1981 г. она выразила мнение, что имело
       место  нарушение  статьи 6 п. 3 "c" (единогласно) и  что  выяснять,
       имело  ли  место  также и нарушение статьи 6  п.  1,  не  требуется
       (одиннадцатью голосами против одного).
           Дело   было   передано   в  Суд  Комиссией   и   Правительством
       Федеративной Республики Германии соответственно 14 и  24  мая  1982
       г.
       
                        ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
       
                                 ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
       
           29.  Заявитель  жаловался на отказ палаты  по  уголовным  делам
       Федерального   суда  назначить  г-на  Раушенбуша  его   официальным
       адвокатом на слушаниях 29 ноября 1977 г. по его ревизионной  жалобе
       в  суде; он утверждал, что такой отказ представляет собой нарушение
       статьи 6 п. 1 и п. 3 "c" Конвенции.
           Никем  не  оспаривалось, что эти нормы применимы  к  настоящему
       случаю,  и  Суд  отмечает  этот  факт  установленным  (см.  mutatis
       mutandis Решение по делу Делькура от 17 января 1970 г. Серия A,  т.
       11,  с. 13 - 15, п. 25 и 26, а также Решение по делу Артико  от  13
       мая  1980  г.  Серия  A, т. 37, с. 15 - 18, п.  31  -  38).  Однако
       Правительство  справедливо указало, что то, как  следует  применять
       эти  нормы, зависит от особенностей конкретного процесса, о котором
       идет  речь  (см. вышеупомянутое Судебное решение по делу  Делькура,
       там же).
       
                I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 3 "c"
       
           30. Статья 6 п. 3 "c"
           "Каждый    человек,   обвиняемый   в   совершении    уголовного
       преступления, имеет как минимум следующие права:
           ...
           c) защищать себя лично или через посредство выбранного им самим
       защитника  или,  если  у него нет достаточных  средств  для  оплаты
       услуг  защитника, иметь назначенного ему защитника бесплатно, когда
       того требуют интересы правосудия;
           ... "
           На слушаниях в Комиссии Правительство утверждало, что статья  6
       п.  3  "c"  не требует предоставления бесплатной правовой помощи  в
       данном  случае,  так  как  г-н Пакелли  мог  бы  лично  явиться  на
       слушание  дела  в Федеральной судебной палате. В Суде Правительство
       не  останавливалось  на этом вопросе подробно,  но  повторило,  что
       заявитель мог бы сам представить свое дело в Федеральном суде.
           31.  Статья  6  п.  3  "c"  гарантирует  лицу,  обвиненному   в
       совершении  уголовного  преступления,  три  права:  защищать   себя
       лично;  иметь  выбранного им самим защитника  и,  при  определенных
       условиях,  иметь назначенного ему защитника бесплатно. В английском
       тексте для установления связи между соответствующими выражениями  в
       каждом  случае  используется разделительный союз  "или";  с  другой
       стороны,  во французском тексте эквивалент данного союза -  "ou"  -
       используется  только  для  соединения  фраз,  излагающих  первое  и
       второе  право,  а  между  вторым  и  третьим  стоит  союз  "и".   В
       подготовительных    работах   трудно    найти    объяснение    этим
       лингвистическим  различиям. Единственное, что они  показывают,  это
       то,  что  в процессе заключительного рассмотрения проекта Конвенции
       накануне  ее  подписания комитет экспертов  внес  "некоторое  число
       формальных  исправлений  и  исправлений перевода",  включая  замену
       союза  "и" на союз "или" в английском варианте статьи 6  п.  3  "c"
       (Recueil  des  Travaux  {Preparatoires}  <*>,  т.  IV,  с.   1010).
       Учитывая   предмет  и  цель  данного  пункта,  назначение  которого
       состоит  в том, чтобы обеспечить эффективную защиту прав на  защиту
       (см. вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Артико. Серия A, т. 37, с.  16,
       п.  33;  см. также mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Адольфа  от  26
       марта  1982  г.  Серия A, т. 49, с. 15, п. 30, и  Решение  по  делу
       "Санди  таймс" от 26 апреля 1979 г. Серия A, т. 30, с. 30, п.  48),
       французский  текст  служит  здесь более  надежным  ориентиром;  Суд
       согласен  с  Комиссией  по данному вопросу. Соответственно  "каждый
       обвиняемый  в  совершении уголовного преступления", кто  не  желает
       защищать себя лично, должен иметь возможность прибегнуть к  услугам
       выбранного им самим защитника; если у него нет достаточных  средств
       для  оплаты такого защитника, то, на основании Конвенции,  защитник
       должен   быть  ему  предоставлен  бесплатно,  когда  того   требуют
       интересы правосудия.
       --------------------------------
           <*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
       латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
       
           Таким  образом, г-н Пакелли, хотя германское право и  разрешало
       ему   лично   предстать  перед  Федеральным  судом,  мог  требовать
       предоставления  ему  юридической помощи в той  мере,  в  какой  это
       удовлетворяло условиям, установленным в статье 6 п. 3 "c".
       
            A. Отсутствие достаточных средств для оплаты защитника
       
           32.  Доводы  Правительства сводились к следующему. Нет  ничего,
       что  бы  подтверждало утверждение заявителя о том, что у  него  нет
       достаточных  средств  для  оплаты выбранного  им  самим  защитника;
       наоборот,  он  сам заявил в участковом суде, что он очень  прилично
       зарабатывал   в   Федеративной   Республике   Германии;    согласно
       констатирующей части Судебного решения от 30 апреля  1976  г.  (см.
       п.  11  выше),  он  также зарабатывал деньги,  торгуя  наркотиками;
       кроме того, вскоре после возвращения в Турцию он открыл свое дело.
           Комиссия   считала,  что  Правительство  не  вправе  оспаривать
       утверждения  заявителя на данной стадии. Она  отметила  также,  что
       немецкое  право не связывает с неплатежеспособностью предоставление
       бесплатного защитника лицу, оказавшемуся под судом. Кроме того,  г-
       н  Раушенбуш предложил до слушания представить сертификат о статусе
       бедности  (см.  п.  16  выше), но Федеральный  суд  не  принял  это
       предложение.
           33.  Суд  не  может согласиться с Комиссией по  этому  вопросу.
       Вопрос  о средствах г-на Пакелли не играл никакой роли в обжалуемом
       решении:  отказ в просьбе о назначении г-на Раушенбуша  основывался
       исключительно  на том факте, что, по мнению председателя  уголовной
       палаты  Федерального  суда,  данный  случай  не  подпадал  под   ту
       категорию  дел,  где  в  соответствии  с  немецким  правом   помощь
       защитника  была  обязательной  (см.  п.  16  выше).  Соответственно
       Правительство  не  утратило в контексте статьи 6  п.  3  "c"  права
       оспаривать перед учреждениями Конвенции утверждение заявителя,  что
       он был беден.
           34. Тем не менее следует признать, что и было сделано делегатом
       Комиссии, что сегодня практически невозможно доказать, что  в  1977
       г.  у  г-на  Пакелли  не было средств для оплаты своего  защитника.
       Есть  лишь  некоторые признаки того, что это было именно  так.  Нет
       никаких  причин предполагать, что г-н Раушенбуш не смог бы получить
       вышеупомянутый сертификат; в этой связи следует отметить,  что  его
       клиент  провел под стражей в Федеративной Республике  Германии  два
       года  до его возвращения в Турцию в 1976 г. (см. п. 15 и 19  выше).
       Кроме  того,  г-н  Пакелли  представил  в  Комиссию  заявление   об
       имущественном   положении  и  справки  от   компетентных   турецких
       властей,   основанные   на  декларации  о  доходах   и   имуществе,
       представленной  им при уплате налогов за предыдущий  год;  из  этих
       документов   явствует,  что  он  занимался  бизнесом  в   небольших
       масштабах  и  его  финансовое положение было весьма  скромным.  Эти
       данные  -  которые,  более того, не оспаривались  Правительством  -
       побудили  Комиссию  предоставить ему бесплатную юридическую  помощь
       (см. п. 27 выше).
           Конечно,  этих  частностей  недостаточно,  чтобы  доказать  вне
       всяких  сомнений,  что в рассматриваемый период  времени  заявитель
       был    неплатежеспособен;   однако,   учитывая   его    предложение
       Федеральному суду доказать, что у него нет средств, и в  отсутствие
       четких  подтверждений противного, Суд склонен рассматривать  первое
       из   двух   условий,  содержащихся  в  статье  6  п.  3  "c",   как
       выполненное.
       
                            B. Интересы правосудия
       
           35.  Согласно мнению заявителя и Комиссии, интересы  правосудия
       требовали,  чтобы  г-н Раушенбуш был официально назначен  адвокатом
       заявителя на слушаниях в Федеральном суде от 29 ноября 1977 г.
           Оспаривая  эту  точку зрения, Правительство выделило  следующие
       моменты.  У  г-на  Пакелли был защитник на той  стадии  письменного
       производства;  что касается слушаний, то их предмет  был  ограничен
       основанием  принесения жалобы по вопросам права:  Судебное  решение
       от   30   апреля  1976  г.  оспаривалось  единственно  по   причине
       предполагаемых  процессуальных ошибок, заявитель не  мог  выдвигать
       новых  жалоб  и  дополнять свой меморандум,  в  котором  излагались
       основания  для  жалобы, ссылками на другие факты. В  ходе  слушаний
       речь  могла  идти  только  об  аргументах  и  выводах  юридического
       характера.  Затронутые проблемы не являлись сложными, и  вынесенное
       по  ним решение не могло повлечь серьезные последствия. Кроме того,
       г-н  Пакелли  мог  бы  явиться на суд лично.  И  наконец,  Комиссия
       неправильно  представляет  себе роль  федеральной  прокуратуры  при
       рассмотрении жалоб по вопросам права. Она с совершенно  независимых
       позиций  изучает  мотивировку  жалобы  и  следит  за  согласованным
       применением   закона  и  единообразием  судебной  практики;   таким
       образом,  эта  задача  очень  близка той  роли,  которую  выполняет
       Генеральный   прокурор   при   Кассационном   суде   Бельгии   (см.
       вышеупомянутое Судебное решение по делу Делькура).
           36.  Суд,  как это ранее сделала Комиссия, отмечает,  что,  во-
       первых,  это был один из тех редких случаев, когда Федеральный  суд
       проводил  слушания:  в  уголовных делах  это  происходит  только  в
       десяти  процентах жалоб по вопросам права (см. п. 23 выше). Тем  не
       менее   в   данном  случае  Федеральный  суд  практически  оказался
       обязанным   провести  устное  разбирательство,  т.к.  жалоба   была
       приемлемой, а прокуратура не требовала отклонить ее как явно  плохо
       обоснованную (статья 349 Уголовно-процессуального кодекса;  см.  п.
       23  выше). Это показывает, что слушание могло бы иметь существенное
       значение   для   вынесения   решения.   Поэтому   для   обеспечения
       справедливого  судебного  разбирательства принцип  состязательности
       приобретал важное значение.
           37.  Федеральному  суду предстояло вынести  решение  только  по
       вопросам,  на  которые указал, а позднее подробно изложил  в  своей
       жалобе  заявитель (см. п. 13 выше), а он ограничился лишь указанием
       на процессуальные ошибки (статья 344 з 2 и статья 352 з 1 Уголовно-
       процессуального  кодекса).  Если  бы  его  адвокат   участвовал   в
       слушании,  г-н  Пакелли  получил  бы  возможность  обосновать  свои
       жалобы,   представить,   в  случае  необходимости,   дополнительные
       подробности  и  развить  свои письменные  аргументы.  Он  смог  бы,
       например,  прокомментировать изложение дела  судьей  -  докладчиком
       (статья  351  Уголовно-процессуального кодекса; см.  п.  25  выше).
       Возможность  выступления  в  ходе судебного  слушания  представляла
       большую  ценность,  поскольку жалоба - весьма объемный  документ  -
       затрагивала девятнадцать различных вопросов.
           Как  справедливо  указала  Комиссия, один  из  содержавшихся  в
       жалобе   вопросов  касался  применения  новой  версии  статьи   146
       Уголовно-процессуального кодекса. Третья палата по уголовным  делам
       Федерального суда ранее, в 1976 г., вынесла решение, что жалоба  по
       вопросам  права,  основывающаяся на данной статье,  не  может  быть
       успешной,  если только защита одним адвокатом нескольких обвиняемых
       фактически  мешала  бы  интересам защиты  (см.  п.  26  выше).  Г-н
       Раушенбуш  не  оспаривал  такое  толкование.  Однако  он  стремился
       показать,  что  в данном деле имел место конфликт интересов.  Кроме
       того,   можно  было  предвидеть,  что  Судебное  решение,   которое
       собирался  вынести  Федеральный  суд,  было  бы  немаловажным   для
       развития   судебной  практики,  которое  -  и  это  также  признало
       Правительство - остановилось после вынесения Судебного  решения  от
       29  ноября 1977 г., которым была отклонена жалоба заявителя. В этой
       связи  толкование статьи 146 в ходе устных прений  представляло  бы
       определенный интерес.
           38.  Само  собой  разумеется,  что в  подобных  обстоятельствах
       личное   присутствие   заявителя  не   смогло   бы   компенсировать
       отсутствия  его  адвоката:  без  услуг  практикующего  юриста   г-н
       Пакелли   не   смог  бы  внести  полезный  вклад   в   рассмотрение
       возникающих  правовых  вопросов  и,  в  частности,  по  статье  146
       Уголовно-процессуального кодекса. Суд разделяет мнение Комиссии  по
       данному вопросу.
           39.  И  наконец, самое главное: судебное разбирательство жалобы
       по  настоящему  делу не было состязательным, во  всяком  случае  на
       стадии  устных  слушаний. Даже на этапе письменного разбирательства
       только   одна  служба  прокурора  при  участковом  суде  Хейлбронна
       представила  возражения на жалобу, поданную г-ном Пакелли,  который
       в  то время еще был представлен г-ном Раушенбушем, но и она не дала
       ответ  по  существу  оснований, приведенных в  жалобе  (см.  п.  14
       выше).  Относительно федеральной прокуратуры - какой бы ни была  ее
       роль  на кассационной стадии - германское право позволяло заявителю
       оспаривать  ее письменные представления (статья 349 з  3  Уголовно-
       процессуального кодекса; см. п. 23 выше). Соответственно,  если  бы
       Федеральный  суд  не принял решение провести слушания,  федеральная
       прокуратура  представила  бы  свои  выводы  в  письменном  виде   и
       сообщила  о  них  заявителю, а последний,  на  что  он  справедливо
       указал,   получил   бы  возможность  изучить   их   и,   в   случае
       необходимости, ответить на них.
           Подобная  возможность опровергнуть доводы прокуратуры во  время
       слушаний  должна  была  быть также предоставлена  и  г-ну  Пакелли.
       Отказавшись  назначить  ему защитника на  устной  стадии  судебного
       разбирательства,  Федеральный  суд лишил  его  возможности  оказать
       влияние  на  исход дела, возможности, которую он бы сохранил,  если
       бы процесс целиком был письменным.
           40.  В  подобных обстоятельствах Суд, как и Комиссия,  считает,
       что   интересы   правосудия   требовали,   чтобы   заявителю   была
       предоставлена помощь защитника в ходе слушаний в Федеральном суде.
       
                                   C. Вывод
       
           41.  Соответственно имело место нарушение статьи  6  п.  3  "c"
       Конвенции.
       
                 II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 1
       
           42.  Применительно  к  тем же самым фактам  заявитель  ссылался
       также на статью 6 п. 1, которая гласит:
           "Каждый  человек  имеет право при определении  его  гражданских
       прав   и   обязанностей  или  при  рассмотрении  любого  уголовного
       обвинения,   предъявляемого  ему,  на  справедливое   и   публичное
       разбирательство  дела в разумный срок независимым и беспристрастным
       судом,  созданным на основании закона. Судебное решение объявляется
       публично, однако пресса и публика могут не допускаться на  судебные
       заседания  в  течение всего процесса или его части по  соображениям
       морали,  общественного порядка или государственной  безопасности  в
       демократическом  обществе,  а  также когда  того  требуют  интересы
       несовершеннолетних или для защиты частной жизни  сторон,  или  -  в
       той  мере,  в  какой это, по мнению суда, строго необходимо  -  при
       особых   обстоятельствах,  когда  гласность  нарушала  бы  интересы
       правосудия".
           Правительство  не  выдвинуло каких-либо  отдельных  доводов  по
       данной проблеме.
           Соглашаясь  с  Комиссией,  Суд хотел бы  напомнить,  что  норма
       статьи  6 п. 3 "c" представляет собой конкретное применение  общего
       принципа справедливого судебного разбирательства, изложенного в  п.
       1  (см. Решение по делу Девеера от 27 февраля 1980 г. Серия  A,  т.
       35,  с.  30, п. 56). Соответственно, вопрос о том, был ли  соблюден
       п.   1,  не  имеет  реального  значения  для  дела  заявителя;   он
       поглощается вопросом о том, были ли выполнены требования п. 3  "c".
       Установление  нарушения  требований  п.  3  "c"  избавляет  Суд  от
       необходимости рассмотрения данного дела в свете п. 1  (см.  mutatis
       mutandis  вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Девеера. Серия A,  т.  35,
       с. 30 - 31, п. 56).
       
                           III. Применение статьи 50
       
           43.  Г-н  Пакелли  потребовал справедливого  удовлетворения  на
       основании  статьи  50.  Прежде всего  он  просил  Суд  аннулировать
       Решение  Федерального суда от 29 ноября 1977  г.  и  дать  указание
       Правительству    выразить   официальное    неодобрение    некоторых
       содержащихся   в   нем  пассажей,  которые  он   рассматривал   как
       расистские  или  дискриминационные,  а  потому  неприемлемые.   Во-
       вторых,  он  просил выплатить ему справедливое возмещение,  которое
       Суд  сочтет  подобающим, за причиненный моральный вред. И  наконец,
       он   потребовал  возмещения  издержек  и  расходов,   связанных   с
       судопроизводством в Федеральном Конституционном  Суде,  которые  он
       определил в размере 668,96 немецкой марки.
           44.   В  представлении  Правительства  утверждалось,  что   эти
       разнообразные  требования должны быть отвергнуты.  Оно  настаивало,
       что  отказ  Федерального суда назначить ему  официального  адвоката
       нисколько  не  повредил  заявителю и что  его  критика  причин,  по
       которым  суд  вынес такое решение, была необоснованна. Относительно
       издержек   и   расходов   по  обращению  в   Конституционный   Суд,
       Правительство  не  считало  установленным  то,  что   г-н   Пакелли
       вынужден  был их нести; оно заявило также, что требуемая  сумма  не
       совсем   точно   соответствует  шкале   ставок,   применявшихся   в
       рассматриваемый период времени.
           45.  Суд считает, что в данных обстоятельствах вопрос готов для
       решения (первое предложение статьи 50 п. 3 Регламента Суда).
           Суд  отмечает  в  отношении  первого  требования,  что  он   на
       основании  Конвенции  не уполномочен ни отменять  Судебные  решения
       Федерального  суда, ни давать Правительству указания  дезавуировать
       те  выдержки  из него, на которые жалуется заявитель  (см.  mutatis
       mutandis Решение по делу Маркс от 13 июня 1979 г. Серия A,  т.  31,
       с.  25,  п.  58,  и Решение по делу Даджена от 24 февраля  1983  г.
       Серия  A,  т.  59, с. 8, п. 15). Не выражая какого-либо  мнения  по
       поводу  данных  выдержек, Суд полагает, что  их  наличие  не  может
       рассматриваться как следствие нарушения статьи 6 п. 3 "c".
           46.  Как  справедливо указало Правительство, г-н  Вингертер  не
       только не доказал наличие морального вреда, но и не указал,  в  чем
       он  заключался.  Нет  ничего,  что бы  показывало,  что  отсутствие
       защитника   вызвало  у  г-на  Пакелли  давящее  ощущение  изоляции,
       замешательства  и  чувства покинутости (см. вышеупомянутое  Решение
       по  делу  Артико. Серия A, т. 37, с. 21, п. 47); эта версия кажется
       маловероятной, так как уже в августе 1976 г. он вернулся в  Турцию.
       Во  всяком  случае установление факта нарушения настоящим  Решением
       уже  представляет собой достаточную компенсацию за якобы понесенный
       моральный вред (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Ле Конта,  Ван
       Левена и Де Мейера от 18 октября 1982 г. Серия A, т. 54, с.  8,  п.
       16).
           47.  Издержки и расходы, о возмещении которых идет  речь,  были
       понесены  с  тем,  чтобы Федеральный Конституционный  Суд  исправил
       нарушения требований статьи 6 п. 3 "c" (см. вышеупомянутое  Решение
       по  делу Даджена. Серия A, т. 59, с. 9, п. 20). Более того, это  не
       оспаривалось  и  Правительством. Однако  Правительство  утверждало,
       что  эти  расходы нес защитник заявителя, а не он сам, так как  г-н
       Вингертер  отказался от вознаграждения и, более  того,  по  причине
       пропуска  срока  исковой  давности он утратил  право  на  взыскание
       долга.
           И  действительно,  до сих пор г-н Пакелли  не  заплатил  своему
       адвокату   за   представительство  его  интересов   в   Федеральном
       Конституционном  Суде:  г-н Вингертер  не  направлял  ему  счет  за
       оказанные  услуги  до 7 февраля 1982 г., и, как  он  заявляет,  это
       было  сделано  для  того, чтобы отсрочить оплату  вознаграждения  с
       учетом   финансовых  трудностей  заявителя.  В  памятной   записке,
       направленной  в Комиссию 16 февраля 1982 г., г-н Вингертер  указал,
       что  он не получил еще какой-либо платы за услуги, оказанные в ходе
       судебного  разбирательства, о котором идет  речь,  и  не  просил  о
       таковых, так как он знал, что у его клиента нет средств.
           Тем   не   менее   ни  эти  заявления,  ни  другие   документы,
       представленные  в Суд, не показывают с достаточной  четкостью,  что
       имел  место  отказ  от права получения вознаграждения.  И  в  самом
       деле,  как справедливо указал делегат Комиссии, неудивительно,  что
       г-н  Вингертер, зная финансовое положение своего клиента, решил  не
       выставлять  ему счет за проделанную работу на более  ранней  стадии
       (см.  Решение  по  делу  X против Соединенного  Королевства  от  18
       октября  1982  г.  Серия A, т. 55, с. 18,  п.  24).  Суд  хотел  бы
       указать, как это уже было сделано делегатом Комиссии, что  в  делах
       о   правах  человека  адвокат,  оказывая  помощь  тому,  кто  не  в
       состоянии сразу ему заплатить, действует во всеобщем интересе.
           Относительно  довода,  основанного на истечении  срока  исковой
       давности на право г-на Вингертера взыскать причитающийся ему  долг,
       это  не  вопрос  публичного порядка, и здесь следует положиться  на
       решение самого г-на Пакелли.
           Принимая  решение  на основе справедливости, Суд  находит,  что
       сумма  в 668,96 немецкой марки, требуемая в порядке компенсации  за
       услуги защитника и за расходы, является разумной.
       
                      ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
       
           1.  Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи  6  п.  3  "c"
       Конвенции;
           2.  Постановил,  что  рассматривать данное  дело  на  основании
       статьи 6 п. 1 нет необходимости;
           3.  Постановил,  что  государство - ответчик  должно  выплатить
       заявителю за понесенные им юридические издержки и расходы  сумму  в
       размере  шестисот  шестидесяти восьми немецких  марок  и  девяноста
       шести   пфеннигов   (DM  668,96),  и  отвергает  оставшуюся   часть
       требования о справедливом возмещении.
       
           Совершено   на   английском   и  французском   языках,   причем
       французский  текст является аутентичным, и оглашено во Дворце  прав
       человека в Страсбурге 25 апреля 1983 г.
       
                                                              Председатель
                                                              Жерар ВИАРДА
       
                                                                    Грефье
                                                         Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
       
       
       
       
       
       
                        EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
                                       
                          CASE OF PAKELLI v. GERMANY
                                       
                                   JUDGMENT
                                       
                           (Strasbourg, 25.IV.1983)
       
           In the Pakelli case,
           The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
       Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of  Human
       Rights   and  Fundamental  Freedoms  ("the  Convention")  and   the
       relevant  provisions  of  the Rules of  Court  <*>,  as  a  Chamber
       composed of the following judges:
       -------------------------------
           <*>  Note  by  the  registry:  In  the  version  of  the  Rules
       applicable  when proceedings were instituted. A revised version  of
       the  Rules of Court entered into force on 1 January 1983, but  only
       in respect of cases referred to the Court after that date.
       
           Mr. G. Wiarda, President,
           Mr. R. Ryssdal,
           Mr. L. Liesch,
           Mr. L.-E. Pettiti,
           Mr. B. Walsh,
           Mr. R. Bernhardt,
           Mr. J. Gersing,
           and  also  Mr.  M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and  Mr.  H.  Petzold,
       Deputy Registrar,
           Having  deliberated in private on 26 November 1982  and  on  23
       March 1983,
           Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
       mentioned date:
       
                                   PROCEDURE
       
           1.  The  present case was referred to the Court by the European
       Commission  of  Human Rights ("the Commission") and the  Government
       of  the  Federal Republic of Germany ("the Government").  The  case
       originated  in  an  application (no. 8398/78)  against  that  State
       lodged  with  the  Commission on 5 October 1978  under  Article  25
       (art.  25)  of  the Convention by a Turkish national,  Mr.  {Lutfu}
       Pakelli.
           2.  The  Commission's request and the Government's  application
       were  lodged  with the registry of the Court within the  period  of
       three  months laid down by Articles 32 para. 1 and 47  (art.  32-1,
       art. 47) - the former on 14 May and the latter on 24 May 1982.  The
       request  referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48)  and  to
       the  declaration whereby the Federal Republic of Germany recognised
       the  compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46)  (art.  46);
       its  purpose  was to obtain a decision as to whether or  not  there
       had  been a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under
       Article  6  para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c). The application  invited  the
       Court to hold that there had been no such breach.
           3.  The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included,  as
       ex  officio members, Mr. R. Bernhardt, the elected judge of  German
       nationality (Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention),  and  Mr.  G.
       Wiarda,  the  President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3  (b)  of  the
       Rules of Court). On 28 May 1982, the President drew by lot, in  the
       presence  of  the Registrar, the names of the five  other  members,
       namely  Mr. R. Ryssdal, Mr. M. Zekia, Mr. L. Liesch, {Mr. E. Garcia
       de  Enterria} and Mr. B. Walsh (Article 43 (art. 43) in fine of the
       Convention  and Rule 21 para. 4). Subsequently, Mr.  L.-E.  Pettiti
       and  Mr. J. Gersing, substitute judges, took the place of Mr. Zekia
       and  {Mr. Garcia de Enterria}, who were prevented from taking  part
       in  the  consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1 and  24  para.
       1).
           4.  Mr. Wiarda, who had assumed the office of President of  the
       Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), ascertained, through the Registrar,  the
       views  of  the  Agent  of the Government and the  Delegate  of  the
       Commission regarding the procedure to be followed. On 9 June  1982,
       having  particular  regard  to  their  concurring  statements,   he
       concluded  that there was no need for memorials to be filed.  After
       consulting,  through  the  Deputy  Registrar,  the  Agent  of   the
       Government  and  the  Delegate  of the  Commission,  the  President
       directed on 4 October that the oral proceedings should open  on  25
       November 1982.
           On  2 November, the Registrar, on the President's instructions,
       requested  the  Commission and the Government  to  produce  several
       documents; these were received on 5, 22 and 23 November.
           5.  The  hearings  were  held in public  at  the  Human  Rights
       Building,  Strasbourg,  on  25 November.  Immediately  before  they
       opened,  the  Chamber  had  held  a  preparatory  meeting;  it  had
       authorised  the Agent and the advocates of the Government  and  the
       person  assisting the Delegate of the Commission to use the  German
       language (Rule 27 paras. 2 and 3).
           There appeared before the Court:
           - for the Government:
           Mrs. I. Maier, Ministerialdirigentin at the Federal Ministry of
       Justice, Agent,
           Mr.  P.  Riess,  Ministerialrat  at  the  Federal  Ministry  of
       Justice,
           Mr.  W. Stiller, Regierungsdirektor at the Federal Ministry  of
       Justice, Advisers;
           - for the Commission:
           Mr. J.A. Frowein, Delegate,
           Mr. N. Wingerter, the applicant's lawyer before the Commission,
       assisting  the Delegate (Rule 29 para. 1, second sentence,  of  the
       Rules of Court).
           The  Court heard addresses by Mrs. Maier and Mr. Riess for  the
       Government   and  by  Mr.  Frowein  and  Mr.  Wingerter   for   the
       Commission,  as  well  as their replies to  its  questions.  On  26
       November,  in  response  to a request which  he  had  made  on  the
       instructions  of  the  President, the  Registrar  received  certain
       documents from the Commission.
           6.  On 20 December, the Commission transmitted to the Court the
       applicant's claims under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention.
           In  accordance with the Orders and directions of the President,
       the registry received the following documents on this issue:
           - on 20 January 1983, the comments of the Government;
           -  on  9 and 10 February 1983, the observations of the Delegate
       of  the  Commission  and,  through him,  the  observations  of  the
       applicant.
       
                                   THE FACTS
       
                       I. The circumstances of the case
       
           7.  Mr.  Pakelli, a Turkish national born in 1937, is currently
       living  in  Turkey;  he  was resident in the  Federal  Republic  of
       Germany from 1964 to 1976.
           8.  The  applicant arrived in the Federal Republic in  February
       1964  and  was  engaged by the firm of Audi-NSU at  Neckarsulm.  He
       stayed  there  for  two and a half years. Subsequently,  he  had  a
       succession  of different occupations: mechanic in another  firm  at
       Neckarsulm,  manager  of  a restaurant, independent  insurance  and
       building-loans   broker.   The   last-mentioned   activity,   which
       consisted  of  negotiating  and  concluding,  for  example,   life-
       insurance  and  savings  contracts with Turkish  workers,  provided
       him, as he himself stated, with a very good monthly income.
           9.  On  31 May 1972, the Heilbronn District Court (Amtsgericht)
       imposed  on  him  a suspended sentence of ten months'  imprisonment
       for      an      offence     against     the     Narcotics      Act
       (Betaeubungsmittelgesetz).    The    Heilbronn    Regional    Court
       (Landgericht) dismissed the applicant's appeal on 12 March 1973.
           These proceedings are not here in issue.
           10.  The criminal proceedings to which the present case relates
       began in 1974.
           Mr.  Pakelli  was  arrested on 7 May  on  suspicion  of  having
       committed  a  further  offence against  the  Narcotics  Act;  on  4
       September,   he  was  granted  the  assistance  of  an   officially
       appointed lawyer, namely Mr. Wingerter, of Heilbronn.
           11.  The trial opened before the Heilbronn Regional Court on  7
       April  1976 and continued on 8, 14, 23 and 3O April. The  applicant
       was  defended  by  Mr. Wingerter and, at certain  moments,  by  Mr.
       Rauschenbusch, a member of the same firm.
           On  30 April, the court sentenced Mr. Pakelli to two years' and
       three  months'  imprisonment for an offence against  the  Narcotics
       Act  and for tax evasion (Steuerhinterziehung): it was found to  be
       proved  that  in  the  spring  of 1972 the  accused  had  illegally
       imported  into  Germany  sixteen kilograms  of  cannabis  resin  of
       Turkish origin, hidden in his car.
           12.  On 3 May 1976, Mr. Wingerter filed an appeal on points  of
       law  (Revision).  In  his  memorial of 5 August,  setting  out  the
       grounds  of  appeal, he relied, inter alia, on Article 146  of  the
       Code  of  Criminal Procedure, which provides that  several  accused
       persons  may  not  be  defended by one and  the  same  lawyer  (see
       paragraph   26  below).  Mr.  Wingerter  explained  that   he   had
       previously  represented  another person  who  on  the  occasion  in
       question had, according to the Regional Court's findings, been  Mr.
       Pakelli's accomplice.
           Mr.  Pakelli  was  released on 10 August 1976 and  returned  to
       Turkey.
           On     22    October,    the    Federal    public    prosecutor
       (Generalbundesanwalt) moved that the appeal  be  held  inadmissible
       on  the ground that it had been filed by a defence counsel who,  on
       his own admission, was not entitled to represent the applicant.
           On  19 November, Mr. Rauschenbusch applied for leave to proceed
       out  of  time (Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand) in  order  to
       lodge  a  fresh appeal, which appeal he in fact filed at  the  same
       moment.  On 21 December 1976, the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof)
       allowed  the  application; it had first sought the opinion  of  the
       public  prosecutor who, without giving reasons, had indicated  that
       he was in favour of such a course.
           On   13   January   1977,  the  Regional  Court   granted   Mr.
       Rauschenbusch's  request  of  19  November  1976  to  be  appointed
       official  defence  counsel  to file the memorial  setting  out  the
       grounds  of  appeal; two weeks later it relieved Mr.  Wingerter  of
       his duties.
           13.  In  his memorial of 26 January 1977, which was thirty-four
       pages  in length, Mr. Rauschenbusch complained solely of procedural
       errors  (Verfahrensrugen).  He  listed  nineteen,  most  of   which
       concerned  decisions of the Heilbronn Regional  Court  refusing  to
       appoint an expert or to summon, question or have questions  put  to
       witnesses.  The last of the alleged errors related to  Article  146
       of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure: recalling that Mr.  Wingerter
       had  previously defended another person whom the Regional Court had
       convicted,  on 21 June 1974, as an accomplice of Mr.  Pakelli,  Mr.
       Rauschenbusch  maintained that this recourse to  a  common  defence
       counsel  had  been contrary to the interests of both  accused  (see
       paragraph 26 below).
           14. In its observations in reply ({Gegenerklarung}) of 14 March
       1977,  the  public  prosecutor's office attached  to  the  Regional
       Court  submitted  that the appeal was inadmissible.  It  considered
       that  Article 146 prevented Mr. Rauschenbusch, just as it  did  Mr.
       Wingerter, from acting in the case as officially appointed  lawyer.
       Mr.  Rauschenbusch  replied on 23 March. He  pointed  out,  amongst
       other  things,  that  since  he had never  defended  Mr.  Pakelli's
       accomplice, Article 146 did not apply to him.
           On  20  April, the Federal public prosecutor invited the above-
       mentioned  office to comment on the complaints that had been  made;
       in  his  view,  it  was at least doubtful whether  the  appeal  was
       inadmissible de plano.
           On  12  August, the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office  filed
       its  supplementary observations (weitere Gegenerklaerung), dated  1
       August;  it  sent  a copy to Mr. Rauschenbusch. In accordance  with
       the   practice  in  such  matters  (Instruction  no.  162  of   the
       Instructions   on  Criminal  Procedure  and  Administrative   Fines
       Procedure   -   Richtlinien  {fur}  das  Strafverfahren   und   das
       Bussgeldverfahren), the observations reproduced for each  complaint
       the   relevant  documents  in  the  case-file,  in  particular  the
       requests  made by the applicant's lawyer during the trial  and  the
       decisions  taken by the Regional Court thereon. As regards  Article
       146  of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure, the public  prosecutor's
       office referred to its earlier observations, including those of  14
       March.
           15.  On  application by the Federal public prosecutor's office,
       the  Federal  Court decided on 13 October 1977 to  hold  a  hearing
       (Hauptverhandlung)  on  29  November.  Mr.  Rauschenbusch  and  his
       client,  who had returned to Turkey, were notified of  this  on  17
       October.
           16.  On  24 October, Mr. Rauschenbusch applied to be officially
       appointed  as  the  applicant's  lawyer  for  the  hearing  of   29
       November.
           The  President of the 1st Criminal Chamber (Strafsenat) of  the
       Federal Court refused the application on the following day. In  his
       view,  an accused (Angeklagter) who was at liberty was not entitled
       to  such  an  appointment for hearings in an appeal on a  point  of
       law;  there  was no legal requirement at that stage for him  either
       to  appear in person or to be represented by a lawyer (Article  350
       paras. 2 and 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; see paragraph  22
       below).    As    regards   compliance   with    procedural    rules
       (verfahrensrechtlich),  an  appeal court  (Revisionsgericht)  would
       examine  the impugned decision on the basis of the written  grounds
       of   appeal;   as   regards   any   substantive   complaints   (bei
       sachlichrechtlicher  Beanstandung), it  would  effect  of  its  own
       motion   a   review  that  was  not  subject  to  any  limitations.
       Furthermore,  on this occasion neither the facts of  the  case  nor
       the legal issues it raised justified the appointment requested.
           In  the objections (Gegenvorstellungen) he raised on 7 November
       1977, Mr. Rauschenbusch cited a judgment of 19 October 1977 of  the
       Federal  Constitutional  Court (see paragraph  22  below),  holding
       that,  in addition to the cases provided for by law, legal aid  had
       to  be  granted  for  hearings in appeals on  a  point  of  law  in
       "serious"  ("schwerwiegend")  cases if  the  person  concerned  was
       unable to pay a lawyer of his own choosing. And, he submitted,  Mr.
       Pakelli was in such a situation, for a final conviction would  lead
       to  his  expulsion. Mr. Rauschenbusch asked the  Federal  Court  to
       indicate  whether he should supply particulars of  the  applicant's
       assets  in  order to substantiate (glaubhaft machen)  the  latter's
       lack  of  means.  According to Mr. Rauschenbusch, Mr.  Pakelli  was
       obviously  (offensichtlich) not in a position to pay a  lawyer.  He
       had  come  to  the  Federal Republic as a migrant  worker  and  had
       returned  to  Turkey  after spending a long (laengeren)  period  in
       Heilbronn prison. It was evident that he had no savings.
           Mr.  Rauschenbusch requested that, if need be,  the  matter  be
       referred to the Chamber for decision.
           On  10  November, the President of the 1st Criminal Chamber  of
       the  Federal  Court confirmed his decision of 25  October  refusing
       the   application;  he  took  the  view  that  the  above-mentioned
       judgment  of  19  October  1977 did not concern  a  case  that  was
       comparable to the applicant's.
           17. The hearing was held on 29 November 1977, in the absence of
       the  applicant and of Mr. Rauschenbusch. According to the  minutes,
       the  Federal  Court heard the judge acting as rapporteur  and  then
       the  submissions  (Ausfuhrungen) of  an  official  of  the  Federal
       public  prosecutor's  office  (Bundesanwaltschaft)  in  favour   of
       rejecting  the  appeal. After deliberating in  private,  the  court
       gave on the same day judgment dismissing the appeal.
           The  judgment  held  firstly that the  appeal  was  admissible:
       Article  146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not prevent  Mr.
       Rauschenbusch  from  representing Mr. Pakelli  before  the  Federal
       Court.  On the other hand, that Article had not been complied  with
       at  first instance since Mr. Wingerter had previously defended  the
       applicant's accomplice. However, the Federal Court, referring to  a
       judgment  of  its  3rd Criminal Chamber (see paragraph  26  below),
       added  that an appeal on a point of law based on that Article could
       succeed  only if the representation of several accused by  one  and
       the   same  lawyer  proved  to  be  really  incompatible,  in   the
       circumstances of the case, with the duties of the defence.  And  on
       this  occasion  it  had not been established  that  there  was  any
       conflict of interests.
           The   Federal  Court  then  rejected  the  remainder   of   the
       complaints:  some were examined in detail and held  to  be  without
       foundation and the others were considered more briefly and held  to
       be manifestly ill-founded.
           The  judgment, which was ten pages in length, was served on Mr.
       Rauschenbusch on 21 December 1977.
           18.  In  January 1978, Mr. Wingerter lodged an appeal with  the
       Federal  Constitutional Court. Alleging a violation of Articles  1,
       2,  3,  6,  20  and 103 para. 1 of the Basic Law, he  repeated  the
       submissions  made  by  his colleague Mr. Rauschenbusch  before  the
       Federal  Court  on  7 November 1977 (see paragraph  16  above).  He
       argued  that it was only through a defence counsel that Mr. Pakelli
       could  have availed himself of his right to be heard: he  lived  in
       Turkey,  lacked financial resources and had an insufficient command
       of   German.   In   addition,  the  legal  issues   involved   were
       particularly  complex, as was shown by the length of  the  memorial
       setting out the grounds of appeal (see paragraph 13 above) and  the
       Federal  Court's  decision to hold a hearing.  Mr.  Pakelli  should
       therefore have been given the opportunity of stating his  views  on
       the  submissions of the Federal public prosecutor's office.  Again,
       the  consequences of an unfavourable judgment would have been  such
       as  to make the official appointment of a lawyer essential: for the
       applicant,  dismissal of the appeal meant his  undoing  in  Germany
       and the breakdown of his marriage and family life.
           Mr.  Wingerter, who requested that legal aid be granted to  the
       applicant,  asked the Constitutional Court to indicate  whether  he
       should  supply  particulars  of his client's  assets  in  order  to
       substantiate (glaubhaft machen) the latter's lack of means.
           In  a  ruling given on 10 May 1978 by a panel of three  judges,
       the  Constitutional Court decided not to hear  the  appeal  on  the
       ground  that it did not offer sufficient prospects of success.  The
       Constitutional  Court found nothing arbitrary in  the  decision  of
       the  President  of the 1st Criminal Chamber of the  Federal  Court.
       Moreover,  the  case was not "serious", within the meaning  of  the
       above-mentioned  judgment of 19 October  1977  (see  paragraphs  16
       above  and  22 below). Finally, Mr. Pakelli could have remained  in
       the  Federal  Republic of Germany and attended the  hearing  before
       the   Federal  Court,  if  need  be  with  the  assistance  of   an
       interpreter.
           19. After his arrest on 7 May 1974, Mr. Pakelli had remained in
       custody  until  10 August 1976, partly in detention on  remand  and
       partly to serve sentences that had been imposed on him.
       
                           II. Relevant legislation
       
                        1. Officially appointed lawyers
       
           20.  If the accused has not chosen a defence counsel, the trial
       court  will  appoint one in the following cases (listed in  Article
       140 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure):
           -  the  trial at first instance is before the Court  of  Appeal
       (Oberlandesgericht) or the Regional Court;
           -   the   accused   is  charged  with  an  indictable   offence
       (Verbrechen);
           -  the proceedings may result in the accused's being prohibited
       from exercising a profession;
           - the accused is deaf or dumb;
           -  the  accused has been interned for at least three months  by
       order or with the approval of a court and has not been released  at
       least two weeks before the opening of the trial;
           -  the  question arises whether the accused should be  detained
       for mental examination;
           -   the   case   concerns   preventive  detention   proceedings
       (Sicherungsverfahren);
           -  a  decision has been taken prohibiting the previous  defence
       counsel from taking part in the proceedings.
           An  appointment will also be made in other cases, either by the
       court  of  its own motion or at the accused's request,  if  such  a
       step appears necessary on account of the seriousness of the act  in
       question, the factual or legal complexity of the case, or if it  is
       obvious  that  the accused cannot conduct his own defence  (Article
       140 para. 2).
           21.  The  official appointment of a lawyer by the  trial  court
       covers  not  only the proceedings before that court  but  also  the
       written  stage  of any appeal on a point of law. If necessary,  the
       trial court will make a special appointment for the latter stage.
           22. An accused (Angeklagter) who is in custody does not have an
       enforceable  right to attend hearings in an appeal on  a  point  of
       law  -  whether  before  the  appeal court  or  the  Federal  Court
       (Articles    121    and    135   of    the    Judicial    Code    -
       Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) -, but he may be represented thereat  by
       a  lawyer (Article 350 para. 2). If he has not chosen a lawyer  and
       is  not  brought to the hearing, the President of the court  having
       jurisdiction  will  appoint one for him if he so requests  (Article
       350 para. 3).
           An  accused  who  is  at liberty may appear  in  person  or  be
       represented  by a lawyer at the appeal hearing (Article  350  para.
       2).  According  to  the  case-law of  the  Federal  Court,  defence
       counsel can be assigned to him only under Article 140 para. 2  (see
       paragraph  20 above), since Article 140 para. 1 does not  apply  to
       hearings  in  an  appeal  on  a point of  law  (Entscheidungen  des
       Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen, vol. 19, pp. 258 - 263).
           Furthermore,  the Federal Constitutional Court  has  held  that
       defence  counsel is to be appointed by the court of its own  motion
       and  at  the  expense of the State in serious cases (schwerwiegende
       {Falle})  if  the  accused  cannot pay for  a  lawyer  of  his  own
       choosing  (Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts,  vol.  46,
       pp. 202 - 213).
       
                    2. Hearings in appeals on points of law
       
           23. The court concerned may dispose of an appeal on a point  of
       law without hearings in the following cases only:
           -  where it finds the appeal inadmissible (Article 349 para.  1
       of the Code of Criminal Procedure);
           -  where,  on a reasoned application by the public prosecutor's
       office,  the  court  considers  unanimously  that  the  appeal   is
       manifestly ill-founded (Article 349 para. 2); and
           - where the court finds unanimously that an appeal filed in the
       interests of the accused is well-founded (Article 349 para. 4).
           In  all  other  cases the court has to hold  a  hearing  before
       taking  its  decision  (Article 349 para. 5);  before  the  Federal
       Court,  there are hearings in only ten per cent of the  appeals  on
       points of law lodged in criminal cases.
           When the public prosecutor's office applies for an appeal to be
       rejected  as  manifestly  ill-founded, it has  to  communicate  its
       submissions and the reasons to the appellant; the latter  may  file
       a reply within two weeks (Article 349 para. 3).
           24.  Article  350  para. 1 requires that the  accused  and  his
       lawyer be informed of the date and place of the hearing; if  it  is
       not  possible to contact the former, notification to the latter  is
       sufficient.
           25. Appeal hearings open with the rapporteur's address; this is
       followed   by  the  statements  and  submissions  of   the   public
       prosecutor's  office,  the  accused and his  defence  counsel.  The
       appellant  is  heard first and the last address  to  the  court  is
       always made by the accused (Article 351).
       
                          3. "Common defence counsel"
                       (gemeinschaftliche Verteidigung)
       
           26.  According to the former version of Article 146 of the Code
       of  Criminal Procedure, which was in force until 31 December  1974,
       several  accused could be represented by a single counsel  if  this
       was  not contrary to the interests of the defence. As it was  often
       difficult  for  courts  to detect or establish  such  conflicts  of
       interests,  Article 146 was modified in 1974: the new  text,  which
       has  been  applicable since 1 January 1975, does not allow  several
       accused to be defended by a common defence counsel.
           However,  the Federal Court (3rd Criminal Chamber) held  on  27
       February  and  13 October 1976 that an appeal on  a  point  of  law
       based  on a violation of Article 146 could succeed only if recourse
       to  a  common defence counsel was in fact contrary to the interests
       of   the   defence   (Entscheidungen  des  Bundesgerichtshofes   in
       Strafsachen,  vol. 26, pp. 291 - 298; vol. 27, pp. 22  -  24).  The
       1st  Criminal Chamber followed these precedents in its judgment  of
       29  November 1977 in the present case (see paragraph 17 above). The
       Government stated that this interpretation has since been  accepted
       by all the Criminal Chambers of the Federal Court.
       
                       PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
       
           27.  In his application lodged with the Commission on 5 October
       1978  (no.  8398/78), Mr. Pakelli claimed to be  the  victim  of  a
       violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of  the
       Convention.  He  alleged that he had lacked the means  to  pay  for
       defence  counsel  of  his own choosing and that  the  interests  of
       justice  required  that  a lawyer should  have  been  appointed  to
       represent  him  at the hearing before the Federal  Court.  He  also
       asserted  that  he  had  not been able to  return  to  the  Federal
       Republic  of Germany to present his own case, since he had  neither
       a residence permit nor the necessary money to pay an interpreter.
           On  16  May 1980, the Commission granted Mr. Pakelli free legal
       aid  on the basis of a declaration of means dated 9 September  1979
       and confirmed by certificates from the competent authorities.
           On   7  May  1981,  the  Commission  declared  the  application
       admissible  in  so  far  as  it related to  the  rejection  of  the
       applicant's request that a lawyer be officially appointed  for  the
       hearing  before the Federal Court; it declared the other complaints
       inadmissible  on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic  remedies
       (Articles  26  and  27  para.  3  (art.  26,  art.  27-3)  of   the
       Convention).
           In  its report of 12 December 1981 (Article 31), the Commission
       expressed  the unanimous opinion that the applicant  had  been  the
       victim  of  a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c)  and,
       by  eleven  votes  to  one, that it was not required  to  determine
       whether  there had also been breach of the right to a  fair  trial,
       within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
       
             FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT
       
           28.  At  the  close  of the hearings of 25 November  1982,  the
       Government  invited the Court "to hold that there has  not  been  a
       violation  of Article 6 paras. 3 (c) and 1 (art. 6-3-c,  art.  6-1)
       of the Convention in the applicant's case".
       
                                 AS TO THE LAW
       
           29.  The  applicant complained of the refusal  of  the  Federal
       Court,  in  proceedings  concerning an  appeal  on  points  of  law
       (Revision),  to  appoint  Mr.  Rauschenbusch  as  official  defence
       counsel for the hearings of 29 November 1977 before that court;  he
       alleged that this constituted a violation of paragraph 3 (c)  (art.
       6-3-c),  and  also of paragraph 1, of Article 6 (art. 6-1)  of  the
       Convention.
           It  was  not disputed that these provisions were applicable  in
       the  present  case  and the Court takes this point  as  established
       (see,  mutatis mutandis, the Delcourt judgment of 17 January  1970,
       Series  A  no.  11, pp. 13 - 15, paras. 25 and 26, and  the  Artico
       judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, pp. 15 - 18, paras. 31  -
       38). However, as the Government rightly pointed out, the manner  in
       which  those  paragraphs are to be applied depends on  the  special
       features  of  the  proceedings involved  (see  the  above-mentioned
       Delcourt judgment, ibid.).
       
                           I. The alleged violation
                     of article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c)
       
           30. Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) reads as follows:
           "Everyone  charged  with a criminal offence has  the  following
       minimum rights:
           ...
           (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance  of
       his  own  choosing or, if he has not sufficient means  to  pay  for
       legal  assistance,  to  be  given it free  when  the  interests  of
       justice so require;
           ..."
           Before  the  Commission, the Government argued that  Article  6
       para.  3  (c) (art. 6-3-c) did not require the grant of free  legal
       assistance  in  the  present  case since  Mr.  Pakelli  could  have
       appeared  in  person at the Federal Court's hearing. Although  they
       did  not  dwell on this point before the Court, they repeated  that
       the  applicant  could have presented his own case  to  the  Federal
       Court.
           31.  Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) guarantees three rights
       to  a person charged with a criminal offence: to defend himself  in
       person,  to  defend  himself through legal assistance  of  his  own
       choosing  and, on certain conditions, to be given legal  assistance
       free. To link the corresponding phrases together, the English  text
       employs on each occasion the disjunctive "or"; the French text,  on
       the  other hand, utilises the equivalent - "ou" - only between  the
       phrases  enouncing the first and the second right;  thereafter,  it
       uses  the  conjunctive "et". The "travaux {preparatoires}"  contain
       hardly  any explanation of this linguistic difference. They  reveal
       solely  that  in  the course of a final examination  of  the  draft
       Convention,  on  the eve of its signature, a Committee  of  Experts
       made  "a  certain number of formal corrections and  corrections  of
       translation",  including the replacement of "and" by  "or"  in  the
       English  version  of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c)  (Collected
       Edition  of  the  "Travaux {preparatoires}",  vol.  IV,  p.  1010).
       Having  regard  to the object and purpose of this paragraph,  which
       is  designed  to ensure effective protection of the rights  of  the
       defence (see the above-mentioned Artico judgment, Series A no.  37,
       p.  16, para. 33; see also, mutatis mutandis, the Adolf judgment of
       26  March  1982, Series A no. 49, p. 15, para. 30, and  the  Sunday
       Times  judgment  of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30,  p.  30,  para.
       48),  the  French  text here provides more reliable  guidance;  the
       Court  concurs  with the Commission on this point.  Accordingly,  a
       "person  charged  with a criminal offence" who  does  not  wish  to
       defend  himself  in person must be able to have recourse  to  legal
       assistance  of  his  own choosing; if he does not  have  sufficient
       means  to  pay  for  such  assistance, he  is  entitled  under  the
       Convention  to  be given it free when the interests of  justice  so
       require.
           Thus  Mr. Pakelli, although authorised by German law to  appear
       in  person before the Federal Court, could claim such assistance to
       the  extent that the conditions laid down by Article 6 para. 3  (c)
       (art. 6-3-c) were satisfied.
       
                           A. Absence of sufficient
                       means to pay for legal assistance
       
           32.  The  Government argued as follows. There  was  nothing  to
       substantiate  the  applicant's  assertion  that  he  did  not  have
       sufficient  means to pay for legal assistance of his own  choosing;
       on  the  contrary, he had himself stated before the Regional  Court
       that  he  earned  a  very good income in the  Federal  Republic  of
       Germany; according to the findings contained in the judgment of  30
       April  1976 (see paragraph 11 above), he also made money  from  his
       drug  traffic  activities; in addition, he had  opened  a  business
       shortly after returning to Turkey.
           The Commission considered that the Government were not entitled
       at  this  stage to challenge the applicant's assertions. It pointed
       out  firstly  that  under  German  law  the  grant  of  free  legal
       assistance was not conditional on the indigence of the litigant  in
       question;  secondly,  Mr.  Rauschenbusch  had  offered  before  the
       hearings  to  supply a certificate of indigence (see  paragraph  16
       above), but the Federal Court did not accept this offer.
           33.  The  Court is unable to agree with the Commission on  this
       point.  The question of Mr. Pakelli's means played no part  in  the
       decision  complained  of:  the  refusal  of  the  request  for  the
       appointment  of  Mr.  Rauschenbusch was based solely  on  the  fact
       that,  in the opinion of the President of the 1st Criminal  Chamber
       of  the Federal Court, the case did not fall within the category of
       cases  for which German law prescribed the assistance of a  defence
       counsel  (see  paragraph  16  above). Accordingly,  the  Government
       cannot  be  held  to have lost their entitlement to contest  before
       the  Convention institutions, in the context of Article 6  para.  3
       (c) (art. 6-3-c), the applicant's claim that he was indigent.
           34.  It  has nevertheless to be recognised, as was done by  the
       Commission's Delegate, that it is in practice impossible  to  prove
       today  that in 1977 Mr. Pakelli did not have the means to  pay  his
       lawyer.  However,  there are some indications  that  this  was  so.
       Thus,  there  is no reason to suppose that Mr. Rauschenbusch  would
       have  been  unable  to obtain the above-mentioned  certificate;  in
       this  connection, it has to be noted that his client had spent  two
       years  in  custody  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  before
       returning  to Turkey in 1976 (see paragraphs 15 and 19  above).  In
       addition,  Mr.  Pakelli  supplied  to  the  Commission  in  1979  a
       statement  of  means  and certificates from the  competent  Turkish
       authorities,  the latter being based on the declaration  of  assets
       and  income  which he had made for tax purposes the previous  year;
       it  appeared  from these documents that he was engaged in  business
       on  a  small  scale  and that his financial situation  was  modest.
       These  data  - which, moreover, were not disputed by the Government
       -  led the Commission to grant him free legal aid (see paragraph 27
       above).
           Admittedly,  these  particulars are  not  sufficient  to  prove
       beyond  all  doubt that the applicant was indigent at the  relevant
       time;  however, having regard to his offer to the Federal Court  to
       prove his lack of means and in the absence of clear indications  to
       the  contrary, they lead the Court to regard the first of  the  two
       conditions  contained  in Article 6 para. 3  (c)  (art.  6-3-c)  as
       satisfied.
       
                          B. The interests of justice
       
           35.   According  to  the  applicant  and  the  Commission,  the
       interests  of justice required that Mr. Rauschenbusch be officially
       appointed  as  the  applicant's  lawyer  for  the  hearings  of  29
       November 1977 before the Federal Court.
           In  contesting  this  view, the Government made  the  following
       points.  Mr.  Pakelli had had a defence counsel during the  written
       stage  of  the proceedings; as for the hearings, their  object  was
       circumscribed by the grounds of his appeal on points of law:  since
       he  was challenging the judgment of 30 April 1976 solely on account
       of   alleged  procedural  errors,  he  could  neither   raise   new
       complaints  nor supplement his memorial setting out the grounds  of
       appeal  by  referring  to  other  questions  of  fact.  Only  legal
       arguments and submissions could have been put to the court  at  the
       hearings.  The issues involved were not complicated  and  it  could
       not   be   said  that  their  determination  would  entail  serious
       consequences,  for  the  proceedings could  not  have  led  to  any
       aggravation  of the decision complained of. Moreover,  Mr.  Pakelli
       could  have  appeared  in  person.  Finally,  the  Commission   had
       misunderstood  the  role of the Federal public prosecutor's  office
       in  appeals on a point of law. That role consisted of examining the
       grounds of appeal from a completely independent standpoint and,  in
       particular,  of  ensuring that the law was  uniformly  applied  and
       that case-law remained consistent; it was thus very similar to  the
       role  of  the Procureur {general} attached to the Belgian Court  of
       Cassation (see the above-mentioned Delcourt judgment).
           36.  The Court notes firstly, as did the Commission, that  this
       was  one  of  the  rare  cases in which the Federal  Court  held  a
       hearing:  this  occurs in only ten per cent of  the  appeals  on  a
       point  of law in criminal cases (see paragraph 23 above). In  fact,
       on  the  present occasion the Federal Court was obliged to  arrange
       for  oral proceedings since the appeal proved to be admissible  and
       the  public  prosecutor's  office had not  applied  for  it  to  be
       rejected  as  manifestly ill-founded (Article 349 of  the  Code  of
       Criminal  Procedure; see paragraph 23 above). This shows  that  the
       hearing  could  have  been of importance for  the  decision  to  be
       given.  It  therefore became necessary, in order to ensure  a  fair
       trial,  to  comply with the rule that oral proceedings  shall  take
       place   with   the   participation   of   both   parties   ({debat}
       contradictoire).
           37.  It  is true that, since the applicant confined himself  to
       alleging that there had been procedural errors (Articles 344  para.
       2  and  352 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), the Federal
       Court  had  solely  to give a ruling on the grounds  which  he  had
       invoked  and later set out at length in his memorial (see paragraph
       13  above).  However, Mr. Pakelli would have  been  able,  had  his
       lawyer  appeared  before the court, to explain his  complaints,  to
       supply  further particulars thereof if need be and to  develop  his
       written  arguments.  He  would, for  example,  have  been  able  to
       comment  on  the statement made by the judge acting  as  rapporteur
       (Article  351  of the Code of Criminal Procedure; see paragraph  25
       above).  Such  possibilities of intervening in the  course  of  the
       proceedings  would  have  been all the more  valuable  because  the
       appeal,  itself a voluminous document, concerned nineteen different
       points.
           Again,  as  the  Commission rightly pointed  out,  one  of  the
       complaints  made related to the application of the new  version  of
       Article 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Admittedly, the  3rd
       Criminal  Chamber  of  the Federal Court had  already  decided,  in
       1976,  that an appeal on a point of law based on this Article could
       succeed  only if recourse to a common defence counsel had  in  fact
       been  contrary  to the interests of the defence (see  paragraph  26
       above).   Moreover,  Mr.  Rauschenbusch  did   not   contest   this
       interpretation. However, he endeavoured to demonstrate  that  there
       had  been a conflict of interests in the present case. In addition,
       it  could be predicted that the judgment that the Federal Court was
       going   to  deliver  would  not  be  without  importance  for   the
       development of case-law. The Government themselves stated that  the
       case-law on this point has remained constant since the judgment  of
       29   November   1977  dismissing  the  applicant's   appeal;   they
       recognised that oral argument on the interpretation of Article  146
       would have been of some value.
           38.  In  these circumstances, it goes without saying  that  the
       personal  appearance  of the appellant would not  have  compensated
       for  the  absence of his lawyer: without the services  of  a  legal
       practitioner,   Mr.   Pakelli  could  not  have   made   a   useful
       contribution  to the examination of the legal issues  arising,  and
       in  particular  the issue relating to Article 146 of  the  Code  of
       Criminal Procedure. The Court concurs with the Commission  on  this
       point.
           39.  Finally  and  above  all, the appeal  proceedings  in  the
       present  case  were  not conducted with the participation  of  both
       parties,  in  any event at the stage of the hearings.  Even  during
       the written phase, only the public prosecutor's office attached  to
       the  Heilbronn Regional Court replied to the appeal lodged  by  Mr.
       Pakelli,  who was then still represented by Mr. Rauschenbusch,  and
       it  made  no submissions on the merits of the grounds invoked  (see
       paragraph  14  above). As regards the Federal  public  prosecutor's
       office   -   and  irrespective  of  its  precise  role  in   appeal
       proceedings  -,  German law enabled the appellant  to  contest  its
       submissions   (Article  349  para.  3  of  the  Code  of   Criminal
       Procedure;  see  paragraph 23 above). Accordingly, if  the  Federal
       Court  had  not  decided  to  hold a hearing,  the  Federal  public
       prosecutor's  office  would have filed its submissions  in  writing
       and  communicated  them  to the applicant and  the  latter,  as  he
       rightly  pointed  out,  would  thus  have  had  an  opportunity  of
       studying them and, if need be, of replying thereto.
           This  opportunity of refuting the public prosecutor's  office's
       arguments should therefore have been made available to Mr.  Pakelli
       at  the  hearings also. By refusing to provide him with  a  defence
       counsel,  the Federal Court deprived him, during the oral stage  of
       the  proceedings, of the opportunity of influencing the outcome  of
       the  case,  a  possibility  that he would  have  retained  had  the
       proceedings been conducted entirely in writing.
           40.  In  these  circumstances, the Court, like the  Commission,
       considers  that  the  interests of justice  did  require  that  the
       applicant  be granted legal assistance for the hearings before  the
       Federal Court.
       
                                 C. Conclusion
       
           41.  Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 6 para.
       3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) of the Convention.
       
                           II. The alleged violation
                        of article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
       
           42.  The  applicant also invoked, as regards  the  same  facts,
       paragraph 1 of Article 6 (art. 6-1), which reads as follows:
           "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
       any  criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled  to  a  fair
       and  public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent  and
       impartial   tribunal  established  by  law.   Judgment   shall   be
       pronounced  publicly but the press and public may be excluded  from
       all  or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public  order
       or  national security in a democratic society, where the  interests
       of  juveniles or the protection of the private life of the  parties
       so  require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion  of
       the  court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice
       the interests of justice."
           The  Government did not put forward any separate  arguments  on
       this issue.
           In company with the Commission, the Court would recall that the
       provisions  of  Article  6  para.  3  (c)  (art.  6-3-c)  represent
       specific  applications of the general principle of  a  fair  trial,
       stated  in  paragraph  1 (see the Deweer judgment  of  27  February
       1980,  Series A no. 35, p. 30, para. 56). Accordingly, the question
       whether   paragraph  1  (art.  6-1)  was  observed  has   no   real
       significance  in  the  applicant's case;  it  is  absorbed  by  the
       question  whether paragraph 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) was  complied  with.
       The  finding  of  a breach of the requirements of paragraph  3  (c)
       (art.  6-3-c) dispenses the Court from also examining the  case  in
       the  light  of  paragraph 1 (art. 6-1) (see, mutatis mutandis,  the
       above-mentioned  Deweer judgment, Series A no. 35,  pp.  30  -  31,
       para. 56).
       
                 III. The application of article 50 (art. 50)
       
           43. Mr. Pakelli sought just satisfaction under Article 50 (art.
       50).  In  the  first  place, he requested the Court  to  annul  the
       Federal  Court's  judgment of 29 November 1977 and  to  direct  the
       Government  to  issue an official disapproval of  certain  passages
       therein,  which  he  regarded  as  racist  or  discriminatory   and
       therefore   unacceptable.  In  the  second  place,  he  asked   for
       compensation  of such amount as the Court considered  fit  for  his
       alleged  non-pecuniary loss. Finally, he claimed  reimbursement  of
       the  costs  and  expenses  entailed by the proceedings  before  the
       Federal Constitutional Court, which he quantified at DM 668.96.
           44.  The Government submitted that these various claims  should
       be  rejected.  They  maintained that the  applicant  had  not  been
       prejudiced in any way by the Federal Court's refusal to  appoint  a
       lawyer  for  him officially and that his criticisms of the  reasons
       for  that  court's decision were unwarranted. As regards the  costs
       and  expenses  of the proceedings before the Constitutional  Court,
       the  Government  contended  that it was not  established  that  Mr.
       Pakelli  had  had  to bear them; they also stated that  the  amount
       claimed did not exactly correspond to the scale applicable  at  the
       relevant time.
           45.  The Court considers that in the circumstances the question
       is  ready  for  decision (Rule 50 para. 3, first sentence,  of  the
       Rules of Court).
           The  Court  notes, as regards the first claim, that it  is  not
       empowered under the Convention either to annul the Federal  Court's
       judgment  or  to  direct  the Government to  disavow  the  passages
       complained  of  (see, mutatis mutandis, the Marckx judgment  of  13
       June  1979,  Series  A  no. 31, p. 25, para. 58,  and  the  Dudgeon
       judgment  of  24 February 1983, Series A no. 59, p. 8,  para.  15).
       Without  expressing  any opinion on those passages,  it  adds  that
       they  cannot  be  regarded  as the consequence  of  the  breach  of
       Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c).
           46.  As  the Government rightly pointed out, Mr. Wingerter  has
       neither  established  the  existence of the  alleged  non-pecuniary
       loss  nor  even indicated the nature thereof. There is  nothing  to
       show that the absence of a defence counsel left Mr. Pakelli with  a
       distressing sensation of isolation, confusion and neglect (see  the
       above-mentioned  Artico judgment, Series A no.  37,  p.  21,  para.
       47);  in fact, this seems unlikely since he had returned to  Turkey
       as  early as the month of August 1976. In any event, the finding of
       a  violation,  contained  in  the  present  judgment,  has  already
       furnished  sufficient  redress for the alleged  non-pecuniary  loss
       (see,  mutatis  mutandis, the Le Compte, Van Leuven and  De  Meyere
       judgment of 18 October 1982, Series A no. 54, p. 8, para. 16).
           47. The costs and expenses whose reimbursement was claimed were
       incurred in order to try to have the breach of the requirements  of
       Article  6  para.  3  (c)  (art. 6-3-c) rectified  by  the  Federal
       Constitutional  Court  (see the above-mentioned  Dudgeon  judgment,
       Series  A no. 59, p. 9, para. 20). Moreover, this was not contested
       by  the Government. However, they claimed that these items had been
       disbursed  by  the  applicant's counsel and not  by  the  applicant
       himself,  since  Mr.  Wingerter  had  waived  repayment   and   was
       moreover,  on  account of statutory limitation, no longer  entitled
       to recover the debt due to him.
           In  fact,  Mr.  Pakelli  has not so far  paid  his  lawyer  for
       representing  him  before  the Federal  Constitutional  Court:  Mr.
       Wingerter  did  not send him a note of his fees  until  7  February
       1982  and  he  stated that it would be in order to  defer  payment,
       having  regard  to  the applicant's financial  difficulties.  In  a
       memorial  of 16 June 1980 filed with the Commission, Mr.  Wingerter
       had  pointed  out  that he had not yet received any  fees  for  the
       proceedings  in question and that he had not asked  for  any  ("ein
       Honorar gar nicht erst gefordert") since he knew his client  to  be
       without means.
           Nevertheless, neither these statements nor the other  documents
       before the Court show sufficiently clearly that there has been  any
       waiver.  Indeed, as the Commission's Delegate rightly pointed  out,
       it  is  not  surprising  that Mr. Wingerter, knowing  his  client's
       financial  circumstances, decided not to send him  a  note  of  his
       fees  at  an earlier date (see the X v. the United Kingdom judgment
       of  18  October 1982, Series A no. 55, p. 18, para. 24). The  Court
       would  here point out, as did the Delegate, that in a human  rights
       case  a  lawyer will be acting in the general interest if he agrees
       to  represent or assist a litigant even if the latter is not  in  a
       position to pay him immediately.
           As  regards  the argument based on the statutory limitation  of
       Mr.  Wingerter's right to recover the debt due to him, this is  not
       a  matter  of  public policy and could be relied  on  only  by  Mr.
       Pakelli himself.
           Deciding on an equitable basis, the Court finds that the sum of
       DM 668.96 claimed for fees and expenses is reasonable.
       
                   FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
       
           1.  Holds that there has been a violation of paragraph 3 (c) of
       Article 6 of the Convention (art. 6-3-c);
           2.  Holds  that  it is not necessary also to examine  the  case
       under paragraph 1 of Article 6 (art. 6-1);
           3.  Holds that the respondent State is to pay to the applicant,
       in  respect of legal costs and expenses, the sum of six hundred and
       sixty-eight  German marks and ninety-six pfennigs (DM  668.96)  and
       rejects the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.
       
           Done in English and in French, the French text being authentic,
       at  the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, this twenty-fifth day of
       April, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-three.
       
                                                   Signed: {Gerard WIARDA}
                                                                 President
       
                                               Signed: {Marc-Andre EISSEN}
                                                                 Registrar
       
       
    


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ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СУДА ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ОТ 25.04.1983 ПАКЕЛЛИ (PAKELLI) ПРОТИВ ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГЕРМАНИИ [РУС. (ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ), АНГЛ.]

(по состоянию на 20 октября 2006 года)

                                               [неофициальный перевод]
   
                  ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
                                   
                           СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
                 ПАКЕЛЛИ (PAKELLI) ПРОТИВ ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ
                          РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГЕРМАНИИ
                                   
                   (Страсбург, 25 апреля 1983 года)
   
                             (Извлечение)
   
          КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
   
                           A. Основные факты
   
       Заявитель, гражданин Турции, родившийся в 1937 г., был  осужден
   участковым  судом  Хейлбронна 30 апреля  1976  г.  и  приговорен  к
   тюремному  заключению  за  участие  в  торговле  наркотиками.   Его
   адвокат  г-н  Вингертер обратился с жалобой  в  порядке  ревизии  в
   Федеральную судебную палату - высшую судебную инстанцию.  В  жалобе
   он  указал на ряд процессуальных нарушений, в том числе статьи  146
   Уголовно-процессуального   кодекса,  который   запрещает   адвокату
   защищать  обвиняемого,  если  ранее  он  защищал  одного   из   его
   соучастников.   Таким  образом,  г-н  Вингертер   указал   как   на
   процессуальное  нарушение  свое  собственное  участие  в  процессе.
   Однако  в  принятии жалобы к рассмотрению было отказано,  поскольку
   она   была   подана   адвокатом,  не  имевшим  право   представлять
   заявителя.
       После того как ревизионная жалоба была подана другим адвокатом,
   г-ном  Раушенбушем, она была принята к рассмотрению. Однако  палата
   по  уголовным  делам Федерального суда отказалась допустить  его  к
   слушанию  дела,  поскольку  он  участвовал  в  процессе  Пакелли  в
   качестве   защитника   другого   обвиняемого.   Палата   отказалась
   назначить  г-ну  Пакелли официального защитника, поскольку  законом
   для  рассмотрения дела в высшей судебной инстанции такое назначение
   не  предусмотрено, а в слушании может участвовать сам г-н  Пакелли.
   Последний  к  этому времени был освобожден из тюрьмы и  вернулся  в
   Турцию.  Он  утверждал, что не имеет финансовых  возможностей  быть
   представленным  другим  адвокатом. В результате  дело  слушалось  в
   отсутствие  г-на Пакелли и адвоката и в удовлетворении жалобы  было
   отказано.
       Г-н  Пакелли подал жалобу в Федеральный Конституционный  Суд  в
   январе  1978  г.  В постановлении, вынесенном 10 мая,  коллегия  из
   трех  судей приняла решение не принимать жалобу к рассмотрению  как
   не имеющую достаточных перспектив успешного разрешения.
   
           B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
   
       В  жалобе,  поданной в Комиссию в октябре 1978 г., г-н  Пакелли
   утверждал,  что  отказ  суда назначить ему  официального  защитника
   нарушил  его  право  на  справедливое  разбирательство  на   основе
   состязательности  (статья  6  п.  1  Конвенции)  и  его  право   на
   бесплатную юридическую помощь (статья 6 п. 3 "c").
       7  мая 1981 г. Комиссия объявила жалобу частично приемлемой.  В
   своем  докладе от 12 декабря 1981 г. она выразила мнение, что имело
   место  нарушение  статьи 6 п. 3 "c" (единогласно) и  что  выяснять,
   имело  ли  место  также и нарушение статьи 6  п.  1,  не  требуется
   (одиннадцатью голосами против одного).
       Дело   было   передано   в  Суд  Комиссией   и   Правительством
   Федеративной Республики Германии соответственно 14 и  24  мая  1982
   г.
   
                    ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
   
                             ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
   
       29.  Заявитель  жаловался на отказ палаты  по  уголовным  делам
   Федерального   суда  назначить  г-на  Раушенбуша  его   официальным
   адвокатом на слушаниях 29 ноября 1977 г. по его ревизионной  жалобе
   в  суде; он утверждал, что такой отказ представляет собой нарушение
   статьи 6 п. 1 и п. 3 "c" Конвенции.
       Никем  не  оспаривалось, что эти нормы применимы  к  настоящему
   случаю,  и  Суд  отмечает  этот  факт  установленным  (см.  mutatis
   mutandis Решение по делу Делькура от 17 января 1970 г. Серия A,  т.
   11,  с. 13 - 15, п. 25 и 26, а также Решение по делу Артико  от  13
   мая  1980  г.  Серия  A, т. 37, с. 15 - 18, п.  31  -  38).  Однако
   Правительство  справедливо указало, что то, как  следует  применять
   эти  нормы, зависит от особенностей конкретного процесса, о котором
   идет  речь  (см. вышеупомянутое Судебное решение по делу  Делькура,
   там же).
   
            I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 3 "c"
   
       30. Статья 6 п. 3 "c"
       "Каждый    человек,   обвиняемый   в   совершении    уголовного
   преступления, имеет как минимум следующие права:
       ...
       c) защищать себя лично или через посредство выбранного им самим
   защитника  или,  если  у него нет достаточных  средств  для  оплаты
   услуг  защитника, иметь назначенного ему защитника бесплатно, когда
   того требуют интересы правосудия;
       ... "
       На слушаниях в Комиссии Правительство утверждало, что статья  6
   п.  3  "c"  не требует предоставления бесплатной правовой помощи  в
   данном  случае,  так  как  г-н Пакелли  мог  бы  лично  явиться  на
   слушание  дела  в Федеральной судебной палате. В Суде Правительство
   не  останавливалось  на этом вопросе подробно,  но  повторило,  что
   заявитель мог бы сам представить свое дело в Федеральном суде.
       31.  Статья  6  п.  3  "c"  гарантирует  лицу,  обвиненному   в
   совершении  уголовного  преступления,  три  права:  защищать   себя
   лично;  иметь  выбранного им самим защитника  и,  при  определенных
   условиях,  иметь назначенного ему защитника бесплатно. В английском
   тексте для установления связи между соответствующими выражениями  в
   каждом  случае  используется разделительный союз  "или";  с  другой
   стороны,  во французском тексте эквивалент данного союза -  "ou"  -
   используется  только  для  соединения  фраз,  излагающих  первое  и
   второе  право,  а  между  вторым  и  третьим  стоит  союз  "и".   В
   подготовительных    работах   трудно    найти    объяснение    этим
   лингвистическим  различиям. Единственное, что они  показывают,  это
   то,  что  в процессе заключительного рассмотрения проекта Конвенции
   накануне  ее  подписания комитет экспертов  внес  "некоторое  число
   формальных  исправлений  и  исправлений перевода",  включая  замену
   союза  "и" на союз "или" в английском варианте статьи 6  п.  3  "c"
   (Recueil  des  Travaux  {Preparatoires}  <*>,  т.  IV,  с.   1010).
   Учитывая   предмет  и  цель  данного  пункта,  назначение  которого
   состоит  в том, чтобы обеспечить эффективную защиту прав на  защиту
   (см. вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Артико. Серия A, т. 37, с.  16,
   п.  33;  см. также mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Адольфа  от  26
   марта  1982  г.  Серия A, т. 49, с. 15, п. 30, и  Решение  по  делу
   "Санди  таймс" от 26 апреля 1979 г. Серия A, т. 30, с. 30, п.  48),
   французский  текст  служит  здесь более  надежным  ориентиром;  Суд
   согласен  с  Комиссией  по данному вопросу. Соответственно  "каждый
   обвиняемый  в  совершении уголовного преступления", кто  не  желает
   защищать себя лично, должен иметь возможность прибегнуть к  услугам
   выбранного им самим защитника; если у него нет достаточных  средств
   для  оплаты такого защитника, то, на основании Конвенции,  защитник
   должен   быть  ему  предоставлен  бесплатно,  когда  того   требуют
   интересы правосудия.
   --------------------------------
       <*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
   латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
   
       Таким  образом, г-н Пакелли, хотя германское право и  разрешало
   ему   лично   предстать  перед  Федеральным  судом,  мог  требовать
   предоставления  ему  юридической помощи в той  мере,  в  какой  это
   удовлетворяло условиям, установленным в статье 6 п. 3 "c".
   
        A. Отсутствие достаточных средств для оплаты защитника
   
       32.  Доводы  Правительства сводились к следующему. Нет  ничего,
   что  бы  подтверждало утверждение заявителя о том, что у  него  нет
   достаточных  средств  для  оплаты выбранного  им  самим  защитника;
   наоборот,  он  сам заявил в участковом суде, что он очень  прилично
   зарабатывал   в   Федеративной   Республике   Германии;    согласно
   констатирующей части Судебного решения от 30 апреля  1976  г.  (см.
   п.  11  выше),  он  также зарабатывал деньги,  торгуя  наркотиками;
   кроме того, вскоре после возвращения в Турцию он открыл свое дело.
       Комиссия   считала,  что  Правительство  не  вправе  оспаривать
   утверждения  заявителя на данной стадии. Она  отметила  также,  что
   немецкое  право не связывает с неплатежеспособностью предоставление
   бесплатного защитника лицу, оказавшемуся под судом. Кроме того,  г-
   н  Раушенбуш предложил до слушания представить сертификат о статусе
   бедности  (см.  п.  16  выше), но Федеральный  суд  не  принял  это
   предложение.
       33.  Суд  не  может согласиться с Комиссией по  этому  вопросу.
   Вопрос  о средствах г-на Пакелли не играл никакой роли в обжалуемом
   решении:  отказ в просьбе о назначении г-на Раушенбуша  основывался
   исключительно  на том факте, что, по мнению председателя  уголовной
   палаты  Федерального  суда,  данный  случай  не  подпадал  под   ту
   категорию  дел,  где  в  соответствии  с  немецким  правом   помощь
   защитника  была  обязательной  (см.  п.  16  выше).  Соответственно
   Правительство  не  утратило в контексте статьи 6  п.  3  "c"  права
   оспаривать перед учреждениями Конвенции утверждение заявителя,  что
   он был беден.
       34. Тем не менее следует признать, что и было сделано делегатом
   Комиссии, что сегодня практически невозможно доказать, что  в  1977
   г.  у  г-на  Пакелли  не было средств для оплаты своего  защитника.
   Есть  лишь  некоторые признаки того, что это было именно  так.  Нет
   никаких  причин предполагать, что г-н Раушенбуш не смог бы получить
   вышеупомянутый сертификат; в этой связи следует отметить,  что  его
   клиент  провел под стражей в Федеративной Республике  Германии  два
   года  до его возвращения в Турцию в 1976 г. (см. п. 15 и 19  выше).
   Кроме  того,  г-н  Пакелли  представил  в  Комиссию  заявление   об
   имущественном   положении  и  справки  от   компетентных   турецких
   властей,   основанные   на  декларации  о  доходах   и   имуществе,
   представленной  им при уплате налогов за предыдущий  год;  из  этих
   документов   явствует,  что  он  занимался  бизнесом  в   небольших
   масштабах  и  его  финансовое положение было весьма  скромным.  Эти
   данные  -  которые,  более того, не оспаривались  Правительством  -
   побудили  Комиссию  предоставить ему бесплатную юридическую  помощь
   (см. п. 27 выше).
       Конечно,  этих  частностей  недостаточно,  чтобы  доказать  вне
   всяких  сомнений,  что в рассматриваемый период  времени  заявитель
   был    неплатежеспособен;   однако,   учитывая   его    предложение
   Федеральному суду доказать, что у него нет средств, и в  отсутствие
   четких  подтверждений противного, Суд склонен рассматривать  первое
   из   двух   условий,  содержащихся  в  статье  6  п.  3  "c",   как
   выполненное.
   
                        B. Интересы правосудия
   
       35.  Согласно мнению заявителя и Комиссии, интересы  правосудия
   требовали,  чтобы  г-н Раушенбуш был официально назначен  адвокатом
   заявителя на слушаниях в Федеральном суде от 29 ноября 1977 г.
       Оспаривая  эту  точку зрения, Правительство выделило  следующие
   моменты.  У  г-на  Пакелли был защитник на той  стадии  письменного
   производства;  что касается слушаний, то их предмет  был  ограничен
   основанием  принесения жалобы по вопросам права:  Судебное  решение
   от   30   апреля  1976  г.  оспаривалось  единственно  по   причине
   предполагаемых  процессуальных ошибок, заявитель не  мог  выдвигать
   новых  жалоб  и  дополнять свой меморандум,  в  котором  излагались
   основания  для  жалобы, ссылками на другие факты. В  ходе  слушаний
   речь  могла  идти  только  об  аргументах  и  выводах  юридического
   характера.  Затронутые проблемы не являлись сложными, и  вынесенное
   по  ним решение не могло повлечь серьезные последствия. Кроме того,
   г-н  Пакелли  мог  бы  явиться на суд лично.  И  наконец,  Комиссия
   неправильно  представляет  себе роль  федеральной  прокуратуры  при
   рассмотрении жалоб по вопросам права. Она с совершенно  независимых
   позиций  изучает  мотивировку  жалобы  и  следит  за  согласованным
   применением   закона  и  единообразием  судебной  практики;   таким
   образом,  эта  задача  очень  близка той  роли,  которую  выполняет
   Генеральный   прокурор   при   Кассационном   суде   Бельгии   (см.
   вышеупомянутое Судебное решение по делу Делькура).
       36.  Суд,  как это ранее сделала Комиссия, отмечает,  что,  во-
   первых,  это был один из тех редких случаев, когда Федеральный  суд
   проводил  слушания:  в  уголовных делах  это  происходит  только  в
   десяти  процентах жалоб по вопросам права (см. п. 23 выше). Тем  не
   менее   в   данном  случае  Федеральный  суд  практически  оказался
   обязанным   провести  устное  разбирательство,  т.к.  жалоба   была
   приемлемой, а прокуратура не требовала отклонить ее как явно  плохо
   обоснованную (статья 349 Уголовно-процессуального кодекса;  см.  п.
   23  выше). Это показывает, что слушание могло бы иметь существенное
   значение   для   вынесения   решения.   Поэтому   для   обеспечения
   справедливого  судебного  разбирательства принцип  состязательности
   приобретал важное значение.
       37.  Федеральному  суду предстояло вынести  решение  только  по
   вопросам,  на  которые указал, а позднее подробно изложил  в  своей
   жалобе  заявитель (см. п. 13 выше), а он ограничился лишь указанием
   на процессуальные ошибки (статья 344 з 2 и статья 352 з 1 Уголовно-
   процессуального  кодекса).  Если  бы  его  адвокат   участвовал   в
   слушании,  г-н  Пакелли  получил  бы  возможность  обосновать  свои
   жалобы,   представить,   в  случае  необходимости,   дополнительные
   подробности  и  развить  свои письменные  аргументы.  Он  смог  бы,
   например,  прокомментировать изложение дела  судьей  -  докладчиком
   (статья  351  Уголовно-процессуального кодекса; см.  п.  25  выше).
   Возможность  выступления  в  ходе судебного  слушания  представляла
   большую  ценность,  поскольку жалоба - весьма объемный  документ  -
   затрагивала девятнадцать различных вопросов.
       Как  справедливо  указала  Комиссия, один  из  содержавшихся  в
   жалобе   вопросов  касался  применения  новой  версии  статьи   146
   Уголовно-процессуального кодекса. Третья палата по уголовным  делам
   Федерального суда ранее, в 1976 г., вынесла решение, что жалоба  по
   вопросам  права,  основывающаяся на данной статье,  не  может  быть
   успешной,  если только защита одним адвокатом нескольких обвиняемых
   фактически  мешала  бы  интересам защиты  (см.  п.  26  выше).  Г-н
   Раушенбуш  не  оспаривал  такое  толкование.  Однако  он  стремился
   показать,  что  в данном деле имел место конфликт интересов.  Кроме
   того,   можно  было  предвидеть,  что  Судебное  решение,   которое
   собирался  вынести  Федеральный  суд,  было  бы  немаловажным   для
   развития   судебной  практики,  которое  -  и  это  также  признало
   Правительство - остановилось после вынесения Судебного  решения  от
   29  ноября 1977 г., которым была отклонена жалоба заявителя. В этой
   связи  толкование статьи 146 в ходе устных прений  представляло  бы
   определенный интерес.
       38.  Само  собой  разумеется,  что в  подобных  обстоятельствах
   личное   присутствие   заявителя  не   смогло   бы   компенсировать
   отсутствия  его  адвоката:  без  услуг  практикующего  юриста   г-н
   Пакелли   не   смог  бы  внести  полезный  вклад   в   рассмотрение
   возникающих  правовых  вопросов  и,  в  частности,  по  статье  146
   Уголовно-процессуального кодекса. Суд разделяет мнение Комиссии  по
   данному вопросу.
       39.  И  наконец, самое главное: судебное разбирательство жалобы
   по  настоящему  делу не было состязательным, во  всяком  случае  на
   стадии  устных  слушаний. Даже на этапе письменного разбирательства
   только   одна  служба  прокурора  при  участковом  суде  Хейлбронна
   представила  возражения на жалобу, поданную г-ном Пакелли,  который
   в  то время еще был представлен г-ном Раушенбушем, но и она не дала
   ответ  по  существу  оснований, приведенных в  жалобе  (см.  п.  14
   выше).  Относительно федеральной прокуратуры - какой бы ни была  ее
   роль  на кассационной стадии - германское право позволяло заявителю
   оспаривать  ее письменные представления (статья 349 з  3  Уголовно-
   процессуального кодекса; см. п. 23 выше). Соответственно,  если  бы
   Федеральный  суд  не принял решение провести слушания,  федеральная
   прокуратура  представила  бы  свои  выводы  в  письменном  виде   и
   сообщила  о  них  заявителю, а последний,  на  что  он  справедливо
   указал,   получил   бы  возможность  изучить   их   и,   в   случае
   необходимости, ответить на них.
       Подобная  возможность опровергнуть доводы прокуратуры во  время
   слушаний  должна  была  быть также предоставлена  и  г-ну  Пакелли.
   Отказавшись  назначить  ему защитника на  устной  стадии  судебного
   разбирательства,  Федеральный  суд лишил  его  возможности  оказать
   влияние  на  исход дела, возможности, которую он бы сохранил,  если
   бы процесс целиком был письменным.
       40.  В  подобных обстоятельствах Суд, как и Комиссия,  считает,
   что   интересы   правосудия   требовали,   чтобы   заявителю   была
   предоставлена помощь защитника в ходе слушаний в Федеральном суде.
   
                               C. Вывод
   
       41.  Соответственно имело место нарушение статьи  6  п.  3  "c"
   Конвенции.
   
             II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 1
   
       42.  Применительно  к  тем же самым фактам  заявитель  ссылался
   также на статью 6 п. 1, которая гласит:
       "Каждый  человек  имеет право при определении  его  гражданских
   прав   и   обязанностей  или  при  рассмотрении  любого  уголовного
   обвинения,   предъявляемого  ему,  на  справедливое   и   публичное
   разбирательство  дела в разумный срок независимым и беспристрастным
   судом,  созданным на основании закона. Судебное решение объявляется
   публично, однако пресса и публика могут не допускаться на  судебные
   заседания  в  течение всего процесса или его части по  соображениям
   морали,  общественного порядка или государственной  безопасности  в
   демократическом  обществе,  а  также когда  того  требуют  интересы
   несовершеннолетних или для защиты частной жизни  сторон,  или  -  в
   той  мере,  в  какой это, по мнению суда, строго необходимо  -  при
   особых   обстоятельствах,  когда  гласность  нарушала  бы  интересы
   правосудия".
       Правительство  не  выдвинуло каких-либо  отдельных  доводов  по
   данной проблеме.
       Соглашаясь  с  Комиссией,  Суд хотел бы  напомнить,  что  норма
   статьи  6 п. 3 "c" представляет собой конкретное применение  общего
   принципа справедливого судебного разбирательства, изложенного в  п.
   1  (см. Решение по делу Девеера от 27 февраля 1980 г. Серия  A,  т.
   35,  с.  30, п. 56). Соответственно, вопрос о том, был ли  соблюден
   п.   1,  не  имеет  реального  значения  для  дела  заявителя;   он
   поглощается вопросом о том, были ли выполнены требования п. 3  "c".
   Установление  нарушения  требований  п.  3  "c"  избавляет  Суд  от
   необходимости рассмотрения данного дела в свете п. 1  (см.  mutatis
   mutandis  вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Девеера. Серия A,  т.  35,
   с. 30 - 31, п. 56).
   
                       III. Применение статьи 50
   
       43.  Г-н  Пакелли  потребовал справедливого  удовлетворения  на
   основании  статьи  50.  Прежде всего  он  просил  Суд  аннулировать
   Решение  Федерального суда от 29 ноября 1977  г.  и  дать  указание
   Правительству    выразить   официальное    неодобрение    некоторых
   содержащихся   в   нем  пассажей,  которые  он   рассматривал   как
   расистские  или  дискриминационные,  а  потому  неприемлемые.   Во-
   вторых,  он  просил выплатить ему справедливое возмещение,  которое
   Суд  сочтет  подобающим, за причиненный моральный вред. И  наконец,
   он   потребовал  возмещения  издержек  и  расходов,   связанных   с
   судопроизводством в Федеральном Конституционном  Суде,  которые  он
   определил в размере 668,96 немецкой марки.
       44.   В  представлении  Правительства  утверждалось,  что   эти
   разнообразные  требования должны быть отвергнуты.  Оно  настаивало,
   что  отказ  Федерального суда назначить ему  официального  адвоката
   нисколько  не  повредил  заявителю и что  его  критика  причин,  по
   которым  суд  вынес такое решение, была необоснованна. Относительно
   издержек   и   расходов   по  обращению  в   Конституционный   Суд,
   Правительство  не  считало  установленным  то,  что   г-н   Пакелли
   вынужден  был их нести; оно заявило также, что требуемая  сумма  не
   совсем   точно   соответствует  шкале   ставок,   применявшихся   в
   рассматриваемый период времени.
       45.  Суд считает, что в данных обстоятельствах вопрос готов для
   решения (первое предложение статьи 50 п. 3 Регламента Суда).
       Суд  отмечает  в  отношении  первого  требования,  что  он   на
   основании  Конвенции  не уполномочен ни отменять  Судебные  решения
   Федерального  суда, ни давать Правительству указания  дезавуировать
   те  выдержки  из него, на которые жалуется заявитель  (см.  mutatis
   mutandis Решение по делу Маркс от 13 июня 1979 г. Серия A,  т.  31,
   с.  25,  п.  58,  и Решение по делу Даджена от 24 февраля  1983  г.
   Серия  A,  т.  59, с. 8, п. 15). Не выражая какого-либо  мнения  по
   поводу  данных  выдержек, Суд полагает, что  их  наличие  не  может
   рассматриваться как следствие нарушения статьи 6 п. 3 "c".
       46.  Как  справедливо указало Правительство, г-н  Вингертер  не
   только не доказал наличие морального вреда, но и не указал,  в  чем
   он  заключался.  Нет  ничего,  что бы  показывало,  что  отсутствие
   защитника   вызвало  у  г-на  Пакелли  давящее  ощущение  изоляции,
   замешательства  и  чувства покинутости (см. вышеупомянутое  Решение
   по  делу  Артико. Серия A, т. 37, с. 21, п. 47); эта версия кажется
   маловероятной, так как уже в августе 1976 г. он вернулся в  Турцию.
   Во  всяком  случае установление факта нарушения настоящим  Решением
   уже  представляет собой достаточную компенсацию за якобы понесенный
   моральный вред (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Ле Конта,  Ван
   Левена и Де Мейера от 18 октября 1982 г. Серия A, т. 54, с.  8,  п.
   16).
       47.  Издержки и расходы, о возмещении которых идет  речь,  были
   понесены  с  тем,  чтобы Федеральный Конституционный  Суд  исправил
   нарушения требований статьи 6 п. 3 "c" (см. вышеупомянутое  Решение
   по  делу Даджена. Серия A, т. 59, с. 9, п. 20). Более того, это  не
   оспаривалось  и  Правительством. Однако  Правительство  утверждало,
   что  эти  расходы нес защитник заявителя, а не он сам, так как  г-н
   Вингертер  отказался от вознаграждения и, более  того,  по  причине
   пропуска  срока  исковой  давности он утратил  право  на  взыскание
   долга.
       И  действительно,  до сих пор г-н Пакелли  не  заплатил  своему
   адвокату   за   представительство  его  интересов   в   Федеральном
   Конституционном  Суде:  г-н Вингертер  не  направлял  ему  счет  за
   оказанные  услуги  до 7 февраля 1982 г., и, как  он  заявляет,  это
   было  сделано  для  того, чтобы отсрочить оплату  вознаграждения  с
   учетом   финансовых  трудностей  заявителя.  В  памятной   записке,
   направленной  в Комиссию 16 февраля 1982 г., г-н Вингертер  указал,
   что  он не получил еще какой-либо платы за услуги, оказанные в ходе
   судебного  разбирательства, о котором идет  речь,  и  не  просил  о
   таковых, так как он знал, что у его клиента нет средств.
       Тем   не   менее   ни  эти  заявления,  ни  другие   документы,
   представленные  в Суд, не показывают с достаточной  четкостью,  что
   имел  место  отказ  от права получения вознаграждения.  И  в  самом
   деле,  как справедливо указал делегат Комиссии, неудивительно,  что
   г-н  Вингертер, зная финансовое положение своего клиента, решил  не
   выставлять  ему счет за проделанную работу на более  ранней  стадии
   (см.  Решение  по  делу  X против Соединенного  Королевства  от  18
   октября  1982  г.  Серия A, т. 55, с. 18,  п.  24).  Суд  хотел  бы
   указать, как это уже было сделано делегатом Комиссии, что  в  делах
   о   правах  человека  адвокат,  оказывая  помощь  тому,  кто  не  в
   состоянии сразу ему заплатить, действует во всеобщем интересе.
       Относительно  довода,  основанного на истечении  срока  исковой
   давности на право г-на Вингертера взыскать причитающийся ему  долг,
   это  не  вопрос  публичного порядка, и здесь следует положиться  на
   решение самого г-на Пакелли.
       Принимая  решение  на основе справедливости, Суд  находит,  что
   сумма  в 668,96 немецкой марки, требуемая в порядке компенсации  за
   услуги защитника и за расходы, является разумной.
   
                  ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
   
       1.  Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи  6  п.  3  "c"
   Конвенции;
       2.  Постановил,  что  рассматривать данное  дело  на  основании
   статьи 6 п. 1 нет необходимости;
       3.  Постановил,  что  государство - ответчик  должно  выплатить
   заявителю за понесенные им юридические издержки и расходы  сумму  в
   размере  шестисот  шестидесяти восьми немецких  марок  и  девяноста
   шести   пфеннигов   (DM  668,96),  и  отвергает  оставшуюся   часть
   требования о справедливом возмещении.
   
       Совершено   на   английском   и  французском   языках,   причем
   французский  текст является аутентичным, и оглашено во Дворце  прав
   человека в Страсбурге 25 апреля 1983 г.
   
                                                          Председатель
                                                          Жерар ВИАРДА
   
                                                                Грефье
                                                     Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
   
   
   
   
   
   
                    EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
                                   
                      CASE OF PAKELLI v. GERMANY
                                   
                               JUDGMENT
                                   
                       (Strasbourg, 25.IV.1983)
   
       In the Pakelli case,
       The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
   Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of  Human
   Rights   and  Fundamental  Freedoms  ("the  Convention")  and   the
   relevant  provisions  of  the Rules of  Court  <*>,  as  a  Chamber
   composed of the following judges:
   -------------------------------
       <*>  Note  by  the  registry:  In  the  version  of  the  Rules
   applicable  when proceedings were instituted. A revised version  of
   the  Rules of Court entered into force on 1 January 1983, but  only
   in respect of cases referred to the Court after that date.
   
       Mr. G. Wiarda, President,
       Mr. R. Ryssdal,
       Mr. L. Liesch,
       Mr. L.-E. Pettiti,
       Mr. B. Walsh,
       Mr. R. Bernhardt,
       Mr. J. Gersing,
       and  also  Mr.  M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and  Mr.  H.  Petzold,
   Deputy Registrar,
       Having  deliberated in private on 26 November 1982  and  on  23
   March 1983,
       Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
   mentioned date:
   
                               PROCEDURE
   
       1.  The  present case was referred to the Court by the European
   Commission  of  Human Rights ("the Commission") and the  Government
   of  the  Federal Republic of Germany ("the Government").  The  case
   originated  in  an  application (no. 8398/78)  against  that  State
   lodged  with  the  Commission on 5 October 1978  under  Article  25
   (art.  25)  of  the Convention by a Turkish national,  Mr.  {Lutfu}
   Pakelli.
       2.  The  Commission's request and the Government's  application
   were  lodged  with the registry of the Court within the  period  of
   three  months laid down by Articles 32 para. 1 and 47  (art.  32-1,
   art. 47) - the former on 14 May and the latter on 24 May 1982.  The
   request  referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48)  and  to
   the  declaration whereby the Federal Republic of Germany recognised
   the  compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46)  (art.  46);
   its  purpose  was to obtain a decision as to whether or  not  there
   had  been a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under
   Article  6  para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c). The application  invited  the
   Court to hold that there had been no such breach.
       3.  The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included,  as
   ex  officio members, Mr. R. Bernhardt, the elected judge of  German
   nationality (Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention),  and  Mr.  G.
   Wiarda,  the  President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3  (b)  of  the
   Rules of Court). On 28 May 1982, the President drew by lot, in  the
   presence  of  the Registrar, the names of the five  other  members,
   namely  Mr. R. Ryssdal, Mr. M. Zekia, Mr. L. Liesch, {Mr. E. Garcia
   de  Enterria} and Mr. B. Walsh (Article 43 (art. 43) in fine of the
   Convention  and Rule 21 para. 4). Subsequently, Mr.  L.-E.  Pettiti
   and  Mr. J. Gersing, substitute judges, took the place of Mr. Zekia
   and  {Mr. Garcia de Enterria}, who were prevented from taking  part
   in  the  consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1 and  24  para.
   1).
       4.  Mr. Wiarda, who had assumed the office of President of  the
   Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), ascertained, through the Registrar,  the
   views  of  the  Agent  of the Government and the  Delegate  of  the
   Commission regarding the procedure to be followed. On 9 June  1982,
   having  particular  regard  to  their  concurring  statements,   he
   concluded  that there was no need for memorials to be filed.  After
   consulting,  through  the  Deputy  Registrar,  the  Agent  of   the
   Government  and  the  Delegate  of the  Commission,  the  President
   directed on 4 October that the oral proceedings should open  on  25
   November 1982.
       On  2 November, the Registrar, on the President's instructions,
   requested  the  Commission and the Government  to  produce  several
   documents; these were received on 5, 22 and 23 November.
       5.  The  hearings  were  held in public  at  the  Human  Rights
   Building,  Strasbourg,  on  25 November.  Immediately  before  they
   opened,  the  Chamber  had  held  a  preparatory  meeting;  it  had
   authorised  the Agent and the advocates of the Government  and  the
   person  assisting the Delegate of the Commission to use the  German
   language (Rule 27 paras. 2 and 3).
       There appeared before the Court:
       - for the Government:
       Mrs. I. Maier, Ministerialdirigentin at the Federal Ministry of
   Justice, Agent,
       Mr.  P.  Riess,  Ministerialrat  at  the  Federal  Ministry  of
   Justice,
       Mr.  W. Stiller, Regierungsdirektor at the Federal Ministry  of
   Justice, Advisers;
       - for the Commission:
       Mr. J.A. Frowein, Delegate,
       Mr. N. Wingerter, the applicant's lawyer before the Commission,
   assisting  the Delegate (Rule 29 para. 1, second sentence,  of  the
   Rules of Court).
       The  Court heard addresses by Mrs. Maier and Mr. Riess for  the
   Government   and  by  Mr.  Frowein  and  Mr.  Wingerter   for   the
   Commission,  as  well  as their replies to  its  questions.  On  26
   November,  in  response  to a request which  he  had  made  on  the
   instructions  of  the  President, the  Registrar  received  certain
   documents from the Commission.
       6.  On 20 December, the Commission transmitted to the Court the
   applicant's claims under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention.
       In  accordance with the Orders and directions of the President,
   the registry received the following documents on this issue:
       - on 20 January 1983, the comments of the Government;
       -  on  9 and 10 February 1983, the observations of the Delegate
   of  the  Commission  and,  through him,  the  observations  of  the
   applicant.
   
                               THE FACTS
   
                   I. The circumstances of the case
   
       7.  Mr.  Pakelli, a Turkish national born in 1937, is currently
   living  in  Turkey;  he  was resident in the  Federal  Republic  of
   Germany from 1964 to 1976.
       8.  The  applicant arrived in the Federal Republic in  February
   1964  and  was  engaged by the firm of Audi-NSU at  Neckarsulm.  He
   stayed  there  for  two and a half years. Subsequently,  he  had  a
   succession  of different occupations: mechanic in another  firm  at
   Neckarsulm,  manager  of  a restaurant, independent  insurance  and
   building-loans   broker.   The   last-mentioned   activity,   which
   consisted  of  negotiating  and  concluding,  for  example,   life-
   insurance  and  savings  contracts with Turkish  workers,  provided
   him, as he himself stated, with a very good monthly income.
       9.  On  31 May 1972, the Heilbronn District Court (Amtsgericht)
   imposed  on  him  a suspended sentence of ten months'  imprisonment
   for      an      offence     against     the     Narcotics      Act
   (Betaeubungsmittelgesetz).    The    Heilbronn    Regional    Court
   (Landgericht) dismissed the applicant's appeal on 12 March 1973.
       These proceedings are not here in issue.
       10.  The criminal proceedings to which the present case relates
   began in 1974.
       Mr.  Pakelli  was  arrested on 7 May  on  suspicion  of  having
   committed  a  further  offence against  the  Narcotics  Act;  on  4
   September,   he  was  granted  the  assistance  of  an   officially
   appointed lawyer, namely Mr. Wingerter, of Heilbronn.
       11.  The trial opened before the Heilbronn Regional Court on  7
   April  1976 and continued on 8, 14, 23 and 3O April. The  applicant
   was  defended  by  Mr. Wingerter and, at certain  moments,  by  Mr.
   Rauschenbusch, a member of the same firm.
       On  30 April, the court sentenced Mr. Pakelli to two years' and
   three  months'  imprisonment for an offence against  the  Narcotics
   Act  and for tax evasion (Steuerhinterziehung): it was found to  be
   proved  that  in  the  spring  of 1972 the  accused  had  illegally
   imported  into  Germany  sixteen kilograms  of  cannabis  resin  of
   Turkish origin, hidden in his car.
       12.  On 3 May 1976, Mr. Wingerter filed an appeal on points  of
   law  (Revision).  In  his  memorial of 5 August,  setting  out  the
   grounds  of  appeal, he relied, inter alia, on Article 146  of  the
   Code  of  Criminal Procedure, which provides that  several  accused
   persons  may  not  be  defended by one and  the  same  lawyer  (see
   paragraph   26  below).  Mr.  Wingerter  explained  that   he   had
   previously  represented  another person  who  on  the  occasion  in
   question had, according to the Regional Court's findings, been  Mr.
   Pakelli's accomplice.
       Mr.  Pakelli  was  released on 10 August 1976 and  returned  to
   Turkey.
       On     22    October,    the    Federal    public    prosecutor
   (Generalbundesanwalt) moved that the appeal  be  held  inadmissible
   on  the ground that it had been filed by a defence counsel who,  on
   his own admission, was not entitled to represent the applicant.
       On  19 November, Mr. Rauschenbusch applied for leave to proceed
   out  of  time (Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand) in  order  to
   lodge  a  fresh appeal, which appeal he in fact filed at  the  same
   moment.  On 21 December 1976, the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof)
   allowed  the  application; it had first sought the opinion  of  the
   public  prosecutor who, without giving reasons, had indicated  that
   he was in favour of such a course.
       On   13   January   1977,  the  Regional  Court   granted   Mr.
   Rauschenbusch's  request  of  19  November  1976  to  be  appointed
   official  defence  counsel  to file the memorial  setting  out  the
   grounds  of  appeal; two weeks later it relieved Mr.  Wingerter  of
   his duties.
       13.  In  his memorial of 26 January 1977, which was thirty-four
   pages  in length, Mr. Rauschenbusch complained solely of procedural
   errors  (Verfahrensrugen).  He  listed  nineteen,  most  of   which
   concerned  decisions of the Heilbronn Regional  Court  refusing  to
   appoint an expert or to summon, question or have questions  put  to
   witnesses.  The last of the alleged errors related to  Article  146
   of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure: recalling that Mr.  Wingerter
   had  previously defended another person whom the Regional Court had
   convicted,  on 21 June 1974, as an accomplice of Mr.  Pakelli,  Mr.
   Rauschenbusch  maintained that this recourse to  a  common  defence
   counsel  had  been contrary to the interests of both  accused  (see
   paragraph 26 below).
       14. In its observations in reply ({Gegenerklarung}) of 14 March
   1977,  the  public  prosecutor's office attached  to  the  Regional
   Court  submitted  that the appeal was inadmissible.  It  considered
   that  Article 146 prevented Mr. Rauschenbusch, just as it  did  Mr.
   Wingerter, from acting in the case as officially appointed  lawyer.
   Mr.  Rauschenbusch  replied on 23 March. He  pointed  out,  amongst
   other  things,  that  since  he had never  defended  Mr.  Pakelli's
   accomplice, Article 146 did not apply to him.
       On  20  April, the Federal public prosecutor invited the above-
   mentioned  office to comment on the complaints that had been  made;
   in  his  view,  it  was at least doubtful whether  the  appeal  was
   inadmissible de plano.
       On  12  August, the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office  filed
   its  supplementary observations (weitere Gegenerklaerung), dated  1
   August;  it  sent  a copy to Mr. Rauschenbusch. In accordance  with
   the   practice  in  such  matters  (Instruction  no.  162  of   the
   Instructions   on  Criminal  Procedure  and  Administrative   Fines
   Procedure   -   Richtlinien  {fur}  das  Strafverfahren   und   das
   Bussgeldverfahren), the observations reproduced for each  complaint
   the   relevant  documents  in  the  case-file,  in  particular  the
   requests  made by the applicant's lawyer during the trial  and  the
   decisions  taken by the Regional Court thereon. As regards  Article
   146  of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure, the public  prosecutor's
   office referred to its earlier observations, including those of  14
   March.
       15.  On  application by the Federal public prosecutor's office,
   the  Federal  Court decided on 13 October 1977 to  hold  a  hearing
   (Hauptverhandlung)  on  29  November.  Mr.  Rauschenbusch  and  his
   client,  who had returned to Turkey, were notified of  this  on  17
   October.
       16.  On  24 October, Mr. Rauschenbusch applied to be officially
   appointed  as  the  applicant's  lawyer  for  the  hearing  of   29
   November.
       The  President of the 1st Criminal Chamber (Strafsenat) of  the
   Federal Court refused the application on the following day. In  his
   view,  an accused (Angeklagter) who was at liberty was not entitled
   to  such  an  appointment for hearings in an appeal on a  point  of
   law;  there  was no legal requirement at that stage for him  either
   to  appear in person or to be represented by a lawyer (Article  350
   paras. 2 and 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; see paragraph  22
   below).    As    regards   compliance   with    procedural    rules
   (verfahrensrechtlich),  an  appeal court  (Revisionsgericht)  would
   examine  the impugned decision on the basis of the written  grounds
   of   appeal;   as   regards   any   substantive   complaints   (bei
   sachlichrechtlicher  Beanstandung), it  would  effect  of  its  own
   motion   a   review  that  was  not  subject  to  any  limitations.
   Furthermore,  on this occasion neither the facts of  the  case  nor
   the legal issues it raised justified the appointment requested.
       In  the objections (Gegenvorstellungen) he raised on 7 November
   1977, Mr. Rauschenbusch cited a judgment of 19 October 1977 of  the
   Federal  Constitutional  Court (see paragraph  22  below),  holding
   that,  in addition to the cases provided for by law, legal aid  had
   to  be  granted  for  hearings in appeals on  a  point  of  law  in
   "serious"  ("schwerwiegend")  cases if  the  person  concerned  was
   unable to pay a lawyer of his own choosing. And, he submitted,  Mr.
   Pakelli was in such a situation, for a final conviction would  lead
   to  his  expulsion. Mr. Rauschenbusch asked the  Federal  Court  to
   indicate  whether he should supply particulars of  the  applicant's
   assets  in  order to substantiate (glaubhaft machen)  the  latter's
   lack  of  means.  According to Mr. Rauschenbusch, Mr.  Pakelli  was
   obviously  (offensichtlich) not in a position to pay a  lawyer.  He
   had  come  to  the  Federal Republic as a migrant  worker  and  had
   returned  to  Turkey  after spending a long (laengeren)  period  in
   Heilbronn prison. It was evident that he had no savings.
       Mr.  Rauschenbusch requested that, if need be,  the  matter  be
   referred to the Chamber for decision.
       On  10  November, the President of the 1st Criminal Chamber  of
   the  Federal  Court confirmed his decision of 25  October  refusing
   the   application;  he  took  the  view  that  the  above-mentioned
   judgment  of  19  October  1977 did not concern  a  case  that  was
   comparable to the applicant's.
       17. The hearing was held on 29 November 1977, in the absence of
   the  applicant and of Mr. Rauschenbusch. According to the  minutes,
   the  Federal  Court heard the judge acting as rapporteur  and  then
   the  submissions  (Ausfuhrungen) of  an  official  of  the  Federal
   public  prosecutor's  office  (Bundesanwaltschaft)  in  favour   of
   rejecting  the  appeal. After deliberating in  private,  the  court
   gave on the same day judgment dismissing the appeal.
       The  judgment  held  firstly that the  appeal  was  admissible:
   Article  146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not prevent  Mr.
   Rauschenbusch  from  representing Mr. Pakelli  before  the  Federal
   Court.  On the other hand, that Article had not been complied  with
   at  first instance since Mr. Wingerter had previously defended  the
   applicant's accomplice. However, the Federal Court, referring to  a
   judgment  of  its  3rd Criminal Chamber (see paragraph  26  below),
   added  that an appeal on a point of law based on that Article could
   succeed  only if the representation of several accused by  one  and
   the   same  lawyer  proved  to  be  really  incompatible,  in   the
   circumstances of the case, with the duties of the defence.  And  on
   this  occasion  it  had not been established  that  there  was  any
   conflict of interests.
       The   Federal  Court  then  rejected  the  remainder   of   the
   complaints:  some were examined in detail and held  to  be  without
   foundation and the others were considered more briefly and held  to
   be manifestly ill-founded.
       The  judgment, which was ten pages in length, was served on Mr.
   Rauschenbusch on 21 December 1977.
       18.  In  January 1978, Mr. Wingerter lodged an appeal with  the
   Federal  Constitutional Court. Alleging a violation of Articles  1,
   2,  3,  6,  20  and 103 para. 1 of the Basic Law, he  repeated  the
   submissions  made  by  his colleague Mr. Rauschenbusch  before  the
   Federal  Court  on  7 November 1977 (see paragraph  16  above).  He
   argued  that it was only through a defence counsel that Mr. Pakelli
   could  have availed himself of his right to be heard: he  lived  in
   Turkey,  lacked financial resources and had an insufficient command
   of   German.   In   addition,  the  legal  issues   involved   were
   particularly  complex, as was shown by the length of  the  memorial
   setting out the grounds of appeal (see paragraph 13 above) and  the
   Federal  Court's  decision to hold a hearing.  Mr.  Pakelli  should
   therefore have been given the opportunity of stating his  views  on
   the  submissions of the Federal public prosecutor's office.  Again,
   the  consequences of an unfavourable judgment would have been  such
   as  to make the official appointment of a lawyer essential: for the
   applicant,  dismissal of the appeal meant his  undoing  in  Germany
   and the breakdown of his marriage and family life.
       Mr.  Wingerter, who requested that legal aid be granted to  the
   applicant,  asked the Constitutional Court to indicate  whether  he
   should  supply  particulars  of his client's  assets  in  order  to
   substantiate (glaubhaft machen) the latter's lack of means.
       In  a  ruling given on 10 May 1978 by a panel of three  judges,
   the  Constitutional Court decided not to hear  the  appeal  on  the
   ground  that it did not offer sufficient prospects of success.  The
   Constitutional  Court found nothing arbitrary in  the  decision  of
   the  President  of the 1st Criminal Chamber of the  Federal  Court.
   Moreover,  the  case was not "serious", within the meaning  of  the
   above-mentioned  judgment of 19 October  1977  (see  paragraphs  16
   above  and  22 below). Finally, Mr. Pakelli could have remained  in
   the  Federal  Republic of Germany and attended the  hearing  before
   the   Federal  Court,  if  need  be  with  the  assistance  of   an
   interpreter.
       19. After his arrest on 7 May 1974, Mr. Pakelli had remained in
   custody  until  10 August 1976, partly in detention on  remand  and
   partly to serve sentences that had been imposed on him.
   
                       II. Relevant legislation
   
                    1. Officially appointed lawyers
   
       20.  If the accused has not chosen a defence counsel, the trial
   court  will  appoint one in the following cases (listed in  Article
   140 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure):
       -  the  trial at first instance is before the Court  of  Appeal
   (Oberlandesgericht) or the Regional Court;
       -   the   accused   is  charged  with  an  indictable   offence
   (Verbrechen);
       -  the proceedings may result in the accused's being prohibited
   from exercising a profession;
       - the accused is deaf or dumb;
       -  the  accused has been interned for at least three months  by
   order or with the approval of a court and has not been released  at
   least two weeks before the opening of the trial;
       -  the  question arises whether the accused should be  detained
   for mental examination;
       -   the   case   concerns   preventive  detention   proceedings
   (Sicherungsverfahren);
       -  a  decision has been taken prohibiting the previous  defence
   counsel from taking part in the proceedings.
       An  appointment will also be made in other cases, either by the
   court  of  its own motion or at the accused's request,  if  such  a
   step appears necessary on account of the seriousness of the act  in
   question, the factual or legal complexity of the case, or if it  is
   obvious  that  the accused cannot conduct his own defence  (Article
   140 para. 2).
       21.  The  official appointment of a lawyer by the  trial  court
   covers  not  only the proceedings before that court  but  also  the
   written  stage  of any appeal on a point of law. If necessary,  the
   trial court will make a special appointment for the latter stage.
       22. An accused (Angeklagter) who is in custody does not have an
   enforceable  right to attend hearings in an appeal on  a  point  of
   law  -  whether  before  the  appeal court  or  the  Federal  Court
   (Articles    121    and    135   of    the    Judicial    Code    -
   Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) -, but he may be represented thereat  by
   a  lawyer (Article 350 para. 2). If he has not chosen a lawyer  and
   is  not  brought to the hearing, the President of the court  having
   jurisdiction  will  appoint one for him if he so requests  (Article
   350 para. 3).
       An  accused  who  is  at liberty may appear  in  person  or  be
   represented  by a lawyer at the appeal hearing (Article  350  para.
   2).  According  to  the  case-law of  the  Federal  Court,  defence
   counsel can be assigned to him only under Article 140 para. 2  (see
   paragraph  20 above), since Article 140 para. 1 does not  apply  to
   hearings  in  an  appeal  on  a point of  law  (Entscheidungen  des
   Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen, vol. 19, pp. 258 - 263).
       Furthermore,  the Federal Constitutional Court  has  held  that
   defence  counsel is to be appointed by the court of its own  motion
   and  at  the  expense of the State in serious cases (schwerwiegende
   {Falle})  if  the  accused  cannot pay for  a  lawyer  of  his  own
   choosing  (Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts,  vol.  46,
   pp. 202 - 213).
   
                2. Hearings in appeals on points of law
   
       23. The court concerned may dispose of an appeal on a point  of
   law without hearings in the following cases only:
       -  where it finds the appeal inadmissible (Article 349 para.  1
   of the Code of Criminal Procedure);
       -  where,  on a reasoned application by the public prosecutor's
   office,  the  court  considers  unanimously  that  the  appeal   is
   manifestly ill-founded (Article 349 para. 2); and
       - where the court finds unanimously that an appeal filed in the
   interests of the accused is well-founded (Article 349 para. 4).
       In  all  other  cases the court has to hold  a  hearing  before
   taking  its  decision  (Article 349 para. 5);  before  the  Federal
   Court,  there are hearings in only ten per cent of the  appeals  on
   points of law lodged in criminal cases.
       When the public prosecutor's office applies for an appeal to be
   rejected  as  manifestly  ill-founded, it has  to  communicate  its
   submissions and the reasons to the appellant; the latter  may  file
   a reply within two weeks (Article 349 para. 3).
       24.  Article  350  para. 1 requires that the  accused  and  his
   lawyer be informed of the date and place of the hearing; if  it  is
   not  possible to contact the former, notification to the latter  is
   sufficient.
       25. Appeal hearings open with the rapporteur's address; this is
   followed   by  the  statements  and  submissions  of   the   public
   prosecutor's  office,  the  accused and his  defence  counsel.  The
   appellant  is  heard first and the last address  to  the  court  is
   always made by the accused (Article 351).
   
                      3. "Common defence counsel"
                   (gemeinschaftliche Verteidigung)
   
       26.  According to the former version of Article 146 of the Code
   of  Criminal Procedure, which was in force until 31 December  1974,
   several  accused could be represented by a single counsel  if  this
   was  not contrary to the interests of the defence. As it was  often
   difficult  for  courts  to detect or establish  such  conflicts  of
   interests,  Article 146 was modified in 1974: the new  text,  which
   has  been  applicable since 1 January 1975, does not allow  several
   accused to be defended by a common defence counsel.
       However,  the Federal Court (3rd Criminal Chamber) held  on  27
   February  and  13 October 1976 that an appeal on  a  point  of  law
   based  on a violation of Article 146 could succeed only if recourse
   to  a  common defence counsel was in fact contrary to the interests
   of   the   defence   (Entscheidungen  des  Bundesgerichtshofes   in
   Strafsachen,  vol. 26, pp. 291 - 298; vol. 27, pp. 22  -  24).  The
   1st  Criminal Chamber followed these precedents in its judgment  of
   29  November 1977 in the present case (see paragraph 17 above). The
   Government stated that this interpretation has since been  accepted
   by all the Criminal Chambers of the Federal Court.
   
                   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
   
       27.  In his application lodged with the Commission on 5 October
   1978  (no.  8398/78), Mr. Pakelli claimed to be  the  victim  of  a
   violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of  the
   Convention.  He  alleged that he had lacked the means  to  pay  for
   defence  counsel  of  his own choosing and that  the  interests  of
   justice  required  that  a lawyer should  have  been  appointed  to
   represent  him  at the hearing before the Federal  Court.  He  also
   asserted  that  he  had  not been able to  return  to  the  Federal
   Republic  of Germany to present his own case, since he had  neither
   a residence permit nor the necessary money to pay an interpreter.
       On  16  May 1980, the Commission granted Mr. Pakelli free legal
   aid  on the basis of a declaration of means dated 9 September  1979
   and confirmed by certificates from the competent authorities.
       On   7  May  1981,  the  Commission  declared  the  application
   admissible  in  so  far  as  it related to  the  rejection  of  the
   applicant's request that a lawyer be officially appointed  for  the
   hearing  before the Federal Court; it declared the other complaints
   inadmissible  on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic  remedies
   (Articles  26  and  27  para.  3  (art.  26,  art.  27-3)  of   the
   Convention).
       In  its report of 12 December 1981 (Article 31), the Commission
   expressed  the unanimous opinion that the applicant  had  been  the
   victim  of  a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c)  and,
   by  eleven  votes  to  one, that it was not required  to  determine
   whether  there had also been breach of the right to a  fair  trial,
   within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
   
         FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT
   
       28.  At  the  close  of the hearings of 25 November  1982,  the
   Government  invited the Court "to hold that there has  not  been  a
   violation  of Article 6 paras. 3 (c) and 1 (art. 6-3-c,  art.  6-1)
   of the Convention in the applicant's case".
   
                             AS TO THE LAW
   
       29.  The  applicant complained of the refusal  of  the  Federal
   Court,  in  proceedings  concerning an  appeal  on  points  of  law
   (Revision),  to  appoint  Mr.  Rauschenbusch  as  official  defence
   counsel for the hearings of 29 November 1977 before that court;  he
   alleged that this constituted a violation of paragraph 3 (c)  (art.
   6-3-c),  and  also of paragraph 1, of Article 6 (art. 6-1)  of  the
   Convention.
       It  was  not disputed that these provisions were applicable  in
   the  present  case  and the Court takes this point  as  established
   (see,  mutatis mutandis, the Delcourt judgment of 17 January  1970,
   Series  A  no.  11, pp. 13 - 15, paras. 25 and 26, and  the  Artico
   judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, pp. 15 - 18, paras. 31  -
   38). However, as the Government rightly pointed out, the manner  in
   which  those  paragraphs are to be applied depends on  the  special
   features  of  the  proceedings involved  (see  the  above-mentioned
   Delcourt judgment, ibid.).
   
                       I. The alleged violation
                 of article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c)
   
       30. Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) reads as follows:
       "Everyone  charged  with a criminal offence has  the  following
   minimum rights:
       ...
       (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance  of
   his  own  choosing or, if he has not sufficient means  to  pay  for
   legal  assistance,  to  be  given it free  when  the  interests  of
   justice so require;
       ..."
       Before  the  Commission, the Government argued that  Article  6
   para.  3  (c) (art. 6-3-c) did not require the grant of free  legal
   assistance  in  the  present  case since  Mr.  Pakelli  could  have
   appeared  in  person at the Federal Court's hearing. Although  they
   did  not  dwell on this point before the Court, they repeated  that
   the  applicant  could have presented his own case  to  the  Federal
   Court.
       31.  Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) guarantees three rights
   to  a person charged with a criminal offence: to defend himself  in
   person,  to  defend  himself through legal assistance  of  his  own
   choosing  and, on certain conditions, to be given legal  assistance
   free. To link the corresponding phrases together, the English  text
   employs on each occasion the disjunctive "or"; the French text,  on
   the  other hand, utilises the equivalent - "ou" - only between  the
   phrases  enouncing the first and the second right;  thereafter,  it
   uses  the  conjunctive "et". The "travaux {preparatoires}"  contain
   hardly  any explanation of this linguistic difference. They  reveal
   solely  that  in  the course of a final examination  of  the  draft
   Convention,  on  the eve of its signature, a Committee  of  Experts
   made  "a  certain number of formal corrections and  corrections  of
   translation",  including the replacement of "and" by  "or"  in  the
   English  version  of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c)  (Collected
   Edition  of  the  "Travaux {preparatoires}",  vol.  IV,  p.  1010).
   Having  regard  to the object and purpose of this paragraph,  which
   is  designed  to ensure effective protection of the rights  of  the
   defence (see the above-mentioned Artico judgment, Series A no.  37,
   p.  16, para. 33; see also, mutatis mutandis, the Adolf judgment of
   26  March  1982, Series A no. 49, p. 15, para. 30, and  the  Sunday
   Times  judgment  of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30,  p.  30,  para.
   48),  the  French  text here provides more reliable  guidance;  the
   Court  concurs  with the Commission on this point.  Accordingly,  a
   "person  charged  with a criminal offence" who  does  not  wish  to
   defend  himself  in person must be able to have recourse  to  legal
   assistance  of  his  own choosing; if he does not  have  sufficient
   means  to  pay  for  such  assistance, he  is  entitled  under  the
   Convention  to  be given it free when the interests of  justice  so
   require.
       Thus  Mr. Pakelli, although authorised by German law to  appear
   in  person before the Federal Court, could claim such assistance to
   the  extent that the conditions laid down by Article 6 para. 3  (c)
   (art. 6-3-c) were satisfied.
   
                       A. Absence of sufficient
                   means to pay for legal assistance
   
       32.  The  Government argued as follows. There  was  nothing  to
   substantiate  the  applicant's  assertion  that  he  did  not  have
   sufficient  means to pay for legal assistance of his own  choosing;
   on  the  contrary, he had himself stated before the Regional  Court
   that  he  earned  a  very good income in the  Federal  Republic  of
   Germany; according to the findings contained in the judgment of  30
   April  1976 (see paragraph 11 above), he also made money  from  his
   drug  traffic  activities; in addition, he had  opened  a  business
   shortly after returning to Turkey.
       The Commission considered that the Government were not entitled
   at  this  stage to challenge the applicant's assertions. It pointed
   out  firstly  that  under  German  law  the  grant  of  free  legal
   assistance was not conditional on the indigence of the litigant  in
   question;  secondly,  Mr.  Rauschenbusch  had  offered  before  the
   hearings  to  supply a certificate of indigence (see  paragraph  16
   above), but the Federal Court did not accept this offer.
       33.  The  Court is unable to agree with the Commission on  this
   point.  The question of Mr. Pakelli's means played no part  in  the
   decision  complained  of:  the  refusal  of  the  request  for  the
   appointment  of  Mr.  Rauschenbusch was based solely  on  the  fact
   that,  in the opinion of the President of the 1st Criminal  Chamber
   of  the Federal Court, the case did not fall within the category of
   cases  for which German law prescribed the assistance of a  defence
   counsel  (see  paragraph  16  above). Accordingly,  the  Government
   cannot  be  held  to have lost their entitlement to contest  before
   the  Convention institutions, in the context of Article 6  para.  3
   (c) (art. 6-3-c), the applicant's claim that he was indigent.
       34.  It  has nevertheless to be recognised, as was done by  the
   Commission's Delegate, that it is in practice impossible  to  prove
   today  that in 1977 Mr. Pakelli did not have the means to  pay  his
   lawyer.  However,  there are some indications  that  this  was  so.
   Thus,  there  is no reason to suppose that Mr. Rauschenbusch  would
   have  been  unable  to obtain the above-mentioned  certificate;  in
   this  connection, it has to be noted that his client had spent  two
   years  in  custody  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  before
   returning  to Turkey in 1976 (see paragraphs 15 and 19  above).  In
   addition,  Mr.  Pakelli  supplied  to  the  Commission  in  1979  a
   statement  of  means  and certificates from the  competent  Turkish
   authorities,  the latter being based on the declaration  of  assets
   and  income  which he had made for tax purposes the previous  year;
   it  appeared  from these documents that he was engaged in  business
   on  a  small  scale  and that his financial situation  was  modest.
   These  data  - which, moreover, were not disputed by the Government
   -  led the Commission to grant him free legal aid (see paragraph 27
   above).
       Admittedly,  these  particulars are  not  sufficient  to  prove
   beyond  all  doubt that the applicant was indigent at the  relevant
   time;  however, having regard to his offer to the Federal Court  to
   prove his lack of means and in the absence of clear indications  to
   the  contrary, they lead the Court to regard the first of  the  two
   conditions  contained  in Article 6 para. 3  (c)  (art.  6-3-c)  as
   satisfied.
   
                      B. The interests of justice
   
       35.   According  to  the  applicant  and  the  Commission,  the
   interests  of justice required that Mr. Rauschenbusch be officially
   appointed  as  the  applicant's  lawyer  for  the  hearings  of  29
   November 1977 before the Federal Court.
       In  contesting  this  view, the Government made  the  following
   points.  Mr.  Pakelli had had a defence counsel during the  written
   stage  of  the proceedings; as for the hearings, their  object  was
   circumscribed by the grounds of his appeal on points of law:  since
   he  was challenging the judgment of 30 April 1976 solely on account
   of   alleged  procedural  errors,  he  could  neither   raise   new
   complaints  nor supplement his memorial setting out the grounds  of
   appeal  by  referring  to  other  questions  of  fact.  Only  legal
   arguments and submissions could have been put to the court  at  the
   hearings.  The issues involved were not complicated  and  it  could
   not   be   said  that  their  determination  would  entail  serious
   consequences,  for  the  proceedings could  not  have  led  to  any
   aggravation  of the decision complained of. Moreover,  Mr.  Pakelli
   could  have  appeared  in  person.  Finally,  the  Commission   had
   misunderstood  the  role of the Federal public prosecutor's  office
   in  appeals on a point of law. That role consisted of examining the
   grounds of appeal from a completely independent standpoint and,  in
   particular,  of  ensuring that the law was  uniformly  applied  and
   that case-law remained consistent; it was thus very similar to  the
   role  of  the Procureur {general} attached to the Belgian Court  of
   Cassation (see the above-mentioned Delcourt judgment).
       36.  The Court notes firstly, as did the Commission, that  this
   was  one  of  the  rare  cases in which the Federal  Court  held  a
   hearing:  this  occurs in only ten per cent of  the  appeals  on  a
   point  of law in criminal cases (see paragraph 23 above). In  fact,
   on  the  present occasion the Federal Court was obliged to  arrange
   for  oral proceedings since the appeal proved to be admissible  and
   the  public  prosecutor's  office had not  applied  for  it  to  be
   rejected  as  manifestly ill-founded (Article 349 of  the  Code  of
   Criminal  Procedure; see paragraph 23 above). This shows  that  the
   hearing  could  have  been of importance for  the  decision  to  be
   given.  It  therefore became necessary, in order to ensure  a  fair
   trial,  to  comply with the rule that oral proceedings  shall  take
   place   with   the   participation   of   both   parties   ({debat}
   contradictoire).
       37.  It  is true that, since the applicant confined himself  to
   alleging that there had been procedural errors (Articles 344  para.
   2  and  352 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), the Federal
   Court  had  solely  to give a ruling on the grounds  which  he  had
   invoked  and later set out at length in his memorial (see paragraph
   13  above).  However, Mr. Pakelli would have  been  able,  had  his
   lawyer  appeared  before the court, to explain his  complaints,  to
   supply  further particulars thereof if need be and to  develop  his
   written  arguments.  He  would, for  example,  have  been  able  to
   comment  on  the statement made by the judge acting  as  rapporteur
   (Article  351  of the Code of Criminal Procedure; see paragraph  25
   above).  Such  possibilities of intervening in the  course  of  the
   proceedings  would  have  been all the more  valuable  because  the
   appeal,  itself a voluminous document, concerned nineteen different
   points.
       Again,  as  the  Commission rightly pointed  out,  one  of  the
   complaints  made related to the application of the new  version  of
   Article 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Admittedly, the  3rd
   Criminal  Chamber  of  the Federal Court had  already  decided,  in
   1976,  that an appeal on a point of law based on this Article could
   succeed  only if recourse to a common defence counsel had  in  fact
   been  contrary  to the interests of the defence (see  paragraph  26
   above).   Moreover,  Mr.  Rauschenbusch  did   not   contest   this
   interpretation. However, he endeavoured to demonstrate  that  there
   had  been a conflict of interests in the present case. In addition,
   it  could be predicted that the judgment that the Federal Court was
   going   to  deliver  would  not  be  without  importance  for   the
   development of case-law. The Government themselves stated that  the
   case-law on this point has remained constant since the judgment  of
   29   November   1977  dismissing  the  applicant's   appeal;   they
   recognised that oral argument on the interpretation of Article  146
   would have been of some value.
       38.  In  these circumstances, it goes without saying  that  the
   personal  appearance  of the appellant would not  have  compensated
   for  the  absence of his lawyer: without the services  of  a  legal
   practitioner,   Mr.   Pakelli  could  not  have   made   a   useful
   contribution  to the examination of the legal issues  arising,  and
   in  particular  the issue relating to Article 146 of  the  Code  of
   Criminal Procedure. The Court concurs with the Commission  on  this
   point.
       39.  Finally  and  above  all, the appeal  proceedings  in  the
   present  case  were  not conducted with the participation  of  both
   parties,  in  any event at the stage of the hearings.  Even  during
   the written phase, only the public prosecutor's office attached  to
   the  Heilbronn Regional Court replied to the appeal lodged  by  Mr.
   Pakelli,  who was then still represented by Mr. Rauschenbusch,  and
   it  made  no submissions on the merits of the grounds invoked  (see
   paragraph  14  above). As regards the Federal  public  prosecutor's
   office   -   and  irrespective  of  its  precise  role  in   appeal
   proceedings  -,  German law enabled the appellant  to  contest  its
   submissions   (Article  349  para.  3  of  the  Code  of   Criminal
   Procedure;  see  paragraph 23 above). Accordingly, if  the  Federal
   Court  had  not  decided  to  hold a hearing,  the  Federal  public
   prosecutor's  office  would have filed its submissions  in  writing
   and  communicated  them  to the applicant and  the  latter,  as  he
   rightly  pointed  out,  would  thus  have  had  an  opportunity  of
   studying them and, if need be, of replying thereto.
       This  opportunity of refuting the public prosecutor's  office's
   arguments should therefore have been made available to Mr.  Pakelli
   at  the  hearings also. By refusing to provide him with  a  defence
   counsel,  the Federal Court deprived him, during the oral stage  of
   the  proceedings, of the opportunity of influencing the outcome  of
   the  case,  a  possibility  that he would  have  retained  had  the
   proceedings been conducted entirely in writing.
       40.  In  these  circumstances, the Court, like the  Commission,
   considers  that  the  interests of justice  did  require  that  the
   applicant  be granted legal assistance for the hearings before  the
   Federal Court.
   
                             C. Conclusion
   
       41.  Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 6 para.
   3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) of the Convention.
   
                       II. The alleged violation
                    of article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
   
       42.  The  applicant also invoked, as regards  the  same  facts,
   paragraph 1 of Article 6 (art. 6-1), which reads as follows:
       "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
   any  criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled  to  a  fair
   and  public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent  and
   impartial   tribunal  established  by  law.   Judgment   shall   be
   pronounced  publicly but the press and public may be excluded  from
   all  or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public  order
   or  national security in a democratic society, where the  interests
   of  juveniles or the protection of the private life of the  parties
   so  require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion  of
   the  court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice
   the interests of justice."
       The  Government did not put forward any separate  arguments  on
   this issue.
       In company with the Commission, the Court would recall that the
   provisions  of  Article  6  para.  3  (c)  (art.  6-3-c)  represent
   specific  applications of the general principle of  a  fair  trial,
   stated  in  paragraph  1 (see the Deweer judgment  of  27  February
   1980,  Series A no. 35, p. 30, para. 56). Accordingly, the question
   whether   paragraph  1  (art.  6-1)  was  observed  has   no   real
   significance  in  the  applicant's case;  it  is  absorbed  by  the
   question  whether paragraph 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) was  complied  with.
   The  finding  of  a breach of the requirements of paragraph  3  (c)
   (art.  6-3-c) dispenses the Court from also examining the  case  in
   the  light  of  paragraph 1 (art. 6-1) (see, mutatis mutandis,  the
   above-mentioned  Deweer judgment, Series A no. 35,  pp.  30  -  31,
   para. 56).
   
             III. The application of article 50 (art. 50)
   
       43. Mr. Pakelli sought just satisfaction under Article 50 (art.
   50).  In  the  first  place, he requested the Court  to  annul  the
   Federal  Court's  judgment of 29 November 1977 and  to  direct  the
   Government  to  issue an official disapproval of  certain  passages
   therein,  which  he  regarded  as  racist  or  discriminatory   and
   therefore   unacceptable.  In  the  second  place,  he  asked   for
   compensation  of such amount as the Court considered  fit  for  his
   alleged  non-pecuniary loss. Finally, he claimed  reimbursement  of
   the  costs  and  expenses  entailed by the proceedings  before  the
   Federal Constitutional Court, which he quantified at DM 668.96.
       44.  The Government submitted that these various claims  should
   be  rejected.  They  maintained that the  applicant  had  not  been
   prejudiced in any way by the Federal Court's refusal to  appoint  a
   lawyer  for  him officially and that his criticisms of the  reasons
   for  that  court's decision were unwarranted. As regards the  costs
   and  expenses  of the proceedings before the Constitutional  Court,
   the  Government  contended  that it was not  established  that  Mr.
   Pakelli  had  had  to bear them; they also stated that  the  amount
   claimed did not exactly correspond to the scale applicable  at  the
   relevant time.
       45.  The Court considers that in the circumstances the question
   is  ready  for  decision (Rule 50 para. 3, first sentence,  of  the
   Rules of Court).
       The  Court  notes, as regards the first claim, that it  is  not
   empowered under the Convention either to annul the Federal  Court's
   judgment  or  to  direct  the Government to  disavow  the  passages
   complained  of  (see, mutatis mutandis, the Marckx judgment  of  13
   June  1979,  Series  A  no. 31, p. 25, para. 58,  and  the  Dudgeon
   judgment  of  24 February 1983, Series A no. 59, p. 8,  para.  15).
   Without  expressing  any opinion on those passages,  it  adds  that
   they  cannot  be  regarded  as the consequence  of  the  breach  of
   Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c).
       46.  As  the Government rightly pointed out, Mr. Wingerter  has
   neither  established  the  existence of the  alleged  non-pecuniary
   loss  nor  even indicated the nature thereof. There is  nothing  to
   show that the absence of a defence counsel left Mr. Pakelli with  a
   distressing sensation of isolation, confusion and neglect (see  the
   above-mentioned  Artico judgment, Series A no.  37,  p.  21,  para.
   47);  in fact, this seems unlikely since he had returned to  Turkey
   as  early as the month of August 1976. In any event, the finding of
   a  violation,  contained  in  the  present  judgment,  has  already
   furnished  sufficient  redress for the alleged  non-pecuniary  loss
   (see,  mutatis  mutandis, the Le Compte, Van Leuven and  De  Meyere
   judgment of 18 October 1982, Series A no. 54, p. 8, para. 16).
       47. The costs and expenses whose reimbursement was claimed were
   incurred in order to try to have the breach of the requirements  of
   Article  6  para.  3  (c)  (art. 6-3-c) rectified  by  the  Federal
   Constitutional  Court  (see the above-mentioned  Dudgeon  judgment,
   Series  A no. 59, p. 9, para. 20). Moreover, this was not contested
   by  the Government. However, they claimed that these items had been
   disbursed  by  the  applicant's counsel and not  by  the  applicant
   himself,  since  Mr.  Wingerter  had  waived  repayment   and   was
   moreover,  on  account of statutory limitation, no longer  entitled
   to recover the debt due to him.
       In  fact,  Mr.  Pakelli  has not so far  paid  his  lawyer  for
   representing  him  before  the Federal  Constitutional  Court:  Mr.
   Wingerter  did  not send him a note of his fees  until  7  February
   1982  and  he  stated that it would be in order to  defer  payment,
   having  regard  to  the applicant's financial  difficulties.  In  a
   memorial  of 16 June 1980 filed with the Commission, Mr.  Wingerter
   had  pointed  out  that he had not yet received any  fees  for  the
   proceedings  in question and that he had not asked  for  any  ("ein
   Honorar gar nicht erst gefordert") since he knew his client  to  be
   without means.
       Nevertheless, neither these statements nor the other  documents
   before the Court show sufficiently clearly that there has been  any
   waiver.  Indeed, as the Commission's Delegate rightly pointed  out,
   it  is  not  surprising  that Mr. Wingerter, knowing  his  client's
   financial  circumstances, decided not to send him  a  note  of  his
   fees  at  an earlier date (see the X v. the United Kingdom judgment
   of  18  October 1982, Series A no. 55, p. 18, para. 24). The  Court
   would  here point out, as did the Delegate, that in a human  rights
   case  a  lawyer will be acting in the general interest if he agrees
   to  represent or assist a litigant even if the latter is not  in  a
   position to pay him immediately.
       As  regards  the argument based on the statutory limitation  of
   Mr.  Wingerter's right to recover the debt due to him, this is  not
   a  matter  of  public policy and could be relied  on  only  by  Mr.
   Pakelli himself.
       Deciding on an equitable basis, the Court finds that the sum of
   DM 668.96 claimed for fees and expenses is reasonable.
   
               FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
   
       1.  Holds that there has been a violation of paragraph 3 (c) of
   Article 6 of the Convention (art. 6-3-c);
       2.  Holds  that  it is not necessary also to examine  the  case
   under paragraph 1 of Article 6 (art. 6-1);
       3.  Holds that the respondent State is to pay to the applicant,
   in  respect of legal costs and expenses, the sum of six hundred and
   sixty-eight  German marks and ninety-six pfennigs (DM  668.96)  and
   rejects the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.
   
       Done in English and in French, the French text being authentic,
   at  the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, this twenty-fifth day of
   April, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-three.
   
                                               Signed: {Gerard WIARDA}
                                                             President
   
                                           Signed: {Marc-Andre EISSEN}
                                                             Registrar
   
   
                                               [неофициальный перевод]
   
                  ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
                                   
                           СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
                 ПАКЕЛЛИ (PAKELLI) ПРОТИВ ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ
                          РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГЕРМАНИИ
                                   
                   (Страсбург, 25 апреля 1983 года)
   
                             (Извлечение)
   
          КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
   
                           A. Основные факты
   
       Заявитель, гражданин Турции, родившийся в 1937 г., был  осужден
   участковым  судом  Хейлбронна 30 апреля  1976  г.  и  приговорен  к
   тюремному  заключению  за  участие  в  торговле  наркотиками.   Его
   адвокат  г-н  Вингертер обратился с жалобой  в  порядке  ревизии  в
   Федеральную судебную палату - высшую судебную инстанцию.  В  жалобе
   он  указал на ряд процессуальных нарушений, в том числе статьи  146
   Уголовно-процессуального   кодекса,  который   запрещает   адвокату
   защищать  обвиняемого,  если  ранее  он  защищал  одного   из   его
   соучастников.   Таким  образом,  г-н  Вингертер   указал   как   на
   процессуальное  нарушение  свое  собственное  участие  в  процессе.
   Однако  в  принятии жалобы к рассмотрению было отказано,  поскольку
   она   была   подана   адвокатом,  не  имевшим  право   представлять
   заявителя.
       После того как ревизионная жалоба была подана другим адвокатом,
   г-ном  Раушенбушем, она была принята к рассмотрению. Однако  палата
   по  уголовным  делам Федерального суда отказалась допустить  его  к
   слушанию  дела,  поскольку  он  участвовал  в  процессе  Пакелли  в
   качестве   защитника   другого   обвиняемого.   Палата   отказалась
   назначить  г-ну  Пакелли официального защитника, поскольку  законом
   для  рассмотрения дела в высшей судебной инстанции такое назначение
   не  предусмотрено, а в слушании может участвовать сам г-н  Пакелли.
   Последний  к  этому времени был освобожден из тюрьмы и  вернулся  в
   Турцию.  Он  утверждал, что не имеет финансовых  возможностей  быть
   представленным  другим  адвокатом. В результате  дело  слушалось  в
   отсутствие  г-на Пакелли и адвоката и в удовлетворении жалобы  было
   отказано.
       Г-н  Пакелли подал жалобу в Федеральный Конституционный  Суд  в
   январе  1978  г.  В постановлении, вынесенном 10 мая,  коллегия  из
   трех  судей приняла решение не принимать жалобу к рассмотрению  как
   не имеющую достаточных перспектив успешного разрешения.
   
           B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
   
       В  жалобе,  поданной в Комиссию в октябре 1978 г., г-н  Пакелли
   утверждал,  что  отказ  суда назначить ему  официального  защитника
   нарушил  его  право  на  справедливое  разбирательство  на   основе
   состязательности  (статья  6  п.  1  Конвенции)  и  его  право   на
   бесплатную юридическую помощь (статья 6 п. 3 "c").
       7  мая 1981 г. Комиссия объявила жалобу частично приемлемой.  В
   своем  докладе от 12 декабря 1981 г. она выразила мнение, что имело
   место  нарушение  статьи 6 п. 3 "c" (единогласно) и  что  выяснять,
   имело  ли  место  также и нарушение статьи 6  п.  1,  не  требуется
   (одиннадцатью голосами против одного).
       Дело   было   передано   в  Суд  Комиссией   и   Правительством
   Федеративной Республики Германии соответственно 14 и  24  мая  1982
   г.
   
                    ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
   
                             ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
   
       29.  Заявитель  жаловался на отказ палаты  по  уголовным  делам
   Федерального   суда  назначить  г-на  Раушенбуша  его   официальным
   адвокатом на слушаниях 29 ноября 1977 г. по его ревизионной  жалобе
   в  суде; он утверждал, что такой отказ представляет собой нарушение
   статьи 6 п. 1 и п. 3 "c" Конвенции.
       Никем  не  оспаривалось, что эти нормы применимы  к  настоящему
   случаю,  и  Суд  отмечает  этот  факт  установленным  (см.  mutatis
   mutandis Решение по делу Делькура от 17 января 1970 г. Серия A,  т.
   11,  с. 13 - 15, п. 25 и 26, а также Решение по делу Артико  от  13
   мая  1980  г.  Серия  A, т. 37, с. 15 - 18, п.  31  -  38).  Однако
   Правительство  справедливо указало, что то, как  следует  применять
   эти  нормы, зависит от особенностей конкретного процесса, о котором
   идет  речь  (см. вышеупомянутое Судебное решение по делу  Делькура,
   там же).
   
            I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 3 "c"
   
       30. Статья 6 п. 3 "c"
       "Каждый    человек,   обвиняемый   в   совершении    уголовного
   преступления, имеет как минимум следующие права:
       ...
       c) защищать себя лично или через посредство выбранного им самим
   защитника  или,  если  у него нет достаточных  средств  для  оплаты
   услуг  защитника, иметь назначенного ему защитника бесплатно, когда
   того требуют интересы правосудия;
       ... "
       На слушаниях в Комиссии Правительство утверждало, что статья  6
   п.  3  "c"  не требует предоставления бесплатной правовой помощи  в
   данном  случае,  так  как  г-н Пакелли  мог  бы  лично  явиться  на
   слушание  дела  в Федеральной судебной палате. В Суде Правительство
   не  останавливалось  на этом вопросе подробно,  но  повторило,  что
   заявитель мог бы сам представить свое дело в Федеральном суде.
       31.  Статья  6  п.  3  "c"  гарантирует  лицу,  обвиненному   в
   совершении  уголовного  преступления,  три  права:  защищать   себя
   лично;  иметь  выбранного им самим защитника  и,  при  определенных
   условиях,  иметь назначенного ему защитника бесплатно. В английском
   тексте для установления связи между соответствующими выражениями  в
   каждом  случае  используется разделительный союз  "или";  с  другой
   стороны,  во французском тексте эквивалент данного союза -  "ou"  -
   используется  только  для  соединения  фраз,  излагающих  первое  и
   второе  право,  а  между  вторым  и  третьим  стоит  союз  "и".   В
   подготовительных    работах   трудно    найти    объяснение    этим
   лингвистическим  различиям. Единственное, что они  показывают,  это
   то,  что  в процессе заключительного рассмотрения проекта Конвенции
   накануне  ее  подписания комитет экспертов  внес  "некоторое  число
   формальных  исправлений  и  исправлений перевода",  включая  замену
   союза  "и" на союз "или" в английском варианте статьи 6  п.  3  "c"
   (Recueil  des  Travaux  {Preparatoires}  <*>,  т.  IV,  с.   1010).
   Учитывая   предмет  и  цель  данного  пункта,  назначение  которого
   состоит  в том, чтобы обеспечить эффективную защиту прав на  защиту
   (см. вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Артико. Серия A, т. 37, с.  16,
   п.  33;  см. также mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Адольфа  от  26
   марта  1982  г.  Серия A, т. 49, с. 15, п. 30, и  Решение  по  делу
   "Санди  таймс" от 26 апреля 1979 г. Серия A, т. 30, с. 30, п.  48),
   французский  текст  служит  здесь более  надежным  ориентиром;  Суд
   согласен  с  Комиссией  по данному вопросу. Соответственно  "каждый
   обвиняемый  в  совершении уголовного преступления", кто  не  желает
   защищать себя лично, должен иметь возможность прибегнуть к  услугам
   выбранного им самим защитника; если у него нет достаточных  средств
   для  оплаты такого защитника, то, на основании Конвенции,  защитник
   должен   быть  ему  предоставлен  бесплатно,  когда  того   требуют
   интересы правосудия.
   --------------------------------
       <*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
   латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
   
       Таким  образом, г-н Пакелли, хотя германское право и  разрешало
   ему   лично   предстать  перед  Федеральным  судом,  мог  требовать
   предоставления  ему  юридической помощи в той  мере,  в  какой  это
   удовлетворяло условиям, установленным в статье 6 п. 3 "c".
   
        A. Отсутствие достаточных средств для оплаты защитника
   
       32.  Доводы  Правительства сводились к следующему. Нет  ничего,
   что  бы  подтверждало утверждение заявителя о том, что у  него  нет
   достаточных  средств  для  оплаты выбранного  им  самим  защитника;
   наоборот,  он  сам заявил в участковом суде, что он очень  прилично
   зарабатывал   в   Федеративной   Республике   Германии;    согласно
   констатирующей части Судебного решения от 30 апреля  1976  г.  (см.
   п.  11  выше),  он  также зарабатывал деньги,  торгуя  наркотиками;
   кроме того, вскоре после возвращения в Турцию он открыл свое дело.
       Комиссия   считала,  что  Правительство  не  вправе  оспаривать
   утверждения  заявителя на данной стадии. Она  отметила  также,  что
   немецкое  право не связывает с неплатежеспособностью предоставление
   бесплатного защитника лицу, оказавшемуся под судом. Кроме того,  г-
   н  Раушенбуш предложил до слушания представить сертификат о статусе
   бедности  (см.  п.  16  выше), но Федеральный  суд  не  принял  это
   предложение.
       33.  Суд  не  может согласиться с Комиссией по  этому  вопросу.
   Вопрос  о средствах г-на Пакелли не играл никакой роли в обжалуемом
   решении:  отказ в просьбе о назначении г-на Раушенбуша  основывался
   исключительно  на том факте, что, по мнению председателя  уголовной
   палаты  Федерального  суда,  данный  случай  не  подпадал  под   ту
   категорию  дел,  где  в  соответствии  с  немецким  правом   помощь
   защитника  была  обязательной  (см.  п.  16  выше).  Соответственно
   Правительство  не  утратило в контексте статьи 6  п.  3  "c"  права
   оспаривать перед учреждениями Конвенции утверждение заявителя,  что
   он был беден.
       34. Тем не менее следует признать, что и было сделано делегатом
   Комиссии, что сегодня практически невозможно доказать, что  в  1977
   г.  у  г-на  Пакелли  не было средств для оплаты своего  защитника.
   Есть  лишь  некоторые признаки того, что это было именно  так.  Нет
   никаких  причин предполагать, что г-н Раушенбуш не смог бы получить
   вышеупомянутый сертификат; в этой связи следует отметить,  что  его
   клиент  провел под стражей в Федеративной Республике  Германии  два
   года  до его возвращения в Турцию в 1976 г. (см. п. 15 и 19  выше).
   Кроме  того,  г-н  Пакелли  представил  в  Комиссию  заявление   об
   имущественном   положении  и  справки  от   компетентных   турецких
   властей,   основанные   на  декларации  о  доходах   и   имуществе,
   представленной  им при уплате налогов за предыдущий  год;  из  этих
   документов   явствует,  что  он  занимался  бизнесом  в   небольших
   масштабах  и  его  финансовое положение было весьма  скромным.  Эти
   данные  -  которые,  более того, не оспаривались  Правительством  -
   побудили  Комиссию  предоставить ему бесплатную юридическую  помощь
   (см. п. 27 выше).
       Конечно,  этих  частностей  недостаточно,  чтобы  доказать  вне
   всяких  сомнений,  что в рассматриваемый период  времени  заявитель
   был    неплатежеспособен;   однако,   учитывая   его    предложение
   Федеральному суду доказать, что у него нет средств, и в  отсутствие
   четких  подтверждений противного, Суд склонен рассматривать  первое
   из   двух   условий,  содержащихся  в  статье  6  п.  3  "c",   как
   выполненное.
   
                        B. Интересы правосудия
   
       35.  Согласно мнению заявителя и Комиссии, интересы  правосудия
   требовали,  чтобы  г-н Раушенбуш был официально назначен  адвокатом
   заявителя на слушаниях в Федеральном суде от 29 ноября 1977 г.
       Оспаривая  эту  точку зрения, Правительство выделило  следующие
   моменты.  У  г-на  Пакелли был защитник на той  стадии  письменного
   производства;  что касается слушаний, то их предмет  был  ограничен
   основанием  принесения жалобы по вопросам права:  Судебное  решение
   от   30   апреля  1976  г.  оспаривалось  единственно  по   причине
   предполагаемых  процессуальных ошибок, заявитель не  мог  выдвигать
   новых  жалоб  и  дополнять свой меморандум,  в  котором  излагались
   основания  для  жалобы, ссылками на другие факты. В  ходе  слушаний
   речь  могла  идти  только  об  аргументах  и  выводах  юридического
   характера.  Затронутые проблемы не являлись сложными, и  вынесенное
   по  ним решение не могло повлечь серьезные последствия. Кроме того,
   г-н  Пакелли  мог  бы  явиться на суд лично.  И  наконец,  Комиссия
   неправильно  представляет  себе роль  федеральной  прокуратуры  при
   рассмотрении жалоб по вопросам права. Она с совершенно  независимых
   позиций  изучает  мотивировку  жалобы  и  следит  за  согласованным
   применением   закона  и  единообразием  судебной  практики;   таким
   образом,  эта  задача  очень  близка той  роли,  которую  выполняет
   Генеральный   прокурор   при   Кассационном   суде   Бельгии   (см.
   вышеупомянутое Судебное решение по делу Делькура).
       36.  Суд,  как это ранее сделала Комиссия, отмечает,  что,  во-
   первых,  это был один из тех редких случаев, когда Федеральный  суд
   проводил  слушания:  в  уголовных делах  это  происходит  только  в
   десяти  процентах жалоб по вопросам права (см. п. 23 выше). Тем  не
   менее   в   данном  случае  Федеральный  суд  практически  оказался
   обязанным   провести  устное  разбирательство,  т.к.  жалоба   была
   приемлемой, а прокуратура не требовала отклонить ее как явно  плохо
   обоснованную (статья 349 Уголовно-процессуального кодекса;  см.  п.
   23  выше). Это показывает, что слушание могло бы иметь существенное
   значение   для   вынесения   решения.   Поэтому   для   обеспечения
   справедливого  судебного  разбирательства принцип  состязательности
   приобретал важное значение.
       37.  Федеральному  суду предстояло вынести  решение  только  по
   вопросам,  на  которые указал, а позднее подробно изложил  в  своей
   жалобе  заявитель (см. п. 13 выше), а он ограничился лишь указанием
   на процессуальные ошибки (статья 344 з 2 и статья 352 з 1 Уголовно-
   процессуального  кодекса).  Если  бы  его  адвокат   участвовал   в
   слушании,  г-н  Пакелли  получил  бы  возможность  обосновать  свои
   жалобы,   представить,   в  случае  необходимости,   дополнительные
   подробности  и  развить  свои письменные  аргументы.  Он  смог  бы,
   например,  прокомментировать изложение дела  судьей  -  докладчиком
   (статья  351  Уголовно-процессуального кодекса; см.  п.  25  выше).
   Возможность  выступления  в  ходе судебного  слушания  представляла
   большую  ценность,  поскольку жалоба - весьма объемный  документ  -
   затрагивала девятнадцать различных вопросов.
       Как  справедливо  указала  Комиссия, один  из  содержавшихся  в
   жалобе   вопросов  касался  применения  новой  версии  статьи   146
   Уголовно-процессуального кодекса. Третья палата по уголовным  делам
   Федерального суда ранее, в 1976 г., вынесла решение, что жалоба  по
   вопросам  права,  основывающаяся на данной статье,  не  может  быть
   успешной,  если только защита одним адвокатом нескольких обвиняемых
   фактически  мешала  бы  интересам защиты  (см.  п.  26  выше).  Г-н
   Раушенбуш  не  оспаривал  такое  толкование.  Однако  он  стремился
   показать,  что  в данном деле имел место конфликт интересов.  Кроме
   того,   можно  было  предвидеть,  что  Судебное  решение,   которое
   собирался  вынести  Федеральный  суд,  было  бы  немаловажным   для
   развития   судебной  практики,  которое  -  и  это  также  признало
   Правительство - остановилось после вынесения Судебного  решения  от
   29  ноября 1977 г., которым была отклонена жалоба заявителя. В этой
   связи  толкование статьи 146 в ходе устных прений  представляло  бы
   определенный интерес.
       38.  Само  собой  разумеется,  что в  подобных  обстоятельствах
   личное   присутствие   заявителя  не   смогло   бы   компенсировать
   отсутствия  его  адвоката:  без  услуг  практикующего  юриста   г-н
   Пакелли   не   смог  бы  внести  полезный  вклад   в   рассмотрение
   возникающих  правовых  вопросов  и,  в  частности,  по  статье  146
   Уголовно-процессуального кодекса. Суд разделяет мнение Комиссии  по
   данному вопросу.
       39.  И  наконец, самое главное: судебное разбирательство жалобы
   по  настоящему  делу не было состязательным, во  всяком  случае  на
   стадии  устных  слушаний. Даже на этапе письменного разбирательства
   только   одна  служба  прокурора  при  участковом  суде  Хейлбронна
   представила  возражения на жалобу, поданную г-ном Пакелли,  который
   в  то время еще был представлен г-ном Раушенбушем, но и она не дала
   ответ  по  существу  оснований, приведенных в  жалобе  (см.  п.  14
   выше).  Относительно федеральной прокуратуры - какой бы ни была  ее
   роль  на кассационной стадии - германское право позволяло заявителю
   оспаривать  ее письменные представления (статья 349 з  3  Уголовно-
   процессуального кодекса; см. п. 23 выше). Соответственно,  если  бы
   Федеральный  суд  не принял решение провести слушания,  федеральная
   прокуратура  представила  бы  свои  выводы  в  письменном  виде   и
   сообщила  о  них  заявителю, а последний,  на  что  он  справедливо
   указал,   получил   бы  возможность  изучить   их   и,   в   случае
   необходимости, ответить на них.
       Подобная  возможность опровергнуть доводы прокуратуры во  время
   слушаний  должна  была  быть также предоставлена  и  г-ну  Пакелли.
   Отказавшись  назначить  ему защитника на  устной  стадии  судебного
   разбирательства,  Федеральный  суд лишил  его  возможности  оказать
   влияние  на  исход дела, возможности, которую он бы сохранил,  если
   бы процесс целиком был письменным.
       40.  В  подобных обстоятельствах Суд, как и Комиссия,  считает,
   что   интересы   правосудия   требовали,   чтобы   заявителю   была
   предоставлена помощь защитника в ходе слушаний в Федеральном суде.
   
                               C. Вывод
   
       41.  Соответственно имело место нарушение статьи  6  п.  3  "c"
   Конвенции.
   
             II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 1
   
       42.  Применительно  к  тем же самым фактам  заявитель  ссылался
   также на статью 6 п. 1, которая гласит:
       "Каждый  человек  имеет право при определении  его  гражданских
   прав   и   обязанностей  или  при  рассмотрении  любого  уголовного
   обвинения,   предъявляемого  ему,  на  справедливое   и   публичное
   разбирательство  дела в разумный срок независимым и беспристрастным
   судом,  созданным на основании закона. Судебное решение объявляется
   публично, однако пресса и публика могут не допускаться на  судебные
   заседания  в  течение всего процесса или его части по  соображениям
   морали,  общественного порядка или государственной  безопасности  в
   демократическом  обществе,  а  также когда  того  требуют  интересы
   несовершеннолетних или для защиты частной жизни  сторон,  или  -  в
   той  мере,  в  какой это, по мнению суда, строго необходимо  -  при
   особых   обстоятельствах,  когда  гласность  нарушала  бы  интересы
   правосудия".
       Правительство  не  выдвинуло каких-либо  отдельных  доводов  по
   данной проблеме.
       Соглашаясь  с  Комиссией,  Суд хотел бы  напомнить,  что  норма
   статьи  6 п. 3 "c" представляет собой конкретное применение  общего
   принципа справедливого судебного разбирательства, изложенного в  п.
   1  (см. Решение по делу Девеера от 27 февраля 1980 г. Серия  A,  т.
   35,  с.  30, п. 56). Соответственно, вопрос о том, был ли  соблюден
   п.   1,  не  имеет  реального  значения  для  дела  заявителя;   он
   поглощается вопросом о том, были ли выполнены требования п. 3  "c".
   Установление  нарушения  требований  п.  3  "c"  избавляет  Суд  от
   необходимости рассмотрения данного дела в свете п. 1  (см.  mutatis
   mutandis  вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Девеера. Серия A,  т.  35,
   с. 30 - 31, п. 56).
   
                       III. Применение статьи 50
   
       43.  Г-н  Пакелли  потребовал справедливого  удовлетворения  на
   основании  статьи  50.  Прежде всего  он  просил  Суд  аннулировать
   Решение  Федерального суда от 29 ноября 1977  г.  и  дать  указание
   Правительству    выразить   официальное    неодобрение    некоторых
   содержащихся   в   нем  пассажей,  которые  он   рассматривал   как
   расистские  или  дискриминационные,  а  потому  неприемлемые.   Во-
   вторых,  он  просил выплатить ему справедливое возмещение,  которое
   Суд  сочтет  подобающим, за причиненный моральный вред. И  наконец,
   он   потребовал  возмещения  издержек  и  расходов,   связанных   с
   судопроизводством в Федеральном Конституционном  Суде,  которые  он
   определил в размере 668,96 немецкой марки.
       44.   В  представлении  Правительства  утверждалось,  что   эти
   разнообразные  требования должны быть отвергнуты.  Оно  настаивало,
   что  отказ  Федерального суда назначить ему  официального  адвоката
   нисколько  не  повредил  заявителю и что  его  критика  причин,  по
   которым  суд  вынес такое решение, была необоснованна. Относительно
   издержек   и   расходов   по  обращению  в   Конституционный   Суд,
   Правительство  не  считало  установленным  то,  что   г-н   Пакелли
   вынужден  был их нести; оно заявило также, что требуемая  сумма  не
   совсем   точно   соответствует  шкале   ставок,   применявшихся   в
   рассматриваемый период времени.
       45.  Суд считает, что в данных обстоятельствах вопрос готов для
   решения (первое предложение статьи 50 п. 3 Регламента Суда).
       Суд  отмечает  в  отношении  первого  требования,  что  он   на
   основании  Конвенции  не уполномочен ни отменять  Судебные  решения
   Федерального  суда, ни давать Правительству указания  дезавуировать
   те  выдержки  из него, на которые жалуется заявитель  (см.  mutatis
   mutandis Решение по делу Маркс от 13 июня 1979 г. Серия A,  т.  31,
   с.  25,  п.  58,  и Решение по делу Даджена от 24 февраля  1983  г.
   Серия  A,  т.  59, с. 8, п. 15). Не выражая какого-либо  мнения  по
   поводу  данных  выдержек, Суд полагает, что  их  наличие  не  может
   рассматриваться как следствие нарушения статьи 6 п. 3 "c".
       46.  Как  справедливо указало Правительство, г-н  Вингертер  не
   только не доказал наличие морального вреда, но и не указал,  в  чем
   он  заключался.  Нет  ничего,  что бы  показывало,  что  отсутствие
   защитника   вызвало  у  г-на  Пакелли  давящее  ощущение  изоляции,
   замешательства  и  чувства покинутости (см. вышеупомянутое  Решение
   по  делу  Артико. Серия A, т. 37, с. 21, п. 47); эта версия кажется
   маловероятной, так как уже в августе 1976 г. он вернулся в  Турцию.
   Во  всяком  случае установление факта нарушения настоящим  Решением
   уже  представляет собой достаточную компенсацию за якобы понесенный
   моральный вред (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Ле Конта,  Ван
   Левена и Де Мейера от 18 октября 1982 г. Серия A, т. 54, с.  8,  п.
   16).
       47.  Издержки и расходы, о возмещении которых идет  речь,  были
   понесены  с  тем,  чтобы Федеральный Конституционный  Суд  исправил
   нарушения требований статьи 6 п. 3 "c" (см. вышеупомянутое  Решение
   по  делу Даджена. Серия A, т. 59, с. 9, п. 20). Более того, это  не
   оспаривалось  и  Правительством. Однако  Правительство  утверждало,
   что  эти  расходы нес защитник заявителя, а не он сам, так как  г-н
   Вингертер  отказался от вознаграждения и, более  того,  по  причине
   пропуска  срока  исковой  давности он утратил  право  на  взыскание
   долга.
       И  действительно,  до сих пор г-н Пакелли  не  заплатил  своему
   адвокату   за   представительство  его  интересов   в   Федеральном
   Конституционном  Суде:  г-н Вингертер  не  направлял  ему  счет  за
   оказанные  услуги  до 7 февраля 1982 г., и, как  он  заявляет,  это
   было  сделано  для  того, чтобы отсрочить оплату  вознаграждения  с
   учетом   финансовых  трудностей  заявителя.  В  памятной   записке,
   направленной  в Комиссию 16 февраля 1982 г., г-н Вингертер  указал,
   что  он не получил еще какой-либо платы за услуги, оказанные в ходе
   судебного  разбирательства, о котором идет  речь,  и  не  просил  о
   таковых, так как он знал, что у его клиента нет средств.
       Тем   не   менее   ни  эти  заявления,  ни  другие   документы,
   представленные  в Суд, не показывают с достаточной  четкостью,  что
   имел  место  отказ  от права получения вознаграждения.  И  в  самом
   деле,  как справедливо указал делегат Комиссии, неудивительно,  что
   г-н  Вингертер, зная финансовое положение своего клиента, решил  не
   выставлять  ему счет за проделанную работу на более  ранней  стадии
   (см.  Решение  по  делу  X против Соединенного  Королевства  от  18
   октября  1982  г.  Серия A, т. 55, с. 18,  п.  24).  Суд  хотел  бы
   указать, как это уже было сделано делегатом Комиссии, что  в  делах
   о   правах  человека  адвокат,  оказывая  помощь  тому,  кто  не  в
   состоянии сразу ему заплатить, действует во всеобщем интересе.
       Относительно  довода,  основанного на истечении  срока  исковой
   давности на право г-на Вингертера взыскать причитающийся ему  долг,
   это  не  вопрос  публичного порядка, и здесь следует положиться  на
   решение самого г-на Пакелли.
       Принимая  решение  на основе справедливости, Суд  находит,  что
   сумма  в 668,96 немецкой марки, требуемая в порядке компенсации  за
   услуги защитника и за расходы, является разумной.
   
                  ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
   
       1.  Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи  6  п.  3  "c"
   Конвенции;
       2.  Постановил,  что  рассматривать данное  дело  на  основании
   статьи 6 п. 1 нет необходимости;
       3.  Постановил,  что  государство - ответчик  должно  выплатить
   заявителю за понесенные им юридические издержки и расходы  сумму  в
   размере  шестисот  шестидесяти восьми немецких  марок  и  девяноста
   шести   пфеннигов   (DM  668,96),  и  отвергает  оставшуюся   часть
   требования о справедливом возмещении.
   
       Совершено   на   английском   и  французском   языках,   причем
   французский  текст является аутентичным, и оглашено во Дворце  прав
   человека в Страсбурге 25 апреля 1983 г.
   
                                                          Председатель
                                                          Жерар ВИАРДА
   
                                                                Грефье
                                                     Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
   
   
   
   
   
   
                    EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
                                   
                      CASE OF PAKELLI v. GERMANY
                                   
                               JUDGMENT
                                   
                       (Strasbourg, 25.IV.1983)
   
       In the Pakelli case,
       The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
   Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of  Human
   Rights   and  Fundamental  Freedoms  ("the  Convention")  and   the
   relevant  provisions  of  the Rules of  Court  <*>,  as  a  Chamber
   composed of the following judges:
   -------------------------------
       <*>  Note  by  the  registry:  In  the  version  of  the  Rules
   applicable  when proceedings were instituted. A revised version  of
   the  Rules of Court entered into force on 1 January 1983, but  only
   in respect of cases referred to the Court after that date.
   
       Mr. G. Wiarda, President,
       Mr. R. Ryssdal,
       Mr. L. Liesch,
       Mr. L.-E. Pettiti,
       Mr. B. Walsh,
       Mr. R. Bernhardt,
       Mr. J. Gersing,
       and  also  Mr.  M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and  Mr.  H.  Petzold,
   Deputy Registrar,
       Having  deliberated in private on 26 November 1982  and  on  23
   March 1983,
       Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
   mentioned date:
   
                               PROCEDURE
   
       1.  The  present case was referred to the Court by the European
   Commission  of  Human Rights ("the Commission") and the  Government
   of  the  Federal Republic of Germany ("the Government").  The  case
   originated  in  an  application (no. 8398/78)  against  that  State
   lodged  with  the  Commission on 5 October 1978  under  Article  25
   (art.  25)  of  the Convention by a Turkish national,  Mr.  {Lutfu}
   Pakelli.
       2.  The  Commission's request and the Government's  application
   were  lodged  with the registry of the Court within the  period  of
   three  months laid down by Articles 32 para. 1 and 47  (art.  32-1,
   art. 47) - the former on 14 May and the latter on 24 May 1982.  The
   request  referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48)  and  to
   the  declaration whereby the Federal Republic of Germany recognised
   the  compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46)  (art.  46);
   its  purpose  was to obtain a decision as to whether or  not  there
   had  been a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under
   Article  6  para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c). The application  invited  the
   Court to hold that there had been no such breach.
       3.  The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included,  as
   ex  officio members, Mr. R. Bernhardt, the elected judge of  German
   nationality (Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention),  and  Mr.  G.
   Wiarda,  the  President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3  (b)  of  the
   Rules of Court). On 28 May 1982, the President drew by lot, in  the
   presence  of  the Registrar, the names of the five  other  members,
   namely  Mr. R. Ryssdal, Mr. M. Zekia, Mr. L. Liesch, {Mr. E. Garcia
   de  Enterria} and Mr. B. Walsh (Article 43 (art. 43) in fine of the
   Convention  and Rule 21 para. 4). Subsequently, Mr.  L.-E.  Pettiti
   and  Mr. J. Gersing, substitute judges, took the place of Mr. Zekia
   and  {Mr. Garcia de Enterria}, who were prevented from taking  part
   in  the  consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1 and  24  para.
   1).
       4.  Mr. Wiarda, who had assumed the office of President of  the
   Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), ascertained, through the Registrar,  the
   views  of  the  Agent  of the Government and the  Delegate  of  the
   Commission regarding the procedure to be followed. On 9 June  1982,
   having  particular  regard  to  their  concurring  statements,   he
   concluded  that there was no need for memorials to be filed.  After
   consulting,  through  the  Deputy  Registrar,  the  Agent  of   the
   Government  and  the  Delegate  of the  Commission,  the  President
   directed on 4 October that the oral proceedings should open  on  25
   November 1982.
       On  2 November, the Registrar, on the President's instructions,
   requested  the  Commission and the Government  to  produce  several
   documents; these were received on 5, 22 and 23 November.
       5.  The  hearings  were  held in public  at  the  Human  Rights
   Building,  Strasbourg,  on  25 November.  Immediately  before  they
   opened,  the  Chamber  had  held  a  preparatory  meeting;  it  had
   authorised  the Agent and the advocates of the Government  and  the
   person  assisting the Delegate of the Commission to use the  German
   language (Rule 27 paras. 2 and 3).
       There appeared before the Court:
       - for the Government:
       Mrs. I. Maier, Ministerialdirigentin at the Federal Ministry of
   Justice, Agent,
       Mr.  P.  Riess,  Ministerialrat  at  the  Federal  Ministry  of
   Justice,
       Mr.  W. Stiller, Regierungsdirektor at the Federal Ministry  of
   Justice, Advisers;
       - for the Commission:
       Mr. J.A. Frowein, Delegate,
       Mr. N. Wingerter, the applicant's lawyer before the Commission,
   assisting  the Delegate (Rule 29 para. 1, second sentence,  of  the
   Rules of Court).
       The  Court heard addresses by Mrs. Maier and Mr. Riess for  the
   Government   and  by  Mr.  Frowein  and  Mr.  Wingerter   for   the
   Commission,  as  well  as their replies to  its  questions.  On  26
   November,  in  response  to a request which  he  had  made  on  the
   instructions  of  the  President, the  Registrar  received  certain
   documents from the Commission.
       6.  On 20 December, the Commission transmitted to the Court the
   applicant's claims under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention.
       In  accordance with the Orders and directions of the President,
   the registry received the following documents on this issue:
       - on 20 January 1983, the comments of the Government;
       -  on  9 and 10 February 1983, the observations of the Delegate
   of  the  Commission  and,  through him,  the  observations  of  the
   applicant.
   
                               THE FACTS
   
                   I. The circumstances of the case
   
       7.  Mr.  Pakelli, a Turkish national born in 1937, is currently
   living  in  Turkey;  he  was resident in the  Federal  Republic  of
   Germany from 1964 to 1976.
       8.  The  applicant arrived in the Federal Republic in  February
   1964  and  was  engaged by the firm of Audi-NSU at  Neckarsulm.  He
   stayed  there  for  two and a half years. Subsequently,  he  had  a
   succession  of different occupations: mechanic in another  firm  at
   Neckarsulm,  manager  of  a restaurant, independent  insurance  and
   building-loans   broker.   The   last-mentioned   activity,   which
   consisted  of  negotiating  and  concluding,  for  example,   life-
   insurance  and  savings  contracts with Turkish  workers,  provided
   him, as he himself stated, with a very good monthly income.
       9.  On  31 May 1972, the Heilbronn District Court (Amtsgericht)
   imposed  on  him  a suspended sentence of ten months'  imprisonment
   for      an      offence     against     the     Narcotics      Act
   (Betaeubungsmittelgesetz).    The    Heilbronn    Regional    Court
   (Landgericht) dismissed the applicant's appeal on 12 March 1973.
       These proceedings are not here in issue.
       10.  The criminal proceedings to which the present case relates
   began in 1974.
       Mr.  Pakelli  was  arrested on 7 May  on  suspicion  of  having
   committed  a  further  offence against  the  Narcotics  Act;  on  4
   September,   he  was  granted  the  assistance  of  an   officially
   appointed lawyer, namely Mr. Wingerter, of Heilbronn.
       11.  The trial opened before the Heilbronn Regional Court on  7
   April  1976 and continued on 8, 14, 23 and 3O April. The  applicant
   was  defended  by  Mr. Wingerter and, at certain  moments,  by  Mr.
   Rauschenbusch, a member of the same firm.
       On  30 April, the court sentenced Mr. Pakelli to two years' and
   three  months'  imprisonment for an offence against  the  Narcotics
   Act  and for tax evasion (Steuerhinterziehung): it was found to  be
   proved  that  in  the  spring  of 1972 the  accused  had  illegally
   imported  into  Germany  sixteen kilograms  of  cannabis  resin  of
   Turkish origin, hidden in his car.
       12.  On 3 May 1976, Mr. Wingerter filed an appeal on points  of
   law  (Revision).  In  his  memorial of 5 August,  setting  out  the
   grounds  of  appeal, he relied, inter alia, on Article 146  of  the
   Code  of  Criminal Procedure, which provides that  several  accused
   persons  may  not  be  defended by one and  the  same  lawyer  (see
   paragraph   26  below).  Mr.  Wingerter  explained  that   he   had
   previously  represented  another person  who  on  the  occasion  in
   question had, according to the Regional Court's findings, been  Mr.
   Pakelli's accomplice.
       Mr.  Pakelli  was  released on 10 August 1976 and  returned  to
   Turkey.
       On     22    October,    the    Federal    public    prosecutor
   (Generalbundesanwalt) moved that the appeal  be  held  inadmissible
   on  the ground that it had been filed by a defence counsel who,  on
   his own admission, was not entitled to represent the applicant.
       On  19 November, Mr. Rauschenbusch applied for leave to proceed
   out  of  time (Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand) in  order  to
   lodge  a  fresh appeal, which appeal he in fact filed at  the  same
   moment.  On 21 December 1976, the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof)
   allowed  the  application; it had first sought the opinion  of  the
   public  prosecutor who, without giving reasons, had indicated  that
   he was in favour of such a course.
       On   13   January   1977,  the  Regional  Court   granted   Mr.
   Rauschenbusch's  request  of  19  November  1976  to  be  appointed
   official  defence  counsel  to file the memorial  setting  out  the
   grounds  of  appeal; two weeks later it relieved Mr.  Wingerter  of
   his duties.
       13.  In  his memorial of 26 January 1977, which was thirty-four
   pages  in length, Mr. Rauschenbusch complained solely of procedural
   errors  (Verfahrensrugen).  He  listed  nineteen,  most  of   which
   concerned  decisions of the Heilbronn Regional  Court  refusing  to
   appoint an expert or to summon, question or have questions  put  to
   witnesses.  The last of the alleged errors related to  Article  146
   of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure: recalling that Mr.  Wingerter
   had  previously defended another person whom the Regional Court had
   convicted,  on 21 June 1974, as an accomplice of Mr.  Pakelli,  Mr.
   Rauschenbusch  maintained that this recourse to  a  common  defence
   counsel  had  been contrary to the interests of both  accused  (see
   paragraph 26 below).
       14. In its observations in reply ({Gegenerklarung}) of 14 March
   1977,  the  public  prosecutor's office attached  to  the  Regional
   Court  submitted  that the appeal was inadmissible.  It  considered
   that  Article 146 prevented Mr. Rauschenbusch, just as it  did  Mr.
   Wingerter, from acting in the case as officially appointed  lawyer.
   Mr.  Rauschenbusch  replied on 23 March. He  pointed  out,  amongst
   other  things,  that  since  he had never  defended  Mr.  Pakelli's
   accomplice, Article 146 did not apply to him.
       On  20  April, the Federal public prosecutor invited the above-
   mentioned  office to comment on the complaints that had been  made;
   in  his  view,  it  was at least doubtful whether  the  appeal  was
   inadmissible de plano.
       On  12  August, the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office  filed
   its  supplementary observations (weitere Gegenerklaerung), dated  1
   August;  it  sent  a copy to Mr. Rauschenbusch. In accordance  with
   the   practice  in  such  matters  (Instruction  no.  162  of   the
   Instructions   on  Criminal  Procedure  and  Administrative   Fines
   Procedure   -   Richtlinien  {fur}  das  Strafverfahren   und   das
   Bussgeldverfahren), the observations reproduced for each  complaint
   the   relevant  documents  in  the  case-file,  in  particular  the
   requests  made by the applicant's lawyer during the trial  and  the
   decisions  taken by the Regional Court thereon. As regards  Article
   146  of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure, the public  prosecutor's
   office referred to its earlier observations, including those of  14
   March.
       15.  On  application by the Federal public prosecutor's office,
   the  Federal  Court decided on 13 October 1977 to  hold  a  hearing
   (Hauptverhandlung)  on  29  November.  Mr.  Rauschenbusch  and  his
   client,  who had returned to Turkey, were notified of  this  on  17
   October.
       16.  On  24 October, Mr. Rauschenbusch applied to be officially
   appointed  as  the  applicant's  lawyer  for  the  hearing  of   29
   November.
       The  President of the 1st Criminal Chamber (Strafsenat) of  the
   Federal Court refused the application on the following day. In  his
   view,  an accused (Angeklagter) who was at liberty was not entitled
   to  such  an  appointment for hearings in an appeal on a  point  of
   law;  there  was no legal requirement at that stage for him  either
   to  appear in person or to be represented by a lawyer (Article  350
   paras. 2 and 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; see paragraph  22
   below).    As    regards   compliance   with    procedural    rules
   (verfahrensrechtlich),  an  appeal court  (Revisionsgericht)  would
   examine  the impugned decision on the basis of the written  grounds
   of   appeal;   as   regards   any   substantive   complaints   (bei
   sachlichrechtlicher  Beanstandung), it  would  effect  of  its  own
   motion   a   review  that  was  not  subject  to  any  limitations.
   Furthermore,  on this occasion neither the facts of  the  case  nor
   the legal issues it raised justified the appointment requested.
       In  the objections (Gegenvorstellungen) he raised on 7 November
   1977, Mr. Rauschenbusch cited a judgment of 19 October 1977 of  the
   Federal  Constitutional  Court (see paragraph  22  below),  holding
   that,  in addition to the cases provided for by law, legal aid  had
   to  be  granted  for  hearings in appeals on  a  point  of  law  in
   "serious"  ("schwerwiegend")  cases if  the  person  concerned  was
   unable to pay a lawyer of his own choosing. And, he submitted,  Mr.
   Pakelli was in such a situation, for a final conviction would  lead
   to  his  expulsion. Mr. Rauschenbusch asked the  Federal  Court  to
   indicate  whether he should supply particulars of  the  applicant's
   assets  in  order to substantiate (glaubhaft machen)  the  latter's
   lack  of  means.  According to Mr. Rauschenbusch, Mr.  Pakelli  was
   obviously  (offensichtlich) not in a position to pay a  lawyer.  He
   had  come  to  the  Federal Republic as a migrant  worker  and  had
   returned  to  Turkey  after spending a long (laengeren)  period  in
   Heilbronn prison. It was evident that he had no savings.
       Mr.  Rauschenbusch requested that, if need be,  the  matter  be
   referred to the Chamber for decision.
       On  10  November, the President of the 1st Criminal Chamber  of
   the  Federal  Court confirmed his decision of 25  October  refusing
   the   application;  he  took  the  view  that  the  above-mentioned
   judgment  of  19  October  1977 did not concern  a  case  that  was
   comparable to the applicant's.
       17. The hearing was held on 29 November 1977, in the absence of
   the  applicant and of Mr. Rauschenbusch. According to the  minutes,
   the  Federal  Court heard the judge acting as rapporteur  and  then
   the  submissions  (Ausfuhrungen) of  an  official  of  the  Federal
   public  prosecutor's  office  (Bundesanwaltschaft)  in  favour   of
   rejecting  the  appeal. After deliberating in  private,  the  court
   gave on the same day judgment dismissing the appeal.
       The  judgment  held  firstly that the  appeal  was  admissible:
   Article  146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not prevent  Mr.
   Rauschenbusch  from  representing Mr. Pakelli  before  the  Federal
   Court.  On the other hand, that Article had not been complied  with
   at  first instance since Mr. Wingerter had previously defended  the
   applicant's accomplice. However, the Federal Court, referring to  a
   judgment  of  its  3rd Criminal Chamber (see paragraph  26  below),
   added  that an appeal on a point of law based on that Article could
   succeed  only if the representation of several accused by  one  and
   the   same  lawyer  proved  to  be  really  incompatible,  in   the
   circumstances of the case, with the duties of the defence.  And  on
   this  occasion  it  had not been established  that  there  was  any
   conflict of interests.
       The   Federal  Court  then  rejected  the  remainder   of   the
   complaints:  some were examined in detail and held  to  be  without
   foundation and the others were considered more briefly and held  to
   be manifestly ill-founded.
       The  judgment, which was ten pages in length, was served on Mr.
   Rauschenbusch on 21 December 1977.
       18.  In  January 1978, Mr. Wingerter lodged an appeal with  the
   Federal  Constitutional Court. Alleging a violation of Articles  1,
   2,  3,  6,  20  and 103 para. 1 of the Basic Law, he  repeated  the
   submissions  made  by  his colleague Mr. Rauschenbusch  before  the
   Federal  Court  on  7 November 1977 (see paragraph  16  above).  He
   argued  that it was only through a defence counsel that Mr. Pakelli
   could  have availed himself of his right to be heard: he  lived  in
   Turkey,  lacked financial resources and had an insufficient command
   of   German.   In   addition,  the  legal  issues   involved   were
   particularly  complex, as was shown by the length of  the  memorial
   setting out the grounds of appeal (see paragraph 13 above) and  the
   Federal  Court's  decision to hold a hearing.  Mr.  Pakelli  should
   therefore have been given the opportunity of stating his  views  on
   the  submissions of the Federal public prosecutor's office.  Again,
   the  consequences of an unfavourable judgment would have been  such
   as  to make the official appointment of a lawyer essential: for the
   applicant,  dismissal of the appeal meant his  undoing  in  Germany
   and the breakdown of his marriage and family life.
       Mr.  Wingerter, who requested that legal aid be granted to  the
   applicant,  asked the Constitutional Court to indicate  whether  he
   should  supply  particulars  of his client's  assets  in  order  to
   substantiate (glaubhaft machen) the latter's lack of means.
       In  a  ruling given on 10 May 1978 by a panel of three  judges,
   the  Constitutional Court decided not to hear  the  appeal  on  the
   ground  that it did not offer sufficient prospects of success.  The
   Constitutional  Court found nothing arbitrary in  the  decision  of
   the  President  of the 1st Criminal Chamber of the  Federal  Court.
   Moreover,  the  case was not "serious", within the meaning  of  the
   above-mentioned  judgment of 19 October  1977  (see  paragraphs  16
   above  and  22 below). Finally, Mr. Pakelli could have remained  in
   the  Federal  Republic of Germany and attended the  hearing  before
   the   Federal  Court,  if  need  be  with  the  assistance  of   an
   interpreter.
       19. After his arrest on 7 May 1974, Mr. Pakelli had remained in
   custody  until  10 August 1976, partly in detention on  remand  and
   partly to serve sentences that had been imposed on him.
   
                       II. Relevant legislation
   
                    1. Officially appointed lawyers
   
       20.  If the accused has not chosen a defence counsel, the trial
   court  will  appoint one in the following cases (listed in  Article
   140 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure):
       -  the  trial at first instance is before the Court  of  Appeal
   (Oberlandesgericht) or the Regional Court;
       -   the   accused   is  charged  with  an  indictable   offence
   (Verbrechen);
       -  the proceedings may result in the accused's being prohibited
   from exercising a profession;
       - the accused is deaf or dumb;
       -  the  accused has been interned for at least three months  by
   order or with the approval of a court and has not been released  at
   least two weeks before the opening of the trial;
       -  the  question arises whether the accused should be  detained
   for mental examination;
       -   the   case   concerns   preventive  detention   proceedings
   (Sicherungsverfahren);
       -  a  decision has been taken prohibiting the previous  defence
   counsel from taking part in the proceedings.
       An  appointment will also be made in other cases, either by the
   court  of  its own motion or at the accused's request,  if  such  a
   step appears necessary on account of the seriousness of the act  in
   question, the factual or legal complexity of the case, or if it  is
   obvious  that  the accused cannot conduct his own defence  (Article
   140 para. 2).
       21.  The  official appointment of a lawyer by the  trial  court
   covers  not  only the proceedings before that court  but  also  the
   written  stage  of any appeal on a point of law. If necessary,  the
   trial court will make a special appointment for the latter stage.
       22. An accused (Angeklagter) who is in custody does not have an
   enforceable  right to attend hearings in an appeal on  a  point  of
   law  -  whether  before  the  appeal court  or  the  Federal  Court
   (Articles    121    and    135   of    the    Judicial    Code    -
   Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) -, but he may be represented thereat  by
   a  lawyer (Article 350 para. 2). If he has not chosen a lawyer  and
   is  not  brought to the hearing, the President of the court  having
   jurisdiction  will  appoint one for him if he so requests  (Article
   350 para. 3).
       An  accused  who  is  at liberty may appear  in  person  or  be
   represented  by a lawyer at the appeal hearing (Article  350  para.
   2).  According  to  the  case-law of  the  Federal  Court,  defence
   counsel can be assigned to him only under Article 140 para. 2  (see
   paragraph  20 above), since Article 140 para. 1 does not  apply  to
   hearings  in  an  appeal  on  a point of  law  (Entscheidungen  des
   Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen, vol. 19, pp. 258 - 263).
       Furthermore,  the Federal Constitutional Court  has  held  that
   defence  counsel is to be appointed by the court of its own  motion
   and  at  the  expense of the State in serious cases (schwerwiegende
   {Falle})  if  the  accused  cannot pay for  a  lawyer  of  his  own
   choosing  (Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts,  vol.  46,
   pp. 202 - 213).
   
                2. Hearings in appeals on points of law
   
       23. The court concerned may dispose of an appeal on a point  of
   law without hearings in the following cases only:
       -  where it finds the appeal inadmissible (Article 349 para.  1
   of the Code of Criminal Procedure);
       -  where,  on a reasoned application by the public prosecutor's
   office,  the  court  considers  unanimously  that  the  appeal   is
   manifestly ill-founded (Article 349 para. 2); and
       - where the court finds unanimously that an appeal filed in the
   interests of the accused is well-founded (Article 349 para. 4).
       In  all  other  cases the court has to hold  a  hearing  before
   taking  its  decision  (Article 349 para. 5);  before  the  Federal
   Court,  there are hearings in only ten per cent of the  appeals  on
   points of law lodged in criminal cases.
       When the public prosecutor's office applies for an appeal to be
   rejected  as  manifestly  ill-founded, it has  to  communicate  its
   submissions and the reasons to the appellant; the latter  may  file
   a reply within two weeks (Article 349 para. 3).
       24.  Article  350  para. 1 requires that the  accused  and  his
   lawyer be informed of the date and place of the hearing; if  it  is
   not  possible to contact the former, notification to the latter  is
   sufficient.
       25. Appeal hearings open with the rapporteur's address; this is
   followed   by  the  statements  and  submissions  of   the   public
   prosecutor's  office,  the  accused and his  defence  counsel.  The
   appellant  is  heard first and the last address  to  the  court  is
   always made by the accused (Article 351).
   
                      3. "Common defence counsel"
                   (gemeinschaftliche Verteidigung)
   
       26.  According to the former version of Article 146 of the Code
   of  Criminal Procedure, which was in force until 31 December  1974,
   several  accused could be represented by a single counsel  if  this
   was  not contrary to the interests of the defence. As it was  often
   difficult  for  courts  to detect or establish  such  conflicts  of
   interests,  Article 146 was modified in 1974: the new  text,  which
   has  been  applicable since 1 January 1975, does not allow  several
   accused to be defended by a common defence counsel.
       However,  the Federal Court (3rd Criminal Chamber) held  on  27
   February  and  13 October 1976 that an appeal on  a  point  of  law
   based  on a violation of Article 146 could succeed only if recourse
   to  a  common defence counsel was in fact contrary to the interests
   of   the   defence   (Entscheidungen  des  Bundesgerichtshofes   in
   Strafsachen,  vol. 26, pp. 291 - 298; vol. 27, pp. 22  -  24).  The
   1st  Criminal Chamber followed these precedents in its judgment  of
   29  November 1977 in the present case (see paragraph 17 above). The
   Government stated that this interpretation has since been  accepted
   by all the Criminal Chambers of the Federal Court.
   
                   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
   
       27.  In his application lodged with the Commission on 5 October
   1978  (no.  8398/78), Mr. Pakelli claimed to be  the  victim  of  a
   violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of  the
   Convention.  He  alleged that he had lacked the means  to  pay  for
   defence  counsel  of  his own choosing and that  the  interests  of
   justice  required  that  a lawyer should  have  been  appointed  to
   represent  him  at the hearing before the Federal  Court.  He  also
   asserted  that  he  had  not been able to  return  to  the  Federal
   Republic  of Germany to present his own case, since he had  neither
   a residence permit nor the necessary money to pay an interpreter.
       On  16  May 1980, the Commission granted Mr. Pakelli free legal
   aid  on the basis of a declaration of means dated 9 September  1979
   and confirmed by certificates from the competent authorities.
       On   7  May  1981,  the  Commission  declared  the  application
   admissible  in  so  far  as  it related to  the  rejection  of  the
   applicant's request that a lawyer be officially appointed  for  the
   hearing  before the Federal Court; it declared the other complaints
   inadmissible  on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic  remedies
   (Articles  26  and  27  para.  3  (art.  26,  art.  27-3)  of   the
   Convention).
       In  its report of 12 December 1981 (Article 31), the Commission
   expressed  the unanimous opinion that the applicant  had  been  the
   victim  of  a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c)  and,
   by  eleven  votes  to  one, that it was not required  to  determine
   whether  there had also been breach of the right to a  fair  trial,
   within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
   
         FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT
   
       28.  At  the  close  of the hearings of 25 November  1982,  the
   Government  invited the Court "to hold that there has  not  been  a
   violation  of Article 6 paras. 3 (c) and 1 (art. 6-3-c,  art.  6-1)
   of the Convention in the applicant's case".
   
                             AS TO THE LAW
   
       29.  The  applicant complained of the refusal  of  the  Federal
   Court,  in  proceedings  concerning an  appeal  on  points  of  law
   (Revision),  to  appoint  Mr.  Rauschenbusch  as  official  defence
   counsel for the hearings of 29 November 1977 before that court;  he
   alleged that this constituted a violation of paragraph 3 (c)  (art.
   6-3-c),  and  also of paragraph 1, of Article 6 (art. 6-1)  of  the
   Convention.
       It  was  not disputed that these provisions were applicable  in
   the  present  case  and the Court takes this point  as  established
   (see,  mutatis mutandis, the Delcourt judgment of 17 January  1970,
   Series  A  no.  11, pp. 13 - 15, paras. 25 and 26, and  the  Artico
   judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, pp. 15 - 18, paras. 31  -
   38). However, as the Government rightly pointed out, the manner  in
   which  those  paragraphs are to be applied depends on  the  special
   features  of  the  proceedings involved  (see  the  above-mentioned
   Delcourt judgment, ibid.).
   
                       I. The alleged violation
                 of article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c)
   
       30. Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) reads as follows:
       "Everyone  charged  with a criminal offence has  the  following
   minimum rights:
       ...
       (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance  of
   his  own  choosing or, if he has not sufficient means  to  pay  for
   legal  assistance,  to  be  given it free  when  the  interests  of
   justice so require;
       ..."
       Before  the  Commission, the Government argued that  Article  6
   para.  3  (c) (art. 6-3-c) did not require the grant of free  legal
   assistance  in  the  present  case since  Mr.  Pakelli  could  have
   appeared  in  person at the Federal Court's hearing. Although  they
   did  not  dwell on this point before the Court, they repeated  that
   the  applicant  could have presented his own case  to  the  Federal
   Court.
       31.  Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) guarantees three rights
   to  a person charged with a criminal offence: to defend himself  in
   person,  to  defend  himself through legal assistance  of  his  own
   choosing  and, on certain conditions, to be given legal  assistance
   free. To link the corresponding phrases together, the English  text
   employs on each occasion the disjunctive "or"; the French text,  on
   the  other hand, utilises the equivalent - "ou" - only between  the
   phrases  enouncing the first and the second right;  thereafter,  it
   uses  the  conjunctive "et". The "travaux {preparatoires}"  contain
   hardly  any explanation of this linguistic difference. They  reveal
   solely  that  in  the course of a final examination  of  the  draft
   Convention,  on  the eve of its signature, a Committee  of  Experts
   made  "a  certain number of formal corrections and  corrections  of
   translation",  including the replacement of "and" by  "or"  in  the
   English  version  of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c)  (Collected
   Edition  of  the  "Travaux {preparatoires}",  vol.  IV,  p.  1010).
   Having  regard  to the object and purpose of this paragraph,  which
   is  designed  to ensure effective protection of the rights  of  the
   defence (see the above-mentioned Artico judgment, Series A no.  37,
   p.  16, para. 33; see also, mutatis mutandis, the Adolf judgment of
   26  March  1982, Series A no. 49, p. 15, para. 30, and  the  Sunday
   Times  judgment  of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30,  p.  30,  para.
   48),  the  French  text here provides more reliable  guidance;  the
   Court  concurs  with the Commission on this point.  Accordingly,  a
   "person  charged  with a criminal offence" who  does  not  wish  to
   defend  himself  in person must be able to have recourse  to  legal
   assistance  of  his  own choosing; if he does not  have  sufficient
   means  to  pay  for  such  assistance, he  is  entitled  under  the
   Convention  to  be given it free when the interests of  justice  so
   require.
       Thus  Mr. Pakelli, although authorised by German law to  appear
   in  person before the Federal Court, could claim such assistance to
   the  extent that the conditions laid down by Article 6 para. 3  (c)
   (art. 6-3-c) were satisfied.
   
                       A. Absence of sufficient
                   means to pay for legal assistance
   
       32.  The  Government argued as follows. There  was  nothing  to
   substantiate  the  applicant's  assertion  that  he  did  not  have
   sufficient  means to pay for legal assistance of his own  choosing;
   on  the  contrary, he had himself stated before the Regional  Court
   that  he  earned  a  very good income in the  Federal  Republic  of
   Germany; according to the findings contained in the judgment of  30
   April  1976 (see paragraph 11 above), he also made money  from  his
   drug  traffic  activities; in addition, he had  opened  a  business
   shortly after returning to Turkey.
       The Commission considered that the Government were not entitled
   at  this  stage to challenge the applicant's assertions. It pointed
   out  firstly  that  under  German  law  the  grant  of  free  legal
   assistance was not conditional on the indigence of the litigant  in
   question;  secondly,  Mr.  Rauschenbusch  had  offered  before  the
   hearings  to  supply a certificate of indigence (see  paragraph  16
   above), but the Federal Court did not accept this offer.
       33.  The  Court is unable to agree with the Commission on  this
   point.  The question of Mr. Pakelli's means played no part  in  the
   decision  complained  of:  the  refusal  of  the  request  for  the
   appointment  of  Mr.  Rauschenbusch was based solely  on  the  fact
   that,  in the opinion of the President of the 1st Criminal  Chamber
   of  the Federal Court, the case did not fall within the category of
   cases  for which German law prescribed the assistance of a  defence
   counsel  (see  paragraph  16  above). Accordingly,  the  Government
   cannot  be  held  to have lost their entitlement to contest  before
   the  Convention institutions, in the context of Article 6  para.  3
   (c) (art. 6-3-c), the applicant's claim that he was indigent.
       34.  It  has nevertheless to be recognised, as was done by  the
   Commission's Delegate, that it is in practice impossible  to  prove
   today  that in 1977 Mr. Pakelli did not have the means to  pay  his
   lawyer.  However,  there are some indications  that  this  was  so.
   Thus,  there  is no reason to suppose that Mr. Rauschenbusch  would
   have  been  unable  to obtain the above-mentioned  certificate;  in
   this  connection, it has to be noted that his client had spent  two
   years  in  custody  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  before
   returning  to Turkey in 1976 (see paragraphs 15 and 19  above).  In
   addition,  Mr.  Pakelli  supplied  to  the  Commission  in  1979  a
   statement  of  means  and certificates from the  competent  Turkish
   authorities,  the latter being based on the declaration  of  assets
   and  income  which he had made for tax purposes the previous  year;
   it  appeared  from these documents that he was engaged in  business
   on  a  small  scale  and that his financial situation  was  modest.
   These  data  - which, moreover, were not disputed by the Government
   -  led the Commission to grant him free legal aid (see paragraph 27
   above).
       Admittedly,  these  particulars are  not  sufficient  to  prove
   beyond  all  doubt that the applicant was indigent at the  relevant
   time;  however, having regard to his offer to the Federal Court  to
   prove his lack of means and in the absence of clear indications  to
   the  contrary, they lead the Court to regard the first of  the  two
   conditions  contained  in Article 6 para. 3  (c)  (art.  6-3-c)  as
   satisfied.
   
                      B. The interests of justice
   
       35.   According  to  the  applicant  and  the  Commission,  the
   interests  of justice required that Mr. Rauschenbusch be officially
   appointed  as  the  applicant's  lawyer  for  the  hearings  of  29
   November 1977 before the Federal Court.
       In  contesting  this  view, the Government made  the  following
   points.  Mr.  Pakelli had had a defence counsel during the  written
   stage  of  the proceedings; as for the hearings, their  object  was
   circumscribed by the grounds of his appeal on points of law:  since
   he  was challenging the judgment of 30 April 1976 solely on account
   of   alleged  procedural  errors,  he  could  neither   raise   new
   complaints  nor supplement his memorial setting out the grounds  of
   appeal  by  referring  to  other  questions  of  fact.  Only  legal
   arguments and submissions could have been put to the court  at  the
   hearings.  The issues involved were not complicated  and  it  could
   not   be   said  that  their  determination  would  entail  serious
   consequences,  for  the  proceedings could  not  have  led  to  any
   aggravation  of the decision complained of. Moreover,  Mr.  Pakelli
   could  have  appeared  in  person.  Finally,  the  Commission   had
   misunderstood  the  role of the Federal public prosecutor's  office
   in  appeals on a point of law. That role consisted of examining the
   grounds of appeal from a completely independent standpoint and,  in
   particular,  of  ensuring that the law was  uniformly  applied  and
   that case-law remained consistent; it was thus very similar to  the
   role  of  the Procureur {general} attached to the Belgian Court  of
   Cassation (see the above-mentioned Delcourt judgment).
       36.  The Court notes firstly, as did the Commission, that  this
   was  one  of  the  rare  cases in which the Federal  Court  held  a
   hearing:  this  occurs in only ten per cent of  the  appeals  on  a
   point  of law in criminal cases (see paragraph 23 above). In  fact,
   on  the  present occasion the Federal Court was obliged to  arrange
   for  oral proceedings since the appeal proved to be admissible  and
   the  public  prosecutor's  office had not  applied  for  it  to  be
   rejected  as  manifestly ill-founded (Article 349 of  the  Code  of
   Criminal  Procedure; see paragraph 23 above). This shows  that  the
   hearing  could  have  been of importance for  the  decision  to  be
   given.  It  therefore became necessary, in order to ensure  a  fair
   trial,  to  comply with the rule that oral proceedings  shall  take
   place   with   the   participation   of   both   parties   ({debat}
   contradictoire).
       37.  It  is true that, since the applicant confined himself  to
   alleging that there had been procedural errors (Articles 344  para.
   2  and  352 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), the Federal
   Court  had  solely  to give a ruling on the grounds  which  he  had
   invoked  and later set out at length in his memorial (see paragraph
   13  above).  However, Mr. Pakelli would have  been  able,  had  his
   lawyer  appeared  before the court, to explain his  complaints,  to
   supply  further particulars thereof if need be and to  develop  his
   written  arguments.  He  would, for  example,  have  been  able  to
   comment  on  the statement made by the judge acting  as  rapporteur
   (Article  351  of the Code of Criminal Procedure; see paragraph  25
   above).  Such  possibilities of intervening in the  course  of  the
   proceedings  would  have  been all the more  valuable  because  the
   appeal,  itself a voluminous document, concerned nineteen different
   points.
       Again,  as  the  Commission rightly pointed  out,  one  of  the
   complaints  made related to the application of the new  version  of
   Article 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Admittedly, the  3rd
   Criminal  Chamber  of  the Federal Court had  already  decided,  in
   1976,  that an appeal on a point of law based on this Article could
   succeed  only if recourse to a common defence counsel had  in  fact
   been  contrary  to the interests of the defence (see  paragraph  26
   above).   Moreover,  Mr.  Rauschenbusch  did   not   contest   this
   interpretation. However, he endeavoured to demonstrate  that  there
   had  been a conflict of interests in the present case. In addition,
   it  could be predicted that the judgment that the Federal Court was
   going   to  deliver  would  not  be  without  importance  for   the
   development of case-law. The Government themselves stated that  the
   case-law on this point has remained constant since the judgment  of
   29   November   1977  dismissing  the  applicant's   appeal;   they
   recognised that oral argument on the interpretation of Article  146
   would have been of some value.
       38.  In  these circumstances, it goes without saying  that  the
   personal  appearance  of the appellant would not  have  compensated
   for  the  absence of his lawyer: without the services  of  a  legal
   practitioner,   Mr.   Pakelli  could  not  have   made   a   useful
   contribution  to the examination of the legal issues  arising,  and
   in  particular  the issue relating to Article 146 of  the  Code  of
   Criminal Procedure. The Court concurs with the Commission  on  this
   point.
       39.  Finally  and  above  all, the appeal  proceedings  in  the
   present  case  were  not conducted with the participation  of  both
   parties,  in  any event at the stage of the hearings.  Even  during
   the written phase, only the public prosecutor's office attached  to
   the  Heilbronn Regional Court replied to the appeal lodged  by  Mr.
   Pakelli,  who was then still represented by Mr. Rauschenbusch,  and
   it  made  no submissions on the merits of the grounds invoked  (see
   paragraph  14  above). As regards the Federal  public  prosecutor's
   office   -   and  irrespective  of  its  precise  role  in   appeal
   proceedings  -,  German law enabled the appellant  to  contest  its
   submissions   (Article  349  para.  3  of  the  Code  of   Criminal
   Procedure;  see  paragraph 23 above). Accordingly, if  the  Federal
   Court  had  not  decided  to  hold a hearing,  the  Federal  public
   prosecutor's  office  would have filed its submissions  in  writing
   and  communicated  them  to the applicant and  the  latter,  as  he
   rightly  pointed  out,  would  thus  have  had  an  opportunity  of
   studying them and, if need be, of replying thereto.
       This  opportunity of refuting the public prosecutor's  office's
   arguments should therefore have been made available to Mr.  Pakelli
   at  the  hearings also. By refusing to provide him with  a  defence
   counsel,  the Federal Court deprived him, during the oral stage  of
   the  proceedings, of the opportunity of influencing the outcome  of
   the  case,  a  possibility  that he would  have  retained  had  the
   proceedings been conducted entirely in writing.
       40.  In  these  circumstances, the Court, like the  Commission,
   considers  that  the  interests of justice  did  require  that  the
   applicant  be granted legal assistance for the hearings before  the
   Federal Court.
   
                             C. Conclusion
   
       41.  Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 6 para.
   3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) of the Convention.
   
                       II. The alleged violation
                    of article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
   
       42.  The  applicant also invoked, as regards  the  same  facts,
   paragraph 1 of Article 6 (art. 6-1), which reads as follows:
       "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
   any  criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled  to  a  fair
   and  public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent  and
   impartial   tribunal  established  by  law.   Judgment   shall   be
   pronounced  publicly but the press and public may be excluded  from
   all  or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public  order
   or  national security in a democratic society, where the  interests
   of  juveniles or the protection of the private life of the  parties
   so  require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion  of
   the  court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice
   the interests of justice."
       The  Government did not put forward any separate  arguments  on
   this issue.
       In company with the Commission, the Court would recall that the
   provisions  of  Article  6  para.  3  (c)  (art.  6-3-c)  represent
   specific  applications of the general principle of  a  fair  trial,
   stated  in  paragraph  1 (see the Deweer judgment  of  27  February
   1980,  Series A no. 35, p. 30, para. 56). Accordingly, the question
   whether   paragraph  1  (art.  6-1)  was  observed  has   no   real
   significance  in  the  applicant's case;  it  is  absorbed  by  the
   question  whether paragraph 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) was  complied  with.
   The  finding  of  a breach of the requirements of paragraph  3  (c)
   (art.  6-3-c) dispenses the Court from also examining the  case  in
   the  light  of  paragraph 1 (art. 6-1) (see, mutatis mutandis,  the
   above-mentioned  Deweer judgment, Series A no. 35,  pp.  30  -  31,
   para. 56).
   
             III. The application of article 50 (art. 50)
   
       43. Mr. Pakelli sought just satisfaction under Article 50 (art.
   50).  In  the  first  place, he requested the Court  to  annul  the
   Federal  Court's  judgment of 29 November 1977 and  to  direct  the
   Government  to  issue an official disapproval of  certain  passages
   therein,  which  he  regarded  as  racist  or  discriminatory   and
   therefore   unacceptable.  In  the  second  place,  he  asked   for
   compensation  of such amount as the Court considered  fit  for  his
   alleged  non-pecuniary loss. Finally, he claimed  reimbursement  of
   the  costs  and  expenses  entailed by the proceedings  before  the
   Federal Constitutional Court, which he quantified at DM 668.96.
       44.  The Government submitted that these various claims  should
   be  rejected.  They  maintained that the  applicant  had  not  been
   prejudiced in any way by the Federal Court's refusal to  appoint  a
   lawyer  for  him officially and that his criticisms of the  reasons
   for  that  court's decision were unwarranted. As regards the  costs
   and  expenses  of the proceedings before the Constitutional  Court,
   the  Government  contended  that it was not  established  that  Mr.
   Pakelli  had  had  to bear them; they also stated that  the  amount
   claimed did not exactly correspond to the scale applicable  at  the
   relevant time.
       45.  The Court considers that in the circumstances the question
   is  ready  for  decision (Rule 50 para. 3, first sentence,  of  the
   Rules of Court).
       The  Court  notes, as regards the first claim, that it  is  not
   empowered under the Convention either to annul the Federal  Court's
   judgment  or  to  direct  the Government to  disavow  the  passages
   complained  of  (see, mutatis mutandis, the Marckx judgment  of  13
   June  1979,  Series  A  no. 31, p. 25, para. 58,  and  the  Dudgeon
   judgment  of  24 February 1983, Series A no. 59, p. 8,  para.  15).
   Without  expressing  any opinion on those passages,  it  adds  that
   they  cannot  be  regarded  as the consequence  of  the  breach  of
   Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c).
       46.  As  the Government rightly pointed out, Mr. Wingerter  has
   neither  established  the  existence of the  alleged  non-pecuniary
   loss  nor  even indicated the nature thereof. There is  nothing  to
   show that the absence of a defence counsel left Mr. Pakelli with  a
   distressing sensation of isolation, confusion and neglect (see  the
   above-mentioned  Artico judgment, Series A no.  37,  p.  21,  para.
   47);  in fact, this seems unlikely since he had returned to  Turkey
   as  early as the month of August 1976. In any event, the finding of
   a  violation,  contained  in  the  present  judgment,  has  already
   furnished  sufficient  redress for the alleged  non-pecuniary  loss
   (see,  mutatis  mutandis, the Le Compte, Van Leuven and  De  Meyere
   judgment of 18 October 1982, Series A no. 54, p. 8, para. 16).
       47. The costs and expenses whose reimbursement was claimed were
   incurred in order to try to have the breach of the requirements  of
   Article  6  para.  3  (c)  (art. 6-3-c) rectified  by  the  Federal
   Constitutional  Court  (see the above-mentioned  Dudgeon  judgment,
   Series  A no. 59, p. 9, para. 20). Moreover, this was not contested
   by  the Government. However, they claimed that these items had been
   disbursed  by  the  applicant's counsel and not  by  the  applicant
   himself,  since  Mr.  Wingerter  had  waived  repayment   and   was
   moreover,  on  account of statutory limitation, no longer  entitled
   to recover the debt due to him.
       In  fact,  Mr.  Pakelli  has not so far  paid  his  lawyer  for
   representing  him  before  the Federal  Constitutional  Court:  Mr.
   Wingerter  did  not send him a note of his fees  until  7  February
   1982  and  he  stated that it would be in order to  defer  payment,
   having  regard  to  the applicant's financial  difficulties.  In  a
   memorial  of 16 June 1980 filed with the Commission, Mr.  Wingerter
   had  pointed  out  that he had not yet received any  fees  for  the
   proceedings  in question and that he had not asked  for  any  ("ein
   Honorar gar nicht erst gefordert") since he knew his client  to  be
   without means.
       Nevertheless, neither these statements nor the other  documents
   before the Court show sufficiently clearly that there has been  any
   waiver.  Indeed, as the Commission's Delegate rightly pointed  out,
   it  is  not  surprising  that Mr. Wingerter, knowing  his  client's
   financial  circumstances, decided not to send him  a  note  of  his
   fees  at  an earlier date (see the X v. the United Kingdom judgment
   of  18  October 1982, Series A no. 55, p. 18, para. 24). The  Court
   would  here point out, as did the Delegate, that in a human  rights
   case  a  lawyer will be acting in the general interest if he agrees
   to  represent or assist a litigant even if the latter is not  in  a
   position to pay him immediately.
       As  regards  the argument based on the statutory limitation  of
   Mr.  Wingerter's right to recover the debt due to him, this is  not
   a  matter  of  public policy and could be relied  on  only  by  Mr.
   Pakelli himself.
       Deciding on an equitable basis, the Court finds that the sum of
   DM 668.96 claimed for fees and expenses is reasonable.
   
               FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
   
       1.  Holds that there has been a violation of paragraph 3 (c) of
   Article 6 of the Convention (art. 6-3-c);
       2.  Holds  that  it is not necessary also to examine  the  case
   under paragraph 1 of Article 6 (art. 6-1);
       3.  Holds that the respondent State is to pay to the applicant,
   in  respect of legal costs and expenses, the sum of six hundred and
   sixty-eight  German marks and ninety-six pfennigs (DM  668.96)  and
   rejects the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.
   
       Done in English and in French, the French text being authentic,
   at  the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, this twenty-fifth day of
   April, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-three.
   
                                               Signed: {Gerard WIARDA}
                                                             President
   
                                           Signed: {Marc-Andre EISSEN}
                                                             Registrar